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Abstract 
Goodwill has been in the focus of interest of academics and practitioners for many years now. 
Research interest has been fuelled by its discretionary nature, the large amounts of its write-
downs combined with adverse impact potential on financial statements and loopholes in 
accounting regulations.  
This thesis includes three empirical essays on the causes and impact of goodwill impairment 
write-downs. Its overall objective is to provide a more insightful and comprehensive 
understanding of the goodwill impairment process. 
The first empirical essay explores the role of goodwill write-downs in the rating assessment 
process. It aims to uncover rating agencies’ perception of goodwill using an accounting 
predictive model on ex post basis and comparing accounting treatments of goodwill as 
currently or recently applicable under UK GAAP. Results suggest that raters ignore goodwill 
and its write-downs in their annual rating analyses. While this evidence is consistent with pre-
FRS 10 business reality in the UK, it raises questions about the efficiency of impairment 
regulations on national and international level. 
The second empirical essay investigates managerial choices related to goodwill impairment in 
the UK. Findings suggest that while managers are likely to base the decision whether to impair 
goodwill on financial performance indicators, they might adjust the amount of the impairment 
charge at their discretion for reporting purposes. 
The third empirical essay investigates two of the drivers of financial performance (industrial 
regulation and competition) and their relation to goodwill using a case study approach. The 
evidence suggests that these two phenomena could provide an early warning indicator to 
regulators, auditors and financial statement users about goodwill impairment potential of the 
individual firm or an industry sector. Furthermore, the room for managerial discretion 
provided by the discount rates in the impairment calculation is explored. Results show that 
discount rates can be adjusted using commonly accepted parameters in practice to justify a 
wide range of discount rates and, consequently, a variety of impairment opportunities at the 
discretion of management. 
 12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Intangible assets have been in the centre of attention of the academic and non-
academic communities for quite some years now. The reason for this considerable 
interest lies in their increasing importance in world economy ever since the 1980s as a 
result of the rapid development of information technologies combined with the 
phenomena of globalisation and deregulation (Lev, 2001). 
Intangible assets create value without possessing physical substance. Their key 
characteristics distinguishing them from tangible assets – non-rivalry and (positive) 
network effects – present investors with natural opportunities to outperform the 
competition. However, it is that very nature that also makes them difficult to protect in 
the new environment and to ensure that benefits flowing from them are being 
exclusively used by their owners. Due to non-excludability (or, at best, partial 
excludability), spillovers through imitation, lack of active markets and higher risk 
compared to other assets, the benefits from intangible assets are far from being 
transparent and unambiguous (Lev, 2001). These unique double-sided characteristics 
motivate increasingly research in this area. 
1.2 FOCUS OF THESIS AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
This PhD-thesis concentrates on one specific aspect of intangible asset accounting: 
goodwill impairment. Goodwill accounting has been a very difficult and controversial 
topic for a long time now (even compared to accounting for other intangibles which 
have also been largely discussed in research and in practice) and has constantly been 
altered, at least for the last 15-20 years. Goodwill has been and remains a major 
discussion topic among standard setters, academics and practitioners. Numerous 
studies have already been undertaken in this area over the years in an attempt to 
explain the nature of goodwill (for example Walker, 1938; Emery, 1951; Miller, 1973; 
Barlev, 1973; Ma & Hopkins, 1988), its components (for example Chauvin & 
Hirschey, 1994; Johnson & Petrone, 1998; Henning et al, 2000; Churyk, 2001), its 
measurement (for example Emery, 1951; Miller, 1973; Barlev, 1973), how investors 
react to it (for example Hirschey & Richardson, 2002, 2003; Long, 2005, etc.) and 
whether it is value-relevant (for example Chauvin & Hirschey, 1994; McCarthy & 
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Schneider, 1995; Jennings et al, 1996; Wang, 2003; Li & Meeks, 2006). However, 
despite all the research, there are still problems to be solved, or new questions to be 
answered: for instance although investor reaction to goodwill write-downs is well 
researched, the importance of goodwill for other market participants such as lenders or 
information providers such as rating agencies has been scarcely investigated so far. 
Another reason why goodwill accounting is of considerable interest to the public is 
because goodwill regulations traditionally involve a substantial amount of flexibility 
which provides ample opportunities for managerial discretion (for example Francis et 
al, 1996; Segal, 2003; Sellhorn, 2004). Standard setters have continuously been trying 
to eliminate or at least reduce this flexibility: in the UK the Accounting Standards 
Board (hereafter referred to as ‘ASB’) introduced in 1997 Financial Reporting 
Standard 10 ‘Goodwill and Intangible Assets’ (hereafter referred to as ‘FRS 10’) 
requiring capitalisation of goodwill (previously the Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice No. 22 ‘Accounting for Goodwill’ (hereafter referred to as ‘SSAP 22’) had 
offered a choice between capitalising goodwill and writing it off directly against equity 
but very few firms chose to capitalise it); in the US the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (hereafter referred to as ‘FASB’) eliminated goodwill amortisation in 
2001 and introduced the annual impairment test in the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 142 ‘Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets’ (hereafter 
referred to as ‘SFAS 142’) in the hope that it will reflect better the economic depletion 
of goodwill; and the International Accounting Standards Board (hereafter referred to as 
‘IASB’) followed FASB’s lead and adopted IFRS 3 ‘Business Combinations’ 
(hereafter referred to as ‘IFRS 3’), IAS 38 ‘Intangible Assets’ (hereafter referred to as 
‘IAS 38’) and IAS 36 ‘Impairment of Assets’ (hereafter referred to as ‘IAS 36’) in 
2004 (IFRS 3 was revisited and further adjusted in 2008). Since some of these 
regulations are still relatively new and, more importantly, have a different impact in 
different countries depending on what prior local Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice (hereafter referred to as ‘GAAP’) standards required, many issues arise 
concentrating on the regulatory efficiency and managerial choices concerning goodwill 
accounting. Some of these are discussed in this research. 
This thesis includes three empirical essays on various aspects of goodwill impairment: 
the role of goodwill write-downs in the credit rating decision process; managerial 
choices on goodwill accounting in the UK; and, drivers of economic performance and 
their relation to goodwill impairment as well as potential sources of managerial 
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manipulation in the goodwill impairment calculation. These issues are briefly outlined 
in the following paragraphs. 
The first empirical essay (chapter 4) explores the impact of goodwill write-downs. 
Unlike most of prior research (see literature review in chapter 2), the influence of 
goodwill write-downs on investors is not investigated. Instead, the study concentrates 
on the debt side of the market exploring the importance of goodwill write-downs for 
information providers such as rating agencies. In times when information is a valuable 
and expensive commodity rating agencies reduce costs for capital market participants 
by providing information on a timely basis and at (comparatively) low cost and, 
therefore, allowing efficient worldwide comparison between companies. However, the 
process of reaching a credit rating is to a great extent publicly unavailable, although it 
is clear that accounting information plays an important role in the credit rating 
calculation (S&P, 2005). In this context, considering their sometimes substantial 
amounts, goodwill write-downs are particularly interesting. Intuitively, since goodwill 
write-downs affect the income statement and the balance sheet, their amounts are 
usually large, and might provide signals about the financial welfare of the company or 
the quality of management, it seems logical that they might be incorporated at least to 
some extent in the rating decision making process. Additionally, under current UK 
GAAP (FRS 10 and FRS 11 ‘Impairment of Fixed Assets and Goodwill’ (hereafter 
referred to as ‘FRS 11’)) different accounting treatments for goodwill are permitted, 
each of which might lead to a different perception by rating agencies of goodwill 
write-down amounts in the accounts. Therefore, the study investigates whether 
goodwill write-downs are taken into consideration in the rating decision making 
process. Furthermore, the researcher tests whether different accounting treatments for 
goodwill – impairment, amortisation or immediate write-off against equity – lead to 
different degrees of accuracy in the prediction of the rating calculation. For this 
purpose a predictive accounting model based on financial ratios is used. However, the 
actual prediction of credit ratings is not the purpose of the study but rather a test on an 
ex post basis of the importance of differing goodwill accounting treatments for the 
credit rating calculation. 
The second part of this research (chapter 5) is motivated by the UK regulatory 
framework for goodwill accounting available until 2005 for listed companies and 
presently for non-listed companies in the UK. FRS 10 prescribes systematic 
amortisation over the expected useful life as treatment after initial recognition for 
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intangible assets with definite useful lives and annual impairment testing if the useful 
life of the intangible asset is deemed to be indefinite (FRS 10, paras. 15 and 17). In the 
case of goodwill this regulation leads to a de facto choice between systematic 
amortisation and impairment testing since both definite and indefinite useful life can 
be argued for. Therefore, it is possible that managers choose the accounting treatment 
for the subsequent valuation of goodwill depending on their own reporting incentives 
rather than based on the wish to reflect the economic depletion of goodwill correctly. 
Additionally, since it is possible to change between amortisation and impairment in the 
course of time (FRS 10, para. 33), or to conduct additional impairment beyond regular 
amortisation charges when needed (FRS 10, para. 34 (b)), room for managerial 
discretion and opportunistic behaviour increases even further. In this context chapter 5 
investigates the managerial motivation behind goodwill impairment losses undertaken 
additionally to the regular amortisation charge. The purpose of the study is not only to 
investigate causes for goodwill write-downs under UK GAAP but also to provide an 
initial indication of the likely influences on goodwill impairment under IFRS 3 and 
IAS 36. At a time when the data for a direct investigation of IFRS 3 and IAS 36 are 
still limited, it is hoped to bring some insight into the likely efficiency of these 
standards in restricting managerial discretion by providing evidence from UK goodwill 
accounting which operates under a regime with a comparatively lax regulatory 
environment. Finally, in an attempt to improve understanding of the causes of goodwill 
impairment further the research question is split into an investigation of the reasons 
behind the decision to impair goodwill (the ‘If’ question) and of the parameters 
influencing the amount of the goodwill impairment charge (the ‘How Much’ question). 
The third part of the thesis (chapter 6) elaborates on and extends the results of the 
second empirical study (chapter 5). The first two empirical essays produce results 
based on purely quantitative measures and methodology. The final study represents an 
exploratory attempt to look behind these numbers and uncover new aspects of the 
goodwill accounting impairment process (the ‘Why’ and the ‘How’ questions). For this 
purpose, the study is split into two sections: first, it concentrates on the some of the 
drivers of economic performance and their impact on goodwill impairment. While 
previous research has focused on outcomes of economic performance as appropriate 
regressors for goodwill impairment research, this study looks at two of the underlying 
drivers of economic performance – industrial regulation and competition. The 
investigation is based on qualitative techniques including extensive document research. 
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The analysis uses a case study approach. The second part of the study concentrates on 
potential sources for managerial discretion in the goodwill impairment calculation 
which might influence the amount of the goodwill impairment charge. More 
specifically, the discount rates used in the impairment calculation are analysed to 
illustrate and research the discretionary opportunities available to management. In this 
context, the quality of impairment disclosures is also discussed. 
1.3 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The main contributions of each study are summarised as follows: 
The impact of goodwill write-downs on credit ratings (chapter 4) 
• This study targets the role of goodwill accounting in the rating decision process 
which has mostly been ignored in prior academic investigations. While research 
has mainly concentrated on the implications of goodwill impairment for 
shareholders, this study focuses on the debt side of the market and, in particular, 
the rating agencies’ view of goodwill impairment. 
• The research question is tested using a methodology (an accounting predictive 
model on an ex post basis) that has not been used in relation to goodwill in prior 
research. 
Causes of the managerial choice of impairment in addition to or in place of 
systematic amortisation of goodwill (chapter 5) 
• Existing research is extended by differentiating between ‘If’ and ‘How Much’ 
questions of goodwill impairment outside of a transitional regulatory setting. Thus, 
the influence of economic performance variables and reporting incentive measures 
on the decision to conduct goodwill impairment and on the decision regarding the 
amount of the impairment charge is investigated separately. 
• UK GAAP provides a unique framework for this study by allowing both 
systematic amortisation and annual impairment testing. Such regulatory 
environment provides a different basis for the exploration of managerial incentives 
than the stricter regulations under US GAAP and IFRS and might allow a deeper 
insight into goodwill write-down motivation. 
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• By focusing on UK companies and on goodwill write-downs, this study differs 
from prior research, which largely investigates US companies and more broadly 
defined asset write-downs, or, when it does specifically investigate goodwill, 
write-downs conducted under the transitional requirements of a new accounting 
standard (SFAS 142). 
Sources of goodwill impairment (chapter 6) 
• The research questions in this chapter are explored using a methodology which – 
while being a well established method of research – is relatively new to goodwill 
impairment research. The exploratory study approach aims to look behind the 
numbers and individualise the analysis of two companies in the form of case 
studies. This qualitative methodology allows the collection of information which is 
usually overlooked in data samples for purely quantitative studies. Furthermore, 
the combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques for the investigation of 
the discount rates allows the illustration of manipulation opportunities for 
management in the goodwill impairment calculation.  
• This study explores the drivers of economic performance rather than their 
outcomes which are usually tested in relation to goodwill impairment in previous 
research. By shifting the focus of the investigation this study attempts to uncover 
new drivers that can affect the goodwill impairment decision which could be of 
interest to parties such as financial statement users, auditors and standard setters, 
and to provide impulses for future research in the area of goodwill impairment. 
This purpose is highlighted by the case study approach used for the investigation. 
• Concentrating on the impairment calculation the study explores sources which can 
be used for managerial discretion purposes and illustrates the room for 
discretionary behaviour made available to managers by the lack regulatory detail 
on impairment disclosures and, more specifically, on discount rates.  
1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The PhD-thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 provides background information, 
an overview of the focus of the thesis, the areas of research and the main contributions. 
Chapter 2 includes information on the relevant financial reporting regulations on 
goodwill and a literature review on the causes and impact of goodwill write-downs. 
 18 
The purpose of the literature review is to provide a broad overview on existing 
research, illustrate gaps in the literature, locate the need for future research, and, 
finally, highlight the areas of research in the focus of the thesis and specify the 
research questions. Chapter 3 concentrates on the research design and the methodology 
for the separate empirical studies. Additionally, the sample set is specified as well as 
the database sources for the data needed in the models. Chapters 4 to 6 include the 
results of the three empirical studies and their interpretation. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND: 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW  
The purpose of financial statements is to provide information about the economic state 
of an asset (or liability, or equity, or a company as a whole) to the users of the financial 
statements in a timely manner.1 In this context empirical research aims to discover 
whether accounting regulations live up to expectations and succeed in achieving this 
goal. Researchers explore this issue mostly in two ways: they test different aspects of 
the efficiency of current, past or newly introduced regulations such as their 
transparency or their impact on users. Alternatively, researchers investigate the ‘true’ 
economic phenomena underlying a particular item in the financial statements aiming to 
discover whether these are well grasped by accounting regulations including whether 
the latter allow room for manipulatory action. 
This chapter provides a summary of key national and international accounting 
regulations of goodwill first, thus delivering the regulatory setting for the proposed 
empirical investigations of goodwill impairment (chapters 4 to 6). This is followed by 
a literature review outlining areas for research on goodwill impairment and 
highlighting the focus of interest of this thesis in the form of specific research 
questions. 
2.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR GOODWILL 
The overview of key financial reporting regulations concentrates on UK GAAP2 since 
they build the regulatory framework for the empirical investigations in this thesis. The 
relevant accounting ruling for goodwill under UK GAAP is found in FRS 10 and FRS 
11. 
Additionally, the relevant regulations of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (hereafter referred to as ‘IFRS’) are discussed. According to regulation (EC) 
No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002, 
                                                 
1
  See for example the objectives of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation 
(hereafter referred to as ‘IASC Foundation’) as specified in Constitution 2. 
2
  The term ‘GAAP’ is not so strictly defined in the United Kingdom as for example in the US: for a 
discussion on its scope see Ernst & Young (2003), pp. 66-70. In the United States the same 
abbreviation is used, meaning Generally Accepted Accounting Principles – thus possibly 
accentuating the importance of a rule-based compliance (ibid.). 
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companies with securities traded on regulated markets in the European Union must 
prepare their consolidated accounts on the basis of IFRS for accounting periods 
starting on 1 January 2005 or later (Article 4). The purpose of this regulation is to 
(ultimately) support international harmonisation of accounting standards eventually 
leading to the implementation of ‘a single set of global accounting standards’. Thus, 
the presentation of financial information can be largely standardised ensuring 
transparency and competitiveness of capital markets (Article 1). 
The standards relevant for goodwill accounting under IFRS are IFRS 3, IAS 38 and 
IAS 36. 
Finally, the financial reporting rules for goodwill in the US GAAP are summarised, 
mainly for comparative purposes. These are Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 141 ‘Business Combinations’ (hereafter referred to as ‘SFAS 141’) and 
SFAS 142. There are several reasons for including US GAAP regulations in this thesis, 
although its empirical part is not primarily concerned with this framework. Most 
importantly, an overwhelming part of the research reviewed in the area of goodwill 
and intangibles accounting concentrates on US companies implementing US GAAP. 
Therefore, a brief overview provides the regulatory background necessary for 
interpreting this research. Furthermore, where goodwill is concerned the accounting 
ruling under IFRS is quite similar to that under US GAAP3, in particular, as regards 
the elimination of goodwill amortisation and the introduction of impairment as the 
only alternative for writing goodwill down.4 Finally, a comparison between all three 
more or less differing accounting systems provides a useful source for further 
developing and justifying the research questions.  
2.1.1 Initial recognition 
2.1.1.1 National regulations (UK GAAP) 
The significance of goodwill and, consequently, of the corresponding accounting 
standards increased dramatically in the UK after the takeover wave of the 1970s 
(Seetharaman et al, 2006). The history of goodwill accounting in the UK is marked by 
                                                 
3
  The accounting regulations IFRS and US GAAP are, in general, intended to move closer to each 
other with the utmost aim of becoming identical in the long run. This aim is being pursued by special 
convergence projects jointly supervised by the respective standard setters (http://www.iasb.org).  
4
  It should be noted that, though, that the ASB introduced goodwill impairment before the FASB and 
the IASB and may be, therefore, considered the original source of current international goodwill 
accounting in this respect. 
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a simultaneous use of various treatments. Nobes (1992) has documented this 
phenomenon during the 1970s and the 1980s: surveys of the practices used by UK 
companies showed that although most of the companies preferred to write-off goodwill 
immediately after acquisition against equity reserves, there were quite a few cases of 
other accounting treatments.5  
More dependent on public views than its American and Australian counterparts the 
Accounting Standards Committee (hereafter referred to as  ‘ASC’) was influenced 
substantially by the opinions of various political groups such as auditors, management, 
government, etc. (Nobes, 1992). Throughout the years it was reluctant to settle on a 
particular accounting for goodwill for fear of too much criticism by any of these 
groups.6 The first document on goodwill by the ASC was published in 1980: a 
discussion paper on goodwill accounting. It was largely motivated by the 4th Directive 
of EC and recommended a treatment similar to the applicable US practice at the time: 
capitalisation of goodwill and subsequent amortisation over up to 40 years. However, 
public opinion remained in favour of immediate writing-off of goodwill charges and, 
therefore, in 1982 the ASC proposed allowing both the immediate writing-off against 
reserves, and capitalisation and amortisation over up to 20 years (Exposure Draft 
(hereafter referred to as ‘ED’) No. 30, 1983). 
The next regulatory step in goodwill accounting was taken in 1984 when SSAP 22 was 
issued based among other things on the public debate following ED 30. Holgate (1983) 
follows this debate, providing evidence that public opinion was split between writing-
off against reserves, amortisation and an option to use any of these two treatments. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, SSAP 22 allowed the use of either of these treatments 
(with no limitation of the useful life of goodwill). Furthermore, companies were not 
compelled to use one accounting treatment consistently, but were allowed to switch 
between the options allowed (SSAP 22, para. 42). In the years after the issuance of 
SSAP 22 discussion around goodwill regulations became even more intense. The lack 
of explicit mandatory recommendation in many areas of the Statement raised a variety 
of technical and political questions (Nobes, 1992). This lead to the issuance of another 
                                                 
5
  The author recognises, however, that some of these accounting treatments, which diverged from the 
main stream (immediate deduction of goodwill from reserves), might have resulted from companies’ 
lack of adequate reserves which could carry the goodwill charge. Therefore, the variety of 
accounting treatments of goodwill might have been prompted by necessity rather than by political 
intention or managerial choice. 
6
  For an extensive discussion of the political process surrounding goodwill accounting in the UK, see 
Nobes (1992). 
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exposure draft concerning goodwill, ED 47 ‘Accounting for Goodwill’ in 1989 
recommending capitalisation of goodwill and subsequent amortisation over up to 20 
years or, if plausibly justified, up to 40 years.7 The systematic amortisation suggestion 
in ED 47 – similar to reactions in previous years – met a very strong opposition (Stacy 
& Tweedie, 1989; Hastie, 1990; Higson, 1998) and therefore, the exposure draft was 
not pursued further. Instead, a consultation process was started in 1993 and after two 
discussion papers in 1993 and 1994, a working paper in 1996, a lot of interaction with 
the public, finally, in 1997, FRS 10 was issued which is the current regulation for UK 
companies that do not have securities traded on any regulated financial market in the 
European Union.8  
The regulations in FRS 10 are based on the Companies Act 1985, which includes 
guidelines for fixed asset reporting (Companies Act, 1985). 
The objectives of FRS 10 are: 
 ‘…to ensure that: 
(a) capitalised goodwill  and intangible assets are charged in the profit and loss 
account in the periods in which they are depleted; and 
(b) sufficient information is disclosed in the financial statements to enable users to 
determine the impact of goodwill and intangible assets on the financial position 
and performance of the reporting equity.’ (FRS 10, para. 1) 
Thus, the ASB aimed to enhance the regulations for goodwill and intangible assets by 
narrowing down and specifying the accounting treatments (as opposed to the choice 
offered by previous rules), by increasing the transparency of their impact on the 
company and, in particular, by setting out the same principles for goodwill as for other 
intangibles. 
Goodwill is defined as the result of the following calculation:  
‘The difference between the cost of an acquired entity and the aggregate of the fair values of 
that entity’s identifiable assets and liabilities. Positive goodwill arises when the acquisition cost 
exceeds the aggregate fair values of the identifiable assets and liabilities. Negative goodwill 
arises when the aggregate fair values of the identifiable assets and liabilities of the entity 
exceed the acquisition cost.’ (FRS 10, para. 2). 
                                                 
7
  Similar accounting treatment was proposed also for other intangible fixed assets (ED 52 ‘Accounting 
for Intangible Fixed Assets’). 
8
  For a discussion of the consultation process and its social implications, see Tollington (2006). Apart 
from aiming to finally establish an accounting treatment for goodwill, the ASB was prompted to act 
on clarifying the regulations concerning another category of intangibles, which grew at an alarming 
speed during the 1980s and the early 1990s: brands, in particular, were appearing increasingly on 
company balance sheets. In the absence of specific ruling, management often capitalised brands but 
did not amortise them (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 884-889; Nobes (1992) provides some examples). 
For example, the capitalisation of brands and other intangible assets could be used to diminish the 
amount of goodwill to be written off in cases where it exceeded the available equity resources.  
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Following the purpose of financial statements goodwill accounting regulations are 
aimed at providing a ’true and fair view of a reporting entity’s financial position and 
profit or loss (or income and expenditure) for a period’ (FRS 10, para. 4).  
Positive purchased goodwill is to be recognised as an asset on the balance sheet and 
capitalised. Internally developed goodwill, however, is not considered to be an asset 
and is, therefore, not to be capitalised (FRS 10, paras. 7-8). 
In order to provide a consistent treatment, when negative goodwill is generated as a 
result of an acquisition, it should – after verifying the acquired assets and liabilities – 
be recognised on the balance sheet ‘immediately below the goodwill heading and 
followed by a subtotal showing the net amount of the positive and negative goodwill’ 
(FRS 10, para. 48, Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 899). Goodwill acquired in a single 
transaction cannot be separated into a negative and a positive part (FRS 10, para. 51). 
Goodwill acquired before the entry into force of FRS 10 may be reinstated 
(implementation of FRS 10) or, alternatively, SSAP 22 may be applied: in the latter 
case the amount of this ‘old’ goodwill should be disclosed in the notes to the accounts 
(FRS 10, para. 71). 
2.1.1.2 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
The IASB is responsible for setting and amending the International Accounting 
Standards (hereafter referred to as ‘IAS’) and the IFRSs. The IASB succeeded its 
predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (hereafter referred to 
as ‘IASC’) in April 2001 in its role of a standard setter for the IASC Foundation. Its 
objective is:  
‘to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, enforceable and 
globally accepted financial reporting standards based on clearly articulated principles . These 
standards should require high quality, transparent and comparable information in financial 
statements and other financial reporting to help investors, other participants in the various capital 
markets of the world and other users of financial information make economic decisions.’ (IASB, 
2011, Preface, para. 6(a)).  
The IASB is supported in its activities by the IFRS Advisory Council (formerly, the 
Standards Advisory Council) which gives advice to the IASB and provides 
information about the implications of proposed standards or standard setting projects. 
Additionally, the IFRS Interpretations Committee (which is the successor of the 
Standing Interpretations Committee (hereafter referred to as ‘SIC’) and, later, of the 
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (hereafter referred to as 
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‘IFRIC’)) provides ‘timely guidance on financial reporting issues’ (IASB, 2011, 
Preface, para. 2). 
The International Financial Reporting Standards are issued by the IASB and include, 
apart from the IFRSs, also IASs (issued by IASB’s predecessor, IASC), IFRIC and 
SIC interpretations (IASB, 2011, Preface, paras. 7f.). The standards relevant to 
goodwill and intangible asset reporting are: IFRS 3, IAS 36 and IAS 38. 
The definition of goodwill acquired in a business combination is found in IFRS 3, 
para. 32, where it is referred to as:  
‘the excess of (a) over (b) below: 
(a) the aggregate of: 
(i) the consideration transferred measured in accordance with this IFRS, which generally 
requires acquisition-date fair value…; 
(ii) the amount of any non-controlling interest in the acquiree measured in accordance with this 
IFRS; and 
(iii) in a business combination achieved in stages (…) the acquisition-date fair value of the 
acquirer’s previously held equity interest in the acquiree. 
(b) The net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets acquired and the liabilities assumed 
measured in accordance with this IFRS.’ 
Goodwill acquired in a business combination is initially recognised at cost. 
The term ‘negative goodwill’ is not used anymore in IFRS 3. However, whenever it 
factually occurs, the acquired items should be reassessed and, if any excess remains 
after that, it should be recognised immediately in the profit or loss account (IFRS 3, 
paras. 34-36). 
Internally generated goodwill cannot be recognised as an asset because it does not 
meet the criteria required for intangible assets to be capitalised (IAS 38, paras. 48-50). 
2.1.1.3 US GAAP 
US GAAP regulations concerning goodwill are not in the main focus of this thesis (see 
p. 20 for reasons to include an outline of US GAAP) and therefore, only a very short 
overview of relevant regulations is included here. In July 2001 the FASB issued 
SFAS 141 (revised in 2007) and SFAS 142 which regulate accounting for goodwill 
and other intangible assets under US GAAP and represent the result of a long and 
extensive discussion (Long, 2005).  
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The definition of goodwill under US GAAP is the same as under IFRS (SFAS 141, 
paras. 34-39). 
Goodwill resulting from business combinations is recognised as an asset as of the 
acquisition date (SFAS 141, para. 34). 
2.1.2 Subsequent measurement and valuation 
A variety of methods have been used over the years to measure goodwill after initial 
recognition in cases where it was considered an asset rather than written off against 
reserves immediately after acquisition. These methods include systematic amortisation 
over a limited period of time, such as 20 or 40 years, annual impairment, or 
impairment whenever certain indicators were present. The following section offers a 
concise review of the currently relevant regulations under UK GAAP, IFRS and 
US GAAP. 
2.1.2.1 National regulations (UK GAAP) 
FRS 10 proposes a combination of an amortisation and an impairment approach in 
order to ensure correct measurement of goodwill and intangible assets after 
capitalisation which complies with the objectives set in the standard. FRS 10, para. 19 
states that ‘there is a rebuttable presumption that the useful economic lives of 
purchased goodwill and intangible assets are limited to 20 years or less’. Accordingly, 
goodwill and other intangible assets that were initially recognised should be amortised 
over the length of their useful economic lives (FRS 10, para. 15) and the amortisation 
charges must be recognised in the profit and loss account. The useful economic life is 
defined as the period over which benefits from the purchased goodwill or intangible 
asset are expected to flow to the entity (FRS 10, para. 2). The useful economic life of 
acquired goodwill and intangible assets may be considered indefinite if two conditions 
are fulfilled. The first condition requires a plausible explanation justifying the claim 
that the useful economic life of goodwill is estimated to be longer than 20 years. 
Additionally, the asset in question should be ‘capable of continued measurement’ 
(FRS 10, para. 19). This second condition ensures that the impairment calculation can 
be performed. If this requirement is not fulfilled but the useful economic life of the 
purchased goodwill is proven to be longer than 20 years or indefinite, amortisation still 
remains as the relevant accounting treatment since impairment testing is not considered 
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to be feasible. When amortised, the straight line method is the preferred treatment 
although other methods might be accepted where appropriate (FRS 10, para. 30). 
For purchased goodwill with definite useful life less than 20 years (or where 
amortisation is the relevant accounting treatment), an impairment test is nevertheless 
required at the end of the first full financial year after the acquisition and, additionally, 
in following years should there be indicators of impairment (FRS 10, para. 34), 
examples of which are specified in FRS 11, para. 10. In cases of purchased goodwill 
with an indefinite useful life the impairment test is to be conducted annually at the end 
of each reporting period (FRS 10, para. 37). 
The requirement of an impairment review at the end of the first financial year after the 
acquisition is motivated by the need to ensure an accurate measurement and 
presentation of the acquisition on the balance sheet (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 1052f.). 
Specifically, FRS 10, para. 35 (a) raises the issue of overpayment as a possible reason 
for an impairment loss in this period9: 
‘If an impairment is identified at the time of the first year review, this impairment reflects: 
(a) an overpayment; 
(b) an event that occurred between the acquisition and the first year review; or 
(c) depletion of the acquired goodwill or intangible asset between the acquisition and the 
first year review that exceeds the amount recognised through amortisation.’ (FRS 10, 
para. 35) 
The impairment review at the end of the first financial year after acquisition includes a 
comparison between the pre-acquisition estimates used to calculate the acquisition 
price and post-acquisition performance. Should the latter fail to reach the forecasts, a 
full impairment review is triggered which – similar to impairment reviews in all other 
cases – has to be performed according to the regulations of FRS 11 (FRS 10, paras. 39-
40). 
When an impairment review is triggered, the carrying amount of purchased goodwill is 
compared to its recoverable amount in order to establish whether the goodwill is 
impaired. The recoverable amount is defined as ‘the higher of net realisable value and 
value in use’. If the carrying amount is bigger than the recoverable amount, an 
impairment loss is to be reported in the profit and loss account10 (FRS 11, para. 14). 
                                                 
9
  Appendix III, para. 39 of FRS 10 additionally implies that a possible impairment loss during the first 
year after acquisition is mainly due to overpayment. 
10
  An exception from this rule exists in the case of impairment of previously revalued fixed assets 
(FRS 11, para. 63) which are, however, not in the focus of interest of this thesis. 
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The net realisable value is ‘[t]he amount at which an asset could be disposed of, less 
any direct selling costs’. Value in use is ‘[t]he present value of future cash flows 
obtainable as a result of an asset’s continued use, including those resulting from its 
ultimate disposal’ (FRS 11, para. 2).11 Additionally, some guidance is provided 
concerning direct selling costs in FRS 11, para. 23. When it is not possible to 
determine the net realisable value, the recoverable amount must be established based 
on value in use (FRS 11, paras. 16 and 24). Ernst & Young (2003) have identified 5 
stages of the impairment review under FRS 11: 
1. The company is divided into income-generating units (IGUs). This is done by 
segmenting the total income of the company into ‘as many largely independent 
income streams as is reasonably practicable’ (FRS 11, para. 27). The aim is to 
create as many IGUs as possible. 
2. All assets and liabilities of the entity (including capitalised goodwill, FRS 11, 
para. 34) have to be allocated to the different IGUs, except for financing or tax 
items. These items are not included because the cash flows used to calculate the 
value in use are cash flows before interest and dividends. 
3. The cash flows of the IGUs due for impairment review are forecasted, based on 
plausible assumptions. Cash flows relating to financing and tax items are not taken 
into account, consistent with step 2. ‘The cash flows should be consistent with the 
most up-to-date budgets and plans that have been formally approved by the 
management (FRS 11, para. 36). 
4. The estimated future cash flows are discounted using an appropriate discount rate. 
The discount rate is calculated as ‘an estimate of the rate that the market would 
expect on an equally risky investment’ (FRS 11, para. 41) assuming that long-term 
interest rates are stable and would not influence the occurrence or amount of the 
write-down (FRS 11, para. 11).12 After establishing the discount rate, the 
forecasted cash flows can be discounted and the value in use is calculated. 
5. Finally, the so calculated value in use is compared to the carrying amount and if it 
measures less than this carrying amount, an impairment is allocated, first to the 
                                                 
11
  It should be noted, that in the case of goodwill the net realisable value would be hard to calculate as 
goodwill cannot be sold separately from the rest of the business. 
12
  The standard also discusses methods for estimating the market rate of the equally risky investment in 
paras. 42-43 and in Appendix 1. 
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goodwill of the IGU, then to capitalised intangibles attributed to the IGU and, if 
there is still an impairment loss to be allocated, to the tangible assets of the IGU on 
a pro-rata basis (FRS 11, para. 48). The reasoning behind this regulation is to 
write-down the assets with ‘the most subjective valuations first’ (FRS 11, 
para. 49). 
If the value in use is used as basis for the impairment review the cash flows have to be 
monitored for five years after the impairment review. Where the forecasted cash flows 
significantly exceed the actual cash flows, the impairment review has to be conducted 
again using the actual cash flows. If an impairment is detected, it is then to be 
recognised in the current period (FRS 11, paras. 54-55). 
Past impairment losses can be reversed for goodwill and intangible assets only if one 
of two conditions is met: 
‘(a) an external event caused the recognition of the impairment loss in previous periods, 
and subsequent external events clearly and demonstrably reverse the effects of that 
event in a way that was not foreseen in the original impairment calculations; or 
(b) the impairment loss arose on an intangible asset with a readily ascertainable market 
value and the net realisable value based on that market value has increased to above 
the intangible asset’s impaired carrying amount.’ (FRS 11, para. 60) 
There are two possibilities to transfer negative goodwill to the profit and loss account 
after its initial recognition on the balance sheet. Goodwill exceeding the fair values of 
the non-monetary assets acquired, is to be ‘recognised in the profit and loss account in 
the periods in which the non-monetary assets are recovered, whether through 
depreciation or through sale’ (FRS 10, para. 49). The part of negative goodwill 
exceeding the above-mentioned fair values ‘should be recognised in the profit and loss 
account in the periods expected to be benefited’ (FRS 10, para. 50) and, additionally, 
should be disclosed and explained (FRS 10, para. 64).13 
2.1.2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
IFRS 3 supersedes IAS 22 ‘Business Combinations’ and among other things 
introduces a new accounting treatment for the subsequent valuation of goodwill 
(IFRS 3, B63) which is similar to the one under SFAS 142 (see next section). After 
initial recognition, goodwill acquired in business combinations is not amortised but is 
annually tested for impairment (or more often should indicators suggesting possible 
impairment be present) (IFRS 3, paras. B63, B69; IAS 36, paras. 9f.). 
                                                 
13
  According to Ernst & Young (2003), p. 899, '[t]he exact meaning of this wording is not completely 
clear, but any reasonable interpretation is likely to be acceptable’. 
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IAS 36 prescribes that already at acquisition the goodwill is to be assigned to cash-
generating units, which can be defined as ‘the lowest level within the entity at which 
goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes’ (IAS 36, IN11 (b)). The 
impairment test under IAS 36 is very similar to the one under FRS 10: an impairment 
is said to exist if the carrying amount of an asset exceeds its recoverable amount 
measured as the higher of the fair value less costs to sell (similar to the net realisable 
value under UK GAAP) and the value in use (IAS 36, paras. 18-57). The procedure of 
calculation of the value in use corresponds with the respective procedure under UK 
GAAP (see pp. 27–28).  
Should an impairment loss exist, it must be recognised immediately in the profit or 
loss account (IAS 36, para. 60). Goodwill impairment losses cannot be reversed in 
later periods (IAS 36, para. 124). 
2.1.2.3 US GAAP 
According to the SFAS 142 goodwill amortisation is replaced by an annual impairment 
test which must be performed additionally when a certain set of factors, described in 
SFAS 142, para. 28, suggests possible impairment (SFAS 142, para. 26).  
Goodwill is to be tested for impairment at the level of a reporting unit (SFAS 142, 
para. 18). A reporting unit is defined as an operating segment (or one level below) in 
the sense of SFAS 131 ‘Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related 
Information’: separate financial information has to be available for a unit so that it can 
be described as an operating segment and the management of the unit should be 
reviewing its operating results on a regular basis (SFAS 142, para. 30).  
Once goodwill is allocated to the respective reporting unit, it can undergo the 
impairment test which – unlike the goodwill impairment test under IFRS and under 
UK GAAP – consists of two steps (SFAS 142, paras. 19–22): 
1. A comparison between the fair value of the reporting unit with its carrying amount 
including goodwill is undertaken to determine whether goodwill is impaired. If the 
fair value exceeds the carrying amount, then goodwill is not impaired and the 
impairment test can be stopped. If the opposite case occurs, the second step of the 
impairment test has to be conducted. 
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2. In order to determine the amount of the goodwill impairment loss, the difference 
between the carrying amount of the goodwill and its implied fair value in the 
reporting unit is calculated. The implied fair value of goodwill is defined as the 
residual of the fair value of the reporting unit after allocating fair values to all its 
assets, liabilities, including unrecognised intangible assets.  
An impairment loss once recognised cannot be reversed. The impairment loss cannot 
exceed the carrying value of the goodwill. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: RESEARCH ON GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT 
The focus of this thesis, and thus of the literature review, lies on write-downs (write-
offs) resulting from the subsequent valuation of goodwill after initial recognition.14 
More specifically, the researcher concentrates on goodwill impairment write-downs (as 
opposed to write-downs generated from systematic amortisation of goodwill). 
Therefore, the importance of and motivation for research in this area is discussed in 
this section and is then followed by a literature review and evaluation of antecedent 
empirical research. 
There are several reasons highlighting the importance of academic research on 
goodwill impairment write-downs. First, the magnitude of goodwill write-downs is 
usually substantial, thus rendering any effects resulting from changes in goodwill value 
significant for the key performance indicators of a firm. For example, the studies 
reviewed in Alciatore et al (1998) discuss asset write-downs of up to 19.4% of total 
assets on average. Francis et al (1996)15 find that goodwill write-downs constitute the 
largest item of reported asset write-downs. Examples of significant amounts of 
goodwill write-downs measured on a billion dollar scale is presented by Segal (2003), 
Zang (2003), Duangploy et al (2005) and Li & Meeks (2006).16 Hueffner & Largay III 
(2004), for example, explore a sample of 100 companies with cumulative reported 
goodwill impairment loss amounting to $ 135 bln in 2002 (on average $ 1.35 bln per 
sample company). This accounted for approximately 14.5% of recorded goodwill. 
                                                 
14
  For purposes of this thesis, write-downs are defined as diminutions in value when a residual remains 
(i.e. impairment and amortisation generally, especially when they do not lead to complete 
disappearance of the asset from the balance sheet). Write-offs describe the complete removal of the 
asset from the balance sheet. 
15
  Francis et al (1996) is one of the (few) studies reviewed by Alciatore et al (1998) which includes 
goodwill write-downs. 
16
  Chambers (2007) also focuses on the magnitude of goodwill write-downs and their impact on 
financial reporting as motivation for (his own) research. 
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Since all of these studies were published around the introduction of SFAS 141 and 142 
in the US the large goodwill impairments of the early 2000s which were included in 
them might well have been a reaction to the implementation of the new regulations 
and, therefore, a non-recurring event. However, moving on to much more recent 
reporting periods, it is still obvious that the scale of goodwill impairment charges has 
not decreased. In 2009 about 20% of S&P 500 companies reported a goodwill 
impairment write-down (Lynch & Gandhi, 2010). Research on the S&P 1500 reported 
that the number of companies with market capitalisations below the book value of their 
assets rose to 25% in 2009 (Latham & Watkins, 2009). On 12th January, 2009, the 
Nation’s Restaurant News start with a top-headline: ‘Goodwill Shrinking: Restaurants 
bite impairment bullet’ reporting goodwill impairment losses for many US restaurant 
chains as high as $ 161.6 mln (Lockyer, 2009). Additionally, Dharan (2009) argues 
that the amount of goodwill in corporate balance sheets has increased significantly 
since the M&A activities in the late 1990s. The author uses these results to suggest that 
large impairments are likely to occur in the imminent future.  
Of course, goodwill impairment losses might have probably increased again in recent 
years due to the latest global financial crisis and might well decrease again in amount 
and frequency once the economic world is back on track. Nevertheless, financial crises 
are cyclical events and they tend to occur on a regular basis. For this reason it seems 
safe to assume that goodwill impairment will stay with us for the foreseeable future 
and that its magnitude is not likely to change much.  
Second, although goodwill impairment is a non-cash expenditure, it does influence net 
income as well as the balance sheet.17 For this reason its presence in the financial 
statements and its amount (which in many cases is significant) are bound to attract the 
attention of investors, lenders, standard setters and other users of the financial 
statements which management is well aware of. On the other side, since goodwill is a 
residual item of intangible nature, it offers per definition significant room for 
interpretation and discretion. Depending on the understanding of this nature and of the 
underlying impairment process and on the application of the relevant regulations the 
amount of the impairment charge can be significantly influenced by management.  It 
is, therefore, essential to understand the causes and impact of goodwill impairment 
write-downs in order to provide correct and accurate information to investors, rating 
                                                 
17
  Wines & Ferguson (1993) find that companies tend to recognise identifiable intangibles (with 
indefinite lives) in the balance sheet in order to decrease the burden put on net income by goodwill 
amortisation. The authors test a sample of 150 Australian companies fort he period 1985-1989. 
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agencies, and other users of financial statements as intended by national and 
international standard setters.18 
Third, goodwill impairment losses may also have serious adverse consequences for 
companies possibly even leading to negative cash effects19 as illustrated by recent 
events at Vodafone Group Plc. A court suit was filed against Vodafone in the early 
2000s and - following initial dismissal - was reopened in November 2009 claiming that 
Vodafone failed to recognise material goodwill impairment losses following the 
acquisition of Mannesmann in 2000. The complaint was filed and reopened despite the 
fact that Vodafone had until this point in time already recorded $ 49 bln write-downs 
(Business Valuation Update, April 2010)20. While this claim was dismissed on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to present accurate information regarding the 
timing and the appropriate amount the write-downs should have had, it does show two 
things: first, goodwill impairment write-downs can well have material (adverse) 
consequences for companies and, second, goodwill impairment is not easy to 
determine. It is, therefore, obvious that research on goodwill impairment issues is not 
only welcome but vital to academics and practitioners. 
Finally, research on the subsequent valuation of goodwill has also been motivated by 
the development of goodwill accounting regulations on worldwide level during the last 
few decades. As already discussed in chapter 2.1, goodwill is nowadays largely seen 
by standard setters as an asset. Academic research in this area supports this view with 
empirical evidence presented in numerous studies (for example Emery, 1951; Barlev, 
1973; Johnson & Petrone, 1998 and many others). However, the subsequent treatment 
of goodwill, although gradually converging to a single accounting treatment on 
international level (IFRS, US GAAP)21 is still differing on national level. While IFRS 
and US GAAP regulations impose an impairment test as the sole accounting treatment 
for goodwill (being an intangible with indefinite useful life), UK GAAP allows 
alternative use of either amortisation or impairment, depending on whether goodwill is 
seen to have a definite or indefinite useful life. Such regulatory differences naturally 
                                                 
18
  Moehrle & Reynolds-Moehrle (2001) find evidence that auditors as well as management and 
accountants consider understanding the goodwill impairment process important. Wayman (2002) 
argues that investors would be interested in goodwill impairment as they would benefit most if it is 
conducted precisely and provides true signals about the welfare of the company (see also Martinson, 
2002).  
19
  Massoud & Raiborn (2003) also highlight this potential cash effect of goodwill impairment. 
20
  Another lawsuit was filed in December 2008 against CBS Corporation alleging failure to record 
intangible and goodwill write-downs in a timely manner (Dharan, 2009). 
21
  For a detailed discussion of the differences between the impairment test under IAS 36 and SFAS 142 
see Shoaf & Zaldivar (2005). 
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set a framework for academic investigation and – together with the magnitude of write-
offs – highlight the importance of research concerning the subsequent valuation of 
goodwill.  
IFRS is mandatory for group accounts of companies listed on EU stock markets for 
periods starting on 1 January 2005 or later. Due to the recent adoption of IFRS the 
relevance of UK GAAP (which leads to the largest regulatory differences concerning 
the subsequent valuation of goodwill where this thesis is concerned) might appear 
questionable at first. However, until IFRS regulations finally entered into force (which 
lasted until 2007 in some cases22) UK GAAP ruling was still relevant. Additionally, 
these regulations remain mandatory for companies that are not listed on a regulated 
market in the EU, so differences between the international standards and local GAAP 
can hardly be ignored. With two different accounting treatments for goodwill 
(amortisation and impairment) and FRS 10 and FRS 11 still in use, the motivation for 
and the impact of goodwill write-downs is highly relevant. Considering the economic 
rationale behind IASB’s elimination of amortisation it becomes essential to understand 
the reasoning behind goodwill impairment since it is the only method remaining to 
depict the economic depletion of goodwill in financial statements on international 
level. Of course, the effect of IFRS regulations is best tested using data already 
applying the IFRS standards. However, due to the transitional regulations of IFRS 323 
(see p. 70) as well as the still relatively recent beginning of IFRS application in the UK 
it will take some time before extensive data are available for a direct investigation of 
goodwill impairment regulations under ‘standard conditions’ of IFRS (as opposed to 
transitional requirements). Such data are, however, available under UK GAAP. 
The following sections provide an overview of relevant research on goodwill 
impairment concentrating on findings relating to the impact and causes of write-downs 
as well as on the drivers of the impairment calculation. The overview provided in 
section 2.2.1 relates to the study in chapter 4; research discussed in section 2.2.2 refers 
to the study in chapter 5; finally, topics reviewed in section 2.2.3 relate to the 
investigation in chapter 6. 
                                                 
22
 Many FTSE 100 companies adopted IFRS during 2006. For example The BOC Group Plc as well as 
The Sage Group Plc and Compass Group Plc provided their first IFRS financial statements at 
30/09/2006. Other companies went even further setting the date for the first IFRS financial 
statements in 2007: Gus Plc (31/03/2007) and Wolseley Plc (31/07/2007). 
23
  IFRS 3 was revised in 2008 and the new regulations are to be applied for reporting periods starting 
on or after July 1st 2009 (IFRS 3, Appendix C), thus extending the transitional period even further. 
 34 
2.2.1 Impact of goodwill write-downs 
ASB’s Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting (1999) defines the purpose of 
financial statements as follows: 
‘…to provide information about the reporting entity’s financial performance and financial 
position that is useful to a wide range of users … for making economic decisions.’ (Chapter 1, 
Principles)  
One of the general considerations underlying this objective is that financial statements 
should ensure a ‘true and fair view’ of the company (Statement of Principles, 1999, 
Introduction).24 This means that all assets, liabilities, transactions and other events 
related to the company should be presented in a faithful and truthful way. The concept 
of ‘true and fair view’ is so fundamental and essential that international standard 
setters have seen fit to recommend additional disclosures beyond the requirements of 
IFRS, should this be needed, in order to depict the financial situation of the company 
correctly (IAS 1, para. 17(c)). Thus, the ‘true and fair view’ concept secures the basis 
needed by financial statement users in their decision making process by ensuring that 
the information provided is as complete as needed. In order for this process to be 
successful, user information needs must first be analysed. One way to achieve this is to 
understand better their reaction to and evaluation of accounting numbers. Financial 
statement users’ reactions provide evidence about how they process and use 
information about the company and thus give important feedback to standard setters 
and regulators. 
The ASB has provided some guidance concerning the main groups of financial 
statements’ users and their information needs. Groups interested in company 
information are classified in seven categories for this purpose: investors, employees, 
lenders, suppliers and other trade creditors, customers, governments and their agencies 
and the public (Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting, Chapter 1, para. 1.3).25 
This thesis focuses on two of the categories specified by the ASB – investors and 
lenders – as well as on their information agents (rating agencies). In a broader context, 
rating agencies can be defined as financial intermediaries, since they fulfil one of the 
                                                 
24
  This objective can also be found in the IFRS Framework (QC4, QC12-16) where it is defined as the 
concept of ‘faithful representation’. 
25
  A similar list (albeit concentrating on investors, lenders and other creditors) can be found in the 
IFRS Framework (OB2f.). However, the ASB defines the investor view of an entity, in general, as 
representative for the interests of all other users (Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting, 
Chapter 1, para. 1.11). 
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important functions of the financial intermediary: they reduce ‘agency costs’ by 
providing information and monitoring services.26  
Illustration 2.1 summarises some aspects of the market reaction to goodwill-related 
events and market valuation of goodwill. Goodwill-related reactions of market 
participants can include responses to a number of different events: for example to the 
announcement of an acquisition, to the first post-acquisition financial statements, to an 
announcement of goodwill write-downs as a consequence of impairment, or to 
regulatory changes. Additionally, there are various participants in the capital markets, 
whose reaction could be examined on a stand-alone basis or jointly, for purposes of 
comparison. This thesis primarily focuses on rating agencies and their relation to 
goodwill write-downs (marked as area of own research in illustration 2.1). 
Illustration 2.1: Market reaction to goodwill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An overview of the existing literature and empirical evidence related to shareholders, 
lenders and rating agencies is provided in the following sections. Additionally, a wider 
range of literature is reviewed where applicable investigating similar issues to goodwill 
write-downs (for example other assets or liabilities), since some conclusions from 
                                                 
26
  For more details on the definition and functions of financial intermediaries see Baltensperger (1990), 
Vives (1991), Crane et al (1995), Greenbaum & Thakor (1997) and Cecchetti (1999). Sellhorn 
(2004) defines rating agencies as ‘information intermediaries between firms and investors’. 
Goodwill
Market recipients:
Shareholders:
• Stock prices, abnormal returns
•Trading volume effects
Lenders:
•Interest rates, risk premia
•Credit decisions
•Covenants, volume restrictions,
subordinated debt, etc.
Financial intermediaries:
(rating agencies, etc.)
•Rating decisions
•Rating adjustments
•Timeliness of adjustments
Market reaction to:
Acquisition
Initial announcement
Announcement of first
post-acquisition
financial statements
Results of annual
impairment process
(impairment loss)
GAAP transition
Disposal
Areas of own research highlighted in blue
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these areas could be also relevant to goodwill write-downs and are often used in 
goodwill-centred research. 
2.2.1.1 Shareholders’ reaction to (goodwill) write-downs 
Shareholders’ reaction to asset write-downs is – compared to other groups of financial 
statement users – a thoroughly investigated area in academic literature. The 
magnitude27 of write-downs as well as their more or less discretionary nature can – 
depending on circumstances – have crucial importance for the company’s earnings and 
financial performance measures. Since goodwill write-downs often account for the 
biggest part of these amounts (Francis et al, 1996; Henning et al, 2002; Segal, 2003; Li 
& Meeks, 2006; Dharan, 2009) and provide (per definition of goodwill and of the 
impairment process) sufficient room for managerial discretion, it should be expected 
that research in this particular area is particularly ample. Initially, however, academic 
research concentrated on capital market reactions to asset impairments altogether and 
numerous studies were published in the 1980s and 1990s28 but not many of these 
studies focused on or included goodwill (Francis et al, 1996; and later, Hirschey & 
Richardson, 2002; Hirschey & Richardson, 2003 are among the few). The adoption of 
SFAS 141 and SFAS 142 in the US in 2001, however, caused an increase in goodwill-
related studies, at least the ones based on US companies (Henning et al, 2000; Henning 
et al, 2002; Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Sellhorn, 2004; Long, 2005). 
Based on existing research the main issues related to the shareholders’ reaction can be 
summarised under the following research question groups: 
(1) What is the direction of the shareholders’ reaction? Is the size of the write-
downs related to the market reaction? (see section 2.2.1.1.1) 
(2) Does the market react to the announcement of write-downs in a timely manner 
or is the reaction delayed? Does the market anticipate the write-downs? Is it 
possible to separate the fraction of write-downs that is anticipated by the 
market from the unexpected one? When does the market completely adjust to 
the write-down announcement? (see section 2.2.1.1.2) 
                                                 
27
  Information on research of the amounts of goodwill write-downs is provided on p. 30. 
28
  An overview of the main studies between 1987 and 1998 is provided in Alciatore et al, 1998. The 
assets investigated include (negative) special items exceeding 1% of total assets, inventory, 
restructuring charges, PP&E, severance payments, R&D-in-process (write-offs) and other. However, 
most of the studies do not discriminate between types of asset but rather use a broader definition 
including several types of assets. 
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Question (2) has a close connection to the issue of managerial reporting incentives and 
write-downs which is discussed in section 2.2.2.3. 
According to Alciatore et al (1998) studies investigating the link between asset write-
downs and the market can be typically organised into two broad types: (1) information 
content studies, exploring the market reaction to the announcement of the write-downs 
and covering a relatively short time period, and (2) association studies, which cover a 
longer period of time before and after the announcement and investigate issues of 
value relevance of the write-down. The information content studies are used whenever 
the focus of interest lies on isolating the reaction to a particular event and interpreting 
its effects. A longer time period is recommended in order to capture potential 
anticipation of the event by the market or to test the rapidity of the market adjustment 
to the write-down. However, a long window could also include effects from other 
events, thus obscuring or creating noise in the findings (Alciatore et al, 1998; Sellhorn, 
2004). 
2.2.1.1.1 Direction and size of the capital market reaction to asset 
write-downs 
The majority of the studies related to asset write-downs are information content studies 
concentrating on the immediate announcement effect of the write-downs (see overview 
in Alciatore et al, 1998; specifically for goodwill write-downs, see Hirshey & 
Richardson, 2002; Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Long, 2005; Bens et al, 2007; Lapointe-
Antunes et al, 2009). Although caution must be taken when comparing the studies due 
to differing investigation time periods, varying samples and conditions, most of the 
studies report a negative market reaction to asset write-downs ( for example Elliott & 
Shaw, 1988; Rees et al, 1996). These findings persist also if only studies investigating 
goodwill write-downs are considered: the results provide information about a negative 
reaction (Hirschey & Richardson, 2002, Hirschey & Richardson, 2003; Segal, 2003; 
Long, 2005; Bens et al, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al, 2009) with one exception: 
Francis et al (1996) find no evidence of significant market reaction at all. 
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Although a general trend in studies on the market reaction to asset write-downs can be 
clearly highlighted, some results provide contradicting or additional new information 
to the general drift.29 
An interesting investigation is carried out by Strong & Meyer (1987) whose results 
partly support and partly contradict the general trend in research on the direction of the 
market reaction to asset write-downs. The authors conducted a study following and 
analysing asset write-offs that occurred in the period 1981-1985. Similarly to other 
studies at the time (see fn. 28), they do not discriminate between types of assets; the 
sample is based on a search including several criteria such as ‘write-off’, ‘write-down’, 
‘restructuring’, etc. The authors note that a substantial part of their sample includes 
write-downs that were conducted as a part of restructuring activities. The findings 
show a positive reaction before and after the write-down suggesting that it might be 
correctly perceived by investors, at least for a large fraction of the data, as part of a 
bigger restructuring plan. However, during the announcement period investors’ 
reaction was negative, thus supporting results from other studies (see above). 
Aiming to focus on different aspects of and find patterns in the market reaction to asset 
write-downs, Bunsis (1997) examines their relationship with company cash flows and 
shareholders’ response. The sample is constructed by using the terms ‘write-off’ and 
‘write-down’ in the period between 1983-1989. Firms that had announced write-offs in 
the previous year were excluded in order to isolate market reactions to a new event and 
to minimise anticipation to the event by the market. Bunsis finds that the expected cash 
flow impact of a write-down is responsible for the direction of the capital market 
reaction. For asset write-downs that were expected to increase future cash flows (such 
as for example disinvestment in unprofitable divisions) investors’ reaction was positive 
and vice versa. For write-downs that did not lead to expectations for a change in future 
cash flows, the response was ambiguous: negative in the two days after the 
announcement, but positive when three-day returns were considered. Bartov et al 
(1998) provide results which can be interpreted similarly to the findings of Bunsis 
(1997). They categorise asset write-downs either as pure accounting changes or as 
based on managerial strategic considerations. The empirical evidence shows a weak 
negative reaction in the overall sample. When differentiated, however, the response 
                                                 
29
  Where studies separate types of assets or use differing definitions of write-downs, these are 
discussed below in the context of the focus of interest of this thesis. 
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was more negative for the write-downs classified as pure accounting changes. Also 
similar to Bunsis (1997), this study does not specifically concentrate on goodwill.30 
Moving closer to goodwill-related research was a study concentrating on a particular 
type of intangible write-offs conducted by Deng & Lev (1998). They focus on 
investors’ reaction to write-offs of acquired R&D-in-process and find - contrary to the 
mainstream trend for asset write-downs - a positive relation between the write-off 
amount and returns. This finding can be explained in the context of the debate 
concerning this particular type of intangible, which, under the purchase method in the 
US, was being immediately expensed after the acquisition and not capitalised. The 
results showed that R&D-in-process were considered as an asset by the investors, 
which accounts for the positive reaction. A similar discussion referring to goodwill has 
been largely present in academic research and has been resolved in favour of goodwill 
capitalisation, at least where UK GAAP, IFRS and US GAAP are concerned.31 
One of the first studies to specifically investigate the market reaction to goodwill 
write-downs is conducted by Francis et al (1996). The authors examine different types 
of write-downs including inventory, restructuring and goodwill write-downs disclosed 
between 1989 and 1992. Goodwill write-downs represent the biggest amounts of the 
sample. The market reaction measured for the overall sample is negative, supporting 
the idea that investors interpret write-downs as a signal for deterioration in the 
financial welfare of the firm. However, after examining the different classes of write-
downs, findings showed no significant response in the case of goodwill write-downs. 
A similar result had been provided before, by Zucca & Campbell (1992) who, 
however, did not concentrate on goodwill but examined ‘discretionary write-downs’.  
Following up on goodwill write-down research Hirschey & Richardson (2002) 
published a study specifically focusing on goodwill impairment write-downs. The 
authors investigate goodwill impairments between1992 and 1996 aiming to understand 
whether there is an economic rationale behind them. They find a negative stock price 
reaction during the announcement period, which they interpret as a signal for negative 
company development and ‘loss of economic goodwill’. Additionally, the authors 
compare the reactions to ‘messy’ versus singular goodwill write-down announce-
                                                 
30
  Other studies which do not discriminate between different types of assets or concentrate on assets 
other than goodwill include Elliott & Shaw (1988), Zucca & Campbell (1992), Elliott & Hanna 
(1996). 
31
  For an overview of the milestones of this discussion in the UK, see section 2.1.1.1. 
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ments32: 66.3% of the write-downs in the sample were disclosed together with other 
important information and categorised as ‘messy’. However, the messiness of goodwill 
write-down announcements did not essentially interfere with the initial direction of the 
market reaction. Although Hirschey & Richardson (2002) discuss the – at that time – 
new US GAAP regulations for goodwill accounting (SFAS 141 and 142), they use 
older data for their study (1992 – 1996) reasoning that they aim to exclude the 
transitional effects and influence of the new standards. The results from a second study 
(Hirschey & Richardson, 2003) confirm the findings from the first one concerning the 
negative market reaction to goodwill write-downs during the announcement period and 
extend it by investigating a longer window – this (association) study is discussed in 
detail in the next section. Finally, the authors test the possibility that announcements of 
goodwill impairments might trigger a contagious stock price reaction where the price 
reaction of the company stock leads to other stock price reactions and could spread 
uncontrollably. However, the findings reject this hypothesis. Thus, the impact of 
goodwill write-downs appears to be restricted to the specific company and its 
immediate environment. 
In contrast to prior research which concentrated mostly on US companies Li & Meeks 
(2006) explore the value relevance of goodwill impairment referring specifically to the 
UK market. The study period (1997-2002) is selected to allow an investigation of 
goodwill impairment at a time when US GAAP had not yet introduced the impairment 
approach and to set the study in an impairment-intensive M&A environment (based on 
the increased M&A activity of the late 1990s followed by a bear market in the early 
2000s). The findings are consistent with results of prior research providing evidence of 
a significant negative market reaction to impairment charges and leading to the 
conclusion that goodwill impairment is value relevant and conveys new information to 
investors. 
One possibility to examine goodwill write-downs is to contrast the impact of new 
accounting standards against the effect of old ones in order to test for improvement of 
the regulatory framework. Although studies examining goodwill in this area are 
discussed in detail in section 2.2.2.4, some results concerning the capital market 
                                                 
32
  Messiness of goodwill write-down announcements is a substantial problem in academic research, 
especially in the case of event studies which concentrate on a short time period around the 
announcement. Since information on goodwill write-downs is often disclosed together with other 
events (for example other restructuring activities, see Strong & Meyer, 1987; also Elliott & Shaw, 
1988), it is often hard to isolate and investigate. 
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reaction are shortly mentioned here. Segal (2003) compares goodwill write-downs 
under two different accounting regulations (SFAS 121 and SFAS 142) in a study 
aiming to examine the effects of the adoption of SFAS 142. The author provides 
evidence of negative reactions for write-downs under both regulatory regimes and does 
not find any significant variation in the response. A similar result for transitional 
goodwill write-downs is found by Long (2005) who examines investor reaction to the 
adoption of SFAS 142. The author proceeds to differentiate between the causes for the 
write-downs and finds differing investor responses: negative reaction if the goodwill 
write-down was caused by economic events, and no reaction if it was the result of a 
‘cosmetic’ accounting change. Similarly, Lapointe-Antunes et al (2009) find a negative 
relationship between share prices and transitional impairment losses for Canadian 
firms applying a combination of SFAS 142 and Section 3062 of the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants’ Handbook. Due to the specifics of the regulations for the 
transitional period, however, these studies concentrate on a particular set of questions 
and cannot be further generalised. 
Findings concerning the relation between the size of asset write-downs and market 
reaction vary considerably. Elliott & Shaw (1988) and Strong & Meyer (1987) 
examine substantially the same time period (1981-1985). Their results, however, 
provide differing evidence: while Strong & Meyer (1987) support the hypothesis that 
‘the bigger the bath, the better’, Elliott & Shaw (1988) find, in contrast, that returns 
decrease with the increase in the amount of the asset write-down. This could be due to 
differences in sample profiles: Strong & Meyer (1987) include items in their sample 
that are described as a write-off or a write-down by the company and a large part of 
their sample includes restructuring activities. They do not elaborate on the accounting 
treatment of these write-downs. Elliott & Shaw (1988) include significant nonrecurring 
items, write-downs or write-offs of receivables, intangible assets, capitalised computer 
costs, etc. Although their definition of asset write-downs probably includes goodwill, 
this type of asset is not examined separately. Bunsis (1997) reaches conclusions 
similar to the results of Elliott & Shaw (1998), which however change for large write-
downs (more than 5% of the assets) that were thought to increase future cash flows. In 
this case the author finds that the relationship between write-down size and returns 
reverses and is positive. Still another result is provided by Hirschey & Richardson 
(2003), who specifically concentrate on goodwill impairments and do not find 
evidence of relation between size of the goodwill write-offs and abnormal returns. 
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They interpret this result as evidence that investors are interested in the existence of 
the goodwill write-down, but not in its size. 
In conclusion, findings show that investors do react to goodwill write-down 
announcements. However, despite a general trend indicating a negative market 
reaction, there are still differences in the evidence provided by studies so far, in 
particular in studies investigating the size of write-downs. These differences could be 
due to varying time periods examined, differing sample and/or variable profiles (for 
example different definitions for asset write-downs), or a different investors’ 
interpretation of the information content of the particular write-down. 
Furthermore, the studies reviewed in this section explore samples consisting 
exclusively of US companies with the exception of Li & Meeks (2006). If an 
assumption is made that the UK market is similar to the US, this limitation might be 
waved aside.33 Another limitation which cannot be ignored, however, is that these 
studies use either older datasets (Francis et al, 1996; Hirschey & Richardson, 2002) or 
focus on transitional write-downs (Segal, 2003; Long, 2005).34 
2.2.1.1.2 Timeliness of the market reaction to asset write-down 
announcements 
Association studies cover typically a longer time period around the announcement of a 
write-down and investigate the market response during that time. Apart from exploring 
the market reaction to write-downs, this research approach has an advantage over event 
studies when the focus of interest lies on the investigation of anticipation of the 
announcement by the market, or market adjustment to the write-down disclosure, i.e. 
whether the write-down announcement was timely. According to Alciatore et al (1998) 
the objective of association studies can be best described with the following research 
question: ‘Does the inclusion of the amount of the write-down in earnings result in an 
income number which provides a better summary of the information that investors 
have used in setting security prices over the fiscal period?’ (emphasis in original). 
                                                 
33
  The results of the study of Li & Meeks (2006) are in line with the findings of research on US 
companies which also supports the suggestion above. 
34
  Lapointe-Antunes et al (2008, 2009) represent a partial exception as regards the limitations described 
above: the authors use more recent data (2002) for their investigations and, test their hypotheses on a 
sample of Canadian companies. However, similarly to other studies reviewed in this section, they 
explore transitional goodwill impairment losses. 
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As the impact of write-downs is reflected in net income (or other earnings-based 
numbers) association studies on write-downs usually explore the correlation between 
stock prices and various performance measures such as earnings (Sellhorn, 2004). 
However, this type of study does not assume that the only factors influencing stock 
prices are performance measures and does not impose any strict causality between 
these figures. The purpose of association studies is rather to ‘test whether and how 
quickly accounting measures capture changes in the information set that is reflected in 
security returns’ (Kothari, 2001). In the case of asset write-downs, most of the studies 
reviewed provide evidence of a negative long-term relation between asset write-downs 
and returns (for example Bartov et al, 1998; Hirschey & Richardson, 2003, Duangploy 
et al, 2005). Additionally, there is some evidence that the market anticipated the write-
down, at least to some extent (Elliott & Hanna, 1996; Bartov et al, 1998; Comprix, 
2000; Alciatore et al, 2003; Hirschey & Richardson, 2003). This result is supported by 
the evidence that many of the write-down firms performed poorly compared to their 
industry peers in the years prior to the write-down announcements (Elliott & Shaw, 
1988; Zucca & Campbell, 1992; Rees et al, 1996). Heflin & Warfield (1997) find that 
while the returns of the write-down firms were lower compared to similar firms from 
the same industry, their earnings were higher during the three years preceding the 
write-down. The earnings only declined in the year of the write-down. A hypothesis 
providing a potential explanation for this phenomenon is that write-downs might be 
strategically timed in order to coincide with low earnings. Additionally, the authors 
present further evidence of the lack of timeliness of asset write-downs: a negative 
correlation between write-downs and returns for the three years prior to the write-
down, which supports the general trend. 
Empirical research of the timeliness of asset write-downs is not necessarily restricted 
to the methodology of association studies. In their information content study Bartov et 
al (1998) report, as discussed in the previous section, a very weak negative market 
reaction to asset write-down announcements. They propose two explanations for this 
result: first, that the market might be anticipating the write-down, or, second, that the 
market might need more time to adjust to the effects of the write-down. The authors 
investigate these hypotheses in a further association study covering two years before 
and two years after the announcement. Their findings are in line with previous 
research: market anticipation for the whole pre-announcement period and adjustment 
at least for one year after the write-down announcement. Additionally, Hayn & Hughes 
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(2006) report in their study that goodwill write-downs tend to be reported by 
management three to four years after the economic depletion of goodwill.35 If this 
finding is combined with previous research, it suggests that the market possibly reacts 
to the economic depletion of goodwill (with a certain time-lag) rather than to the actual 
announcement of goodwill write-downs in the financial statements. 
Hirschey & Richardson (2003) extend their 2002 study by exploring longer time 
intervals of one year before and one year after the announcement of goodwill 
impairment write-downs. The results show significant negative abnormal returns for 
both the pre- and post-announcement periods. The authors interpret the pre-
announcement results as supporting the hypothesis that goodwill write-downs are the 
result of company underperformance. Furthermore, considering the timeliness of the 
write-downs, it appears that to some extent the market anticipates goodwill 
impairments. Based on the post-announcement negative reaction, the authors offer the 
explanation that investors underreact to goodwill write-downs during the 
announcement period and the market takes considerable amount of time to adjust fully 
to their negative effect. However, Hirschey & Richardson (2003) do not further 
investigate the causes for this underreaction. The results of both Hirshey & 
Richardson’s studies (2002, see previous section, and 2003) were later confirmed by 
Duangploy et al (2005) who also found in an association study concentrating on US 
companies that the market reacts negatively to goodwill impairment losses.36 
Segal (2003) investigates the timeliness of goodwill write-downs under SFAS 142 and 
SFAS 121 but finds no difference between the two regulatory regimes. This, together 
with his findings of lack of market reaction differences leads him to the conclusion that 
SFAS 142 has not substantially improved the accounting for goodwill impairment as 
compared to the previous systematic amortisation regulation, at least, based on 
analysis of the adoption period. In a similar study, however not examining goodwill 
but long-lived assets, Riedl (2004) investigates the timeliness of write-downs before 
and under SFAS 121. The author also fails to find a significant difference concerning 
this asset write-down characteristic. 
                                                 
35
  Jarva (2009) also finds a time lag between the economic impairment of goodwill and the reporting of 
goodwill write-downs.  
36
  The results from this study contradict a suggestion made by Seetharaman et al (2006) that Hirschey 
& Richardon’s findings (2003) might not be valid since their sample was situated in the mid-
nineties. Seetharaman et al (2006) suggest that shareholders had changed their response to 
impairment after having the opportunity to apply SFAS 142 for some time and, thus, to get used to it.  
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Segal’s investigation could also be viewed as a comparison between goodwill 
amortisation and goodwill impairment write-downs, since SFAS 142 eliminated 
amortisation as accounting treatment for goodwill and made impairment mandatory. 
Therefore, where timeliness of goodwill write-downs is concerned, there was no 
difference between the two accounting treatments. Thus, his study contributes to a 
whole set of research questions concerning the usefulness of amortisation and the 
information it provides to investors. The motivation behind this trend in academic 
research lies in the question whether amortisation numbers build up an appropriate 
pattern to reflect the economic impairment of assets. The importance of this topic has 
been underlined not only by academics but also by the attention it has received by 
standard setters, culminating in the elimination of amortisation under US GAAP in 
2001 and IFRS in 2005.37 Some of the studies concentrating on amortisation 
usefulness are briefly outlined below since – although not primarily relating to the 
focus of interest of this thesis – they constitute an important part of research on 
goodwill write-downs. The relationship between asset write-down frequency and 
investors’ response has been investigated by Elliott & Hanna (1996) who examine the 
market reaction to asset write-downs based on the number of write-downs the 
company conducted in the relevant period. The authors find that the more write-downs 
a firm had, the more the market reaction diminished. Therefore, it seems likely that 
repeated write-downs increase noise and hinder investors to grasp earnings properly. 
This conclusion could be taken one step further and included in the academic 
discussion around the usefulness of goodwill amortisation: if repetitive write-downs 
(the result of amortisation and depreciation) increase noise, then systematic 
amortisation/depreciation accounting treatment is likely to depict economic 
impairment of the assets in question inadequately. 
Zang (2003) investigates the market response to increase in earnings due to the 
elimination of goodwill amortisation under SFAS 142 and also to the announcement of 
the initial goodwill impairment loss. Consistent with his predictions he finds that 
goodwill amortisation was considered to be anticipated rather than conveying new 
information about earnings and there was no significant reaction to its elimination. 
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence presented from Jennings et al 
(2001) stating that goodwill amortisation is a noise for investors and provides no new 
information about the firm. Additionally, Moehrle et al (2001) conduct an information 
                                                 
37
  See section 2.1 for more details on goodwill regulations. 
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content study investigating the usefulness of goodwill amortisation for investors based 
on the relations between goodwill write-downs and market-adjusted returns. Their 
sample includes S&P 1500 firms in the period 1988-1998. Consistent with the findings 
of Jennings et al (2001) and, later, of Zang (2003), the results provide evidence that 
goodwill amortisation was not informative or decision-useful for investors and were, 
therefore, supportive of FASB’s proposal to eliminate amortisation. In contrast to the 
results concerning goodwill amortisation, Zang (2003) finds a significant negative 
market reaction to unanticipated initial impairment losses, particularly for highly 
leveraged firms, suggesting that the impairment test might present a more consistent 
way to depict the economic depletion of goodwill (at least as far as investors are 
concerned). In a further study of the UK market Li & Meeks (2006) test the value 
relevance of goodwill impairment versus that of goodwill amortisation. Confirming 
results from prior research they find that goodwill amortisation is seen by investors as 
noise while impairment seems to reflect relevant information. 
Possibly motivated by the significant amount of research on SFAS 142 and the rather 
vociferal discussion on goodwill impairment at the time, Baker & Wearing (2001) test 
the potential impact of the US GAAP standard on British companies (the authors 
concentrated on Return-on-Assets (ROA) and Return-on-Equity (ROE) effects). Their 
results suggest that intangible-intensive companies would be more affected by the 
application of such an accounting standard in the UK compared to ‘old economy’ 
companies. Finally, Chambers (2007) investigates the value relevance of goodwill 
impairment under SFAS 142 as well as the value relevance of the elimination of 
goodwill amortisation on a sample of US companies for the period 2003-2005. 
Performing the investigation on the basis of a combination of reported numbers (for 
goodwill impairment losses) and ‘as if’ numbers (calculations of goodwill amortisation 
based on various assumptions of the useful life) the author finds that the most value 
relevant goodwill accounting system would include both impairment and amortisation 
methods (which is de facto the case under UK GAAP). 
In conclusion, the findings of studies reviewed in this section show a greater level of 
consistency than those of information content studies. A negative market reaction to 
asset write-downs over longer periods of time prevails in most of the studies 
considered. Together with the evidence that many write-down companies preformed 
poorly before the write-down, this suggests that investors might have expected at least 
partly the write-down. This conclusion might also offer one explanation for the 
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varying market reactions found in information content studies: depending on whether 
the market had anticipated the write-down, it might have reacted differently to its 
announcement. Another common feature showing in the studies reviewed here is that 
the market apparently cannot fully adjust to the effect of the write-downs in the 
announcement period. The write-down impact has been found to linger for up to two 
years after the announcement. The same comparability restrictions already discussed 
for information content studies apply here. Additionally, further caution is 
recommended since, due to the longer time intervals, noise in the data might increase 
due to overlapping with other announcements of new information. In this context 
goodwill write-downs are particularly vulnerable since announcements referring to 
them often include other information which interferes with investors’ response. 
2.2.1.2 Lenders’ response to asset write-downs 
While research concerning shareholders’ response to asset write downs is relatively 
abundant, the same cannot be said about other users of financial statements. This was 
already noted by Alciatore et al (1998) who, in their conclusion section, recommend 
that future research concentrates on other user groups such as lenders, since until then 
they have been rather neglected. The authors illustrate their recommendation by 
highlighting a study by Bernard & Frost (1989) as an example of research on lenders’ 
response to accounting information.  
Bernard & Frost (1989) examine the impact of a SEC rule restricting capitalisation of 
exploration costs for oil and gas companies. They hypothesise that the impact of write-
offs on loan agreements should be significant since the rule was unexpected and 
entered into force after the relevant period, so that companies would have little 
possibility to adjust. Therefore, violations of loan covenants were expected or at least a 
decrease in loan covenant slack. However, results showed no significant link between 
the write-offs and a decrease in loan covenant slack. Additionally, where there were 
violations, this did not seem to lead to alterations of the loan agreements or real costs 
for investors. 
The above example leads to the conclusion that loan covenants might provide a good 
opportunity to detect indirectly lenders’ response to asset write-downs. As loan 
covenants additionally offer a particularly good possibility to examine opportunistic 
managerial behaviour, they have already been intensely discussed in this specific 
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context both in the US and the UK. Section 2.2.2.3.1 concentrates on this discussion in 
detail.38 
Another study investigates a further topic close to the focus of interest here. Catasús & 
Gröjer (2003) examine the relevance of intangibles for credit decisions. The 
motivation of the study is based on the fact that some companies (especially small and 
medium-sized firms) are dependent on banks for acquiring capital, since they do not 
have access to the stock market. The authors rely on qualitative data (interview with 
loan officers, etc.) and their main finding suggests that intangibles are only relevant for 
credit decisions when they are considered to represent reliable information. Thus, it is 
actually the bank officers’ beliefs and personal assessment that appear to be 
responsible for the inclusion of intangibles in the credit decision-making process of 
banks. 
It seems logical that lenders should be interested in goodwill write-downs, since 
research indicates that these might provide a signal for the economic development of a 
company or for opportunistic managerial behaviour39 and, therefore, play a role in 
credit decision making processes. However, apart from numerous studies concerning 
the issue of debt covenants, research in this area has so far been limited.40 
2.2.1.3 Financial intermediaries’ response: Goodwill write-downs and 
credit ratings 
Financial intermediaries, here in particular rating agencies, represent another area 
where research concerning the response to goodwill write-downs is surprisingly scarce. 
A rating agency’s primary function is to ‘assist investors in making investment 
decisions. Through research, analysis, and information the nationally recognised credit 
rating agencies protect investors against unknowingly taking credit risk’ (Baron, 
2000). The role of a rating agency lies in providing valuable information to investors at 
low cost, thus decreasing the costs of obtaining new information and monitoring 
                                                 
38
  It should be noted, however, that research on debt covenants mostly tests the effect of regulatory 
changes on covenants, or the general inclusion of intangibles in the covenant calculation. Only very 
few studies address the role of goodwill for covenants and none test the direct response of lenders to 
goodwill impairment (such as for example restrictions of lending, change in covenants or penalties). 
39
  For an overview of relevant research see sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3. 
40
  The findings on the shareholders’ reaction to goodwill write-downs cannot be applied to lenders 
without adjustments as lenders’ interest in goodwill impairment differs from shareholders’ view. 
While investors require complete information about a company at best, lenders are more likely to be 
concerned about conservatism and timeliness of numbers which would secure their investment in the 
company in question (Ball et al 2008). 
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company performance in a market where rapidity provides valuable advantages. The 
importance of its activities and products (the credit ratings) is strongly interlinked with 
its reputation, which can be seen when the market capitalisation of established rating 
agencies such as Moody’s are traced (Partnoy, 2002; Baron, 2000).41 Despite 
substantial criticism by academics and the public concerning the rate of adjustment of 
their ratings to new events, rating objectivity, lack of informational value or other 
issues42, rating agencies still play a major role in the investors’ decision making 
process. Furthermore, their place in the market is firmly secured by a number of 
regulators including ratings in laws and rulings. Among these are for example the 
Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, the Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank (S&P, 2005; Baron, 2000). 
A credit rating represents the opinion of a rating agency about the ‘overall 
creditworthiness’ of a company (Churyk, 2001). It is the result of extensive analysis 
including quantitative and qualitative information about the firm and its environment. 
Additionally, industry specifics as well as macroeconomic events are evaluated. There 
are two categories of rating analysis: short-term, or ‘point-in-time’ analysis, where 
more weight is placed on the company’s current situation; the second way to conduct a 
credit rating assessment is long-term, or ‘through-the cycle’ analysis which is often 
used when capital supply is the objective. (Crouhy et al, 2001). A good rating allows 
easier access to loans and enhances possibilities to issue debt obligations. A bad rating 
(or a decrease in the rating status), on the other hand can cause difficulties to raise 
capital or/and stock price declines (Sellhorn, 2004). Thus, ratings affect companies’ 
cost of debt and of equity and are, therefore, an issue of considerable importance and 
concern to the company (Martin & Henderson, 1983). 
The quantitative information included in the rating analysis is normally based on data 
available in the company’s financial reports (S&P, 2005). Therefore, accounting 
information is expected to play an important role in the decision process of credit 
ratings. In this context, considering their sometimes substantial amounts, goodwill 
write-downs might possibly be relevant. Issues within this area of research can be 
categorised as follows: 
                                                 
41
  The importance of this link was heavily underlined during the recent financial crisis, when a lot of 
criticism and calls for greater transparency of the rating process were aimed at rating agencies (SEC, 
2008; Utzig, 2010). 
42
  An overview of this discussion is provided in Partnoy (2000). 
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(1) What is the effect of the announcement of new accounting information - and, 
in particular, of goodwill write-downs - on ratings? What is the speed of 
adjustment of credit ratings to such new information? 
(2) What is the role of accounting information in the decision making process of 
credit ratings? How are differing (goodwill) accounting treatments perceived 
by rating agencies and how are they incorporated in the assessment process? 
These two issues are dealt with in turn in the next two subsections. 
2.2.1.3.1 Announcement effect of accounting data 
Rating agencies issue their opinions of the creditworthiness or credit quality of a 
company based on either the current condition of the company or on a long-term 
company cycle, where the worst point in the cycle is evaluated in order to achieve 
stability of the rating (Crouhy et al, 2001). In the process of monitoring the credit 
quality of the company, rating agencies adjust the rating as new information is 
available.  
Following several surveys of reported slowness in the reaction of rating agencies to 
information affecting credit quality (Baker & Mansi, 2002), Altman & Rijken (2004) 
investigate the reasons for the apparently slow adjustment of credit ratings to changes 
in credit quality. Their findings suggest that rating agencies use more often the long-
term ‘through-the-cycle’ methodology and therefore, often do not heed short-term 
indicators. In other words, a rating is changed only when the new information is likely 
to cause permanent changes in creditworthiness.  
A possible way to compensate, at least partially, for the slowness of ratings’ 
adjustments under the ‘through-the-cycle’ methodology is the credit watch, used by 
rating agencies. According to Moody’s and S&P, a company is placed under credit 
watch whenever it is likely that its rating will be changed due to impending events 
including regulatory changes or operating events (Löffler, 2005). Thus, for example, it 
might be possible that announcements of goodwill write-downs lead to a placement of 
the company on the watchlist rather than to a direct downgrade. 
Direct empirical evidence that rating agencies react to accounting information and 
particularly asset write-downs, with adjustments to company ratings is presented by 
Elliott & Shaw (1988) in their study of asset write-downs between 1980 and 1987. 
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They find that bond ratings two years before and two years after the write-down were 
downgraded more often than for industrial firms on average, with the strongest effect 
occurring during the year of the write-down. The authors counted the number of 
increases and decreases of the bond ratings in the relevant period and also found that 
decreases occurred more often for write-down firms than increases. Based on these 
results, the authors perceive a relation between the poor performance of write-down 
firms and their bond rating.  Elliott & Hanna (1996) take this investigation one step 
further and examine the link between the frequency of the write-downs and bond 
ratings. Their results show that an increase in the number of write-downs that a 
company conducts leads to a decrease in the bond rating. The findings of these two 
studies suggest that where the write-down is perceived to be the result of economic 
deterioration of the financial situation of the firm, it is likely that it is followed by a 
change in rating (downgrade) or a placement on the credit watch. Neither Elliott & 
Shaw (1988) nor Elliott & Hanna (1996) concentrate on goodwill write-downs; they 
use a broader definition of write-downs in their studies43.  
2.2.1.3.2 The role of accounting data in the rating decision making 
process 
The correlation between goodwill impairment announcements and changes in the 
rating of a company can be examined by looking at the role of this accounting 
information in the rating assessment process in the first place. Through the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s there has been ample research concerning the role of accounting data 
in the credit rating decision making process. Most of the studies investigate the 
predictability of ratings by using models including publicly available accounting 
numbers. Since rating agencies themselves do not elaborate on their exact decision-
making process (Chattopadhyay et al, 1997; SEC, 2008), the aim of these studies is to 
explain how the rating decision was reached (Horrigan, 1966; West, 1970; Pinches & 
Mingo, 1975; Kaplan & Urwitz, 1979; Belkaoui, 1980; Molinero et al, 1996); or, 
alternatively, to predict firm bankruptcy (Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Altman et al, 
1977; Ohlson, 1980).44 
                                                 
43
  Elliott & Shaw (1988) include significant nonrecurring items, write-downs or write-offs of 
receivables, intangible assets, capitalised computer software, etc. in their sample. Elliott & Hanna 
(1996) concentrate on special items that are larger than 1% of total assets. 
44
  Although research on firm bankruptcy is not relevant here, it is mentioned for the sake of 
completeness and is not further discussed. 
 52 
Altman and Saunders (1998) provide an overview of the main research approaches 
used to predict ratings based on accounting information. Typically, either univariate 
credit-scoring models are used, where the researcher ‘compares various key accounting 
ratios of potential borrowers with industry or group norms’; or multivariate credit-
scoring systems, where the accounting ratios are weighted and combined in a more 
sophisticated system. These methodologies are used either to predict the default 
probability of the companies, or to assess and explain the credit rating issued by rating 
agencies. The findings of most studies explain between 56-75% of the ratings 
(Horrigan, 1966; West, 1970; Pinches & Mingo, 1975; Kaplan & Urwitz, 1979; 
Belkaoui, 1980; Gentry & Whitford, 1988). These studies, however, do not concentrate 
on the implication of a particular accounting number for the rating decision process. 
They investigate the aggregate influence of several accounting variables. 
Concerning the impact of separate accounting positions, research has so far included 
investigations on the effect of pension obligations and of deferred taxes. Martin & 
Henderson (1983) investigate the effect that the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) had on bond ratings. ERISA changed the priority of claim of pension 
liabilities, which was expected to have an impact on bond ratings. The results 
suggested that inclusion of ERISA variables in the prediction model (compared to a 
model using only traditional ratios) increased the predictive ability from 27% to 56% 
with greater accuracy for lower ratings. The authors note the small size of their sample 
and recommend revisiting the study when further data are available.45 
A couple of decades later Hann et al (2007) investigated the value and credit relevance 
of alternative pension accounting models (fair value approach versus the so-called 
‘smoothing’ model) using a sample of US companies between 1991 and 2002. They 
find that the credit relevance (but not the value relevance) of the balance sheet is 
improved under the fair value approach but not when using the ‘smoothing’ model. 
The income statement usefulness (both value and credit relevance), however, was 
diminished when applying fair value accounting for pensions. The authors interpret 
this result as an illustration of the different needs of investors and creditors (also a 
question raised by Holthausen & Watts, 2001).  
                                                 
45
  The link between pension obligations and ratings has also been seen in practice, for example when 
S&P downgraded ThyssenKrupp due to a change of consideration of pension provisions. For a 
discussion of this issue, see Sellhorn, 2004, pp. 141-144. 
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Another issue was discussed in two studies by Huss & Zhao (1991) and by 
Chattopadhyay et al (1997). Both studies investigate the usefulness of alternative 
accounting treatments for deferred tax for the rating decision on an ex post basis. 
Huss & Zhao (1991) use a US sample of Moody’s bond ratings for 1981 including 
ratings of B or higher. They calculate financial ratios on ‘as if’ basis using three 
alternative user treatments linked to the accounting treatments for deferred taxes 
specified by APB opinion No. 11. The results show no difference in rater preferences 
related to any of the different accounting treatments. The authors interpret these 
findings either as lack of relevance of deferred taxes for the rating decision or as a 
signal that rating agencies assign an equal importance to all accounting treatments. 
Similarly, Chattopadhyay et al (1997) concentrate on the usefulness of alternative 
deferred tax accounting treatments for bond rating decisions. They choose a sample of 
Canadian firms, rated by the CBRS between 1973 and 1990. The authors use the same 
methodology as Huss & Zhao (1991) and reach a similar conclusion. They conclude 
that deferred tax accounting might not play a role in the bond rating decision process. 
Moving a step closer to goodwill, Amir et al (2003) focus on intangibles and their 
relevance for analysts. They discuss whether inadequate reporting of R&D is balanced 
by analysts’ use of information available outside of the financial report. Although, the 
authors report that their results are mixed to a certain extent, the findings seem to 
support the above hypothesis. Therefore, where intangibles-intensive industries are 
concerned, it might be advisable to also include additional information available 
outside the financial report. 
Specifically concerning goodwill write-downs, there is some empirical evidence that 
managers do worry about the effect these write-downs might have on the credit rating 
of the company (Gore et al, 2000; Sellhorn (2004) however does not find a significant 
relation).  
Additionally, Hopkins et al (2000) analyse analysts’ sell/buy recommendations in 
relation to goodwill amortisation. Their findings show that analysts are more likely to 
assign a higher value to companies which immediately write off the excess of the 
acquisition price over the identifiable assets and liabilities of the target as IPR&D as 
opposed to companies capitalising and amortising goodwill. 
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2.2.2 Causes for goodwill write-downs 
The impact of goodwill write-downs on company numbers and key performance 
indicators as well as the response of financial statement users to this information is not 
only a valid research question on its own. It also provides the motivation for and acts 
as a ‘prelude’ to another, much larger, goodwill-related research area. If users of 
financial statements react in some way to goodwill write-downs and if this effect is 
material (and, especially if it is material and negative), then it becomes essential to 
understand not only the impact of goodwill write-downs but also the causes ultimately 
leading to these write-downs. 
Additionally, compliance with IFRS eliminates UK managers’ choice between 
amortisation and impairment as accounting treatments for the subsequent valuation of 
goodwill. This regulatory change alone has a substantial impact on companies 
currently and previously applying UK GAAP: despite the accounting choice offered in 
FRS 11, an overwhelming majority (94%) of listed UK companies applied goodwill 
amortisation (Sproul & Higson, 2005). Therefore, beside the assessment of the 
response of financial statement users, it is also important to understand managers’ 
motivation behind their accounting choices.  
For purposes of this thesis the review of prior research related to causes of goodwill 
(and more generally asset) write-downs is structured according to the life span of an 
acquisition. First, overpayment aspects potentially leading to increased goodwill write-
downs are discussed since this event usually occurs at and can be detected shortly after 
an acquisition. Next, the period during which the target is part of the acquirer is 
reviewed and respective research on goodwill write-down causes in this environment is 
addressed. The issues discussed include economic causes for goodwill write-downs, 
reporting incentives inducing the management to carry out the write-down (such as for 
example debt covenants, earnings stability, etc.) or regulatory changes which might 
create a temporary environment dis-/encouraging goodwill write-downs (for example 
the transitional period of the adoption of SFAS 142). Finally, an issue is tentatively 
mentioned concerning possible characteristics of goodwill write-downs shortly before 
the disposal of a firm. This discussion is motivated by UITF abstract 3 ‘Treatment of 
Goodwill on Disposal of a Business’ (UK GAAP). 
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An overview of this structure is presented in illustration 2.2 below including some 
suggestions and/or examples of goodwill-related causes, which are discussed in depth 
in the following sections.  
Illustration 2.2: Causes of goodwill write-downs: an overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Overpayment at acquisition 
According to the definition in FRS 10, para. 2, goodwill is the residual amount 
remaining after accounting for all identifiable assets and liabilities of the entity. 
Previous research has investigated the characteristics of this residual amount and 
evidence for several elements contained in goodwill is available (for example Johnson 
& Petrone, 1998; Henning et al, 2000). However, it is not necessarily clear what 
characteristics the amount of recorded goodwill accounts for (Churyk, 2001). In fact, it 
is possible, at least in some cases, that goodwill or part of it reflects overpayment for 
the target firm at acquisition and is already impaired at this early point in time. A 
problem might arise for UK companies using amortisation in the sense that the 
goodwill write-downs do not correctly reflect an economic decrease in value which 
might be different in the first year after acquisition than in later years. ASB’s solution 
to this problem is contained in FRS 10, para. 34 requiring all companies to conduct an 
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impairment test at the end of the first financial year after acquisition (hereafter called 
the ‘initial impairment test’). The initial impairment test is required in order to capture 
a possible overpayment for the target, or other events leading to the depletion of 
goodwill. There is no study, however, to knowledge of the researcher which 
investigates whether the initial impairment test reflects overpayment in UK firms, as 
opposed to write-downs in subsequent years. Therefore, in this section relevant 
literature under international GAAP is reviewed. 
An interesting question worth asking when looking at overpayment for targets at 
acquisition is why companies might be willing to overpay in the first place. Merger 
and acquisition motives some of which might lead to overpayment have been well 
investigated in previous research and support for several causes has been found.46 For 
example an agency conflict could represent a motive for an acquisition leading to 
overpayment: this is the case when management is prompted to conduct an acquisition 
based on their own interest and acts knowingly to the disadvantage of shareholders. 
Support for the existence of agency conflict as a motive for acquisition has been found 
in several studies (Malatesta, 1983; Walkling & Long, 1984; Lewellen et al, 1985; 
Lang et al, 1989; Schleifer & Vishny, 1989; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Chyruk, 
2001, 2005). However, there is also the possibility that managers act unintentionally to 
the detriment of shareholders when they mistakenly overestimate their ability to 
(better) manage the target which might lead to an overpayment at acquisition. This 
phenomenon is called hubris and is introduced by Roll (1986) and supported with 
further empirical evidence by Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) and Zhang (1998). The 
results of Churyk (2001, 2005) support the existence of both hubris and agency 
conflict in the context of goodwill write-downs. However, the author is unable to 
separate the two phenomena and uses the same variable to describe them. Berkovitch 
& Narayanan (1993) have managed to separate these events in their study of motives 
for takeovers by using the relationship between target and total gains. 
Having identified potential causes leading to overpayment researchers could proceed 
to testing whether the write-downs reflect overpayment at acquisition. The few studies 
investigating this link concentrate on US companies during the transitional regulations 
of SFAS 142 (Li et al, 2004; Long, 2005) or during non-transitional periods under US 
GAAP (Henning et al, 2000; Churyk, 2001, 2005). The transitional regulatory setting 
is specific and write-downs conducted under such regulations might be motivated by 
                                                 
46
  Churyk (2001) provides an overview of the literature concerning motives for mergers. 
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causes other than overpayment.47 Admittedly, a lot of these other possible causes are 
controlled for in the study conducted by Long (2005). The author examines two issues 
related to overpayment. First, the relation between goodwill impairment charges 
caused by the adoption of SFAS 142 and overpayment in the initial acquisition is 
investigated. The results provide evidence that these two variables are positively 
related after controlling for other economic events and incentives. Furthermore, the 
author finds that the market does not view the overpayment element of goodwill 
differently for companies conducting write-downs and for companies who do not. The 
data used in the studies cover the transitional period of the adoption of SFAS 142 
(2002-2003) and initial acquisitions are traced back for the period of 1997-2002. 
Similar results are provided by Li et al (2004) who use the same setting as Long 
(2005), but do not control for some of the economic and incentive variables that Long 
(2005) does account for.48  
Another possible way to investigate the relation between goodwill write-downs and 
overpayment is to establish reliable indicators of overpayment and to test a potential 
link between them and the amount of the goodwill write-down. Since regulators often 
provide guidance to reporting firms using such indicators, it is important to understand 
whether these indicators in fact lead to overpayment and whether other important 
indicators need to be added to that guidance. Researchers have already provided some 
evidence concerning these questions by testing indicators provided by standard setters 
(Churyk, 2001; El-Gazzar et al, 2004; Li et al, 2004; Churyk, 2005; Hayn & Hughes, 
2006). Li et al (2004) find that the market reaction following an acquisition was 
negative for acquirers and positive for target firms, suggesting possible overpayment 
and that the amount of impairment write-downs is positively correlated with some 
indicators of overpayment. The indicators investigated are: ‘(i) the percentage of 
purchase price paid in excess of the pre-acquisition per share book value of the target, 
(ii) percentage purchase premium paid relative to the pre-acquisition price of the 
target, (iii) percentage of the firm price paid in the form of shares, (iv) whether 
multiple bidders competed for the target firm, and (v) whether the acquisition is 
unrelated to the acquirer’s main business’. Concerning indicator (iii) the authors find, 
                                                 
47
  See chapter 2.2.2.4 for more details concerning the characteristics of write-downs conducted around 
regulatory changes. 
48
  Long (2005) also uses a more refined variable to measure overpayment than Li et al (2004) who use 
the difference between the purchase price and the book value of the firm. Long (2005) uses the 
residual of goodwill that remains after accounting for other components of goodwill such as the 
going-concern value of the target and synergies between target and acquirer (see also Johnson & 
Petrone, 1998; Henning et al, 2000).  
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contrary to expectations that the control sample including industry-matched firms that 
did not conduct impairment write-downs had a higher coefficient than impairment 
firms. Similarly, Churyk (2001, 2005) tests initial overpayment of goodwill after 
acquisition with the help of five indicators proposed by the Exposure Draft released 
prior to the issuance of SFAS 142, which are similar to the indicators used by Li et al 
(2004) with the exception of condition (v). The author finds, however, very weak 
evidence for initial overpayment when the payment for the target was in the form of 
shares and no such evidence for the other indicators. A possible explanation for this 
result, as the author mentions herself, is the small size of the sample (144-153 
companies investigated in the period 1996-1998). Churyk’s study is one of the two not 
investigating the framework of SFAS 142 adoption and transitional regulations (the 
other one is Henning et al (2000)).  
El-Gazzar et al (2004) test these same indicators and find that goodwill is more likely 
to be impaired if it was a significant part of the purchase price and, additionally, if the 
purchase price was paid in shares of the acquiree. Finally, Hayn & Hughes (2006) find 
that acquisition characteristics based on these indicators provide more precise 
predictors of future impairment losses than performance measures of the acquiree. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the relation of overpayment at acquisition and 
goodwill impairment is relatively well investigated. However, almost all studies 
existing on this topic are constructed using the regulatory framework of US GAAP and 
/or the transitional phase of SFAS 142. 
2.2.2.2 Economic causes 
If financial reporting regulations are followed, write-offs should ideally reflect a loss in 
the value of the asset. However, regulations for some assets, among them especially 
goodwill, allowed in the past or still allow considerable managerial discretion 
concerning issues such as example the timing or amount of the write-downs (for a 
review of regulations see chapter 2.1). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that research 
has often (at least indirectly) concentrated on questions related to the extent to which 
asset write-downs reflect economic reasons (Strong & Meyer, 1987; Elliott & Shaw, 
1988; Francis et al, 1996; Rees et al, 1996; Heflin & Warfield, 1997; Cotter et al, 
1998; Hirschey & Richardson, 2003; Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Riedl, 2004, Sellhorn, 
2004). A major reason for monitoring the relationship between economic factors and 
goodwill write-downs is the concern (of investors, regulatory bodies, etc.) that write-
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downs might reflect managerial incentives rather than the economic impairment of the 
asset.49 Since the aim of financial statements is to provide economically relevant 
information about the firm situation, this concern leads to the question whether there is 
empirical support showing that write-downs are driven by loss in asset value rather 
than by other causes. 
Generally, empirical results show that asset write-downs actually do reflect economic 
impairment, at least partially. However, findings differ as to the extent of economic 
impairment captured by write-downs (as opposed to other causes). Since economic 
impairment has proven to be hard to model, studies usually use variables describing 
the financial and economic performance of the company prior to the occurrence of the 
write-down (Sellhorn, 2004). Such variables could be stock price movements, market-
to-book (MTB) and return-on-assets (ROA) ratios (Francis et al, 1996; Elliott & Shaw, 
1988; Sellhorn, 2004), company sales (Segal, 2003; Riedl, 2004), company-specific or 
industry factors. Elliott & Shaw (1988) find that asset write-downs are likely to ‘occur 
during a period of sustained economic difficulty’ when the write-down firm 
substantially underperformed its industry peers. Further results concerning firm 
underperformance of write-down firms compared with their industry benchmarks is 
provided by Strong & Meyer (1987), Rees et al (1996) and Heflin & Warfiled (1997). 
Similarly to Elliott & Shaw (1988), however, none of these studies differentiates 
between categories of write-downs. Francis et al (1996) extend prior academic 
research by differentiating between several types of write-downs including inventory 
and goodwill write-downs. Their findings show that the extent to which write-downs 
reflect economic factors (as opposed to reporting incentives) depends on whether the 
asset is discretionary50 or not. In the case of discretionary assets such as goodwill, 
write-downs seemed to be caused more often by reporting incentives than economic 
reasons. Another issue is explored by Riedl (2004) who provides a comparison 
between asset write-downs (for long-lived assets) before and after SFAS 121 in order 
to test the efficiency of the then new standard. The author finds that write-downs 
before SFAS 121 reflected economic factors to a higher extent than write-downs 
                                                 
49
  The numerous studies on managerial incentives usually also include variables aiming to model the 
economic depletion of goodwill. Therefore, they also provide some information regarding the 
relation of goodwill write-downs to economic causes. Managerial reporting incentives for 
conducting a goodwill write-down are discussed in detail in section 2.2.2.3. 
50
  The authors define an asset as discretionary when financial reporting regulations are sufficiently 
flexible for managers to pursue their financial reporting objectives at their own discretion. Goodwill 
write-downs are also considered to be discretionary in later research (Segal, 2003). Sellhorn (2004) 
provides an extensive analysis of the discretionary nature of goodwill write-downs under SFAS 142. 
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conducted after the adoption of SFAS 121. He uses these results as evidence against 
the usefulness and efficiency of the standard. 
In conclusion, it can be said that a number of studies exist that investigate the relation 
between write-downs and economic factors. However, there are several noticeable 
gaps in and limitations of this literature. First, most of the studies do not concentrate 
on specific categories of write-downs but rather investigate a more generally defined 
group, such as discretionary write-downs or negative special items. The only study 
directly referring to goodwill write-downs is Francis et al (1996) which covers data 
from the period 1989-1992. This limitation is, however, only a formality as the 
numerous studies on reporting incentives, managerial opportunism and asset write-
downs (see section 2.2.2.3) also include variables capturing financial performance, 
and, therefore, also test economic causes. Furthermore, the studies reviewed in this 
section all refer to US companies and the US GAAP framework. Finally, previous 
research uses variables measuring the economic performance of companies (i.e. the 
outcomes of economic performance) and links them to goodwill impairment. However, 
the phenomena underlying these economic factors (i.e. what leads to the deterioration 
of financials of a company) are not investigated in relation to goodwill impairment.51  
2.2.2.3 Reporting incentives  
The issue whether managers use asset write-downs to manipulate earnings, i.e. whether 
reporting incentives motivate the occurrence, timing and amount of write-downs is by 
far the most investigated problem in asset write-down literature. This area of research 
can be seen as a part of the much bigger debate on earnings management or disclosure 
management, which is not discussed here. Research interest in this area is based, on the 
one hand, on the fear of investors that management might - in a principal-agent context 
- misuse their trust and the information asymmetry to its own benefit. On the other 
hand, standard setters continuously endeavour to limit potential opportunistic 
behaviour of the management which might hinder a ‘fair presentation’ of the financial 
situation of the firm (as required for example in ASB Principles, Chapter 1, and in 
IFRS, QC4, QC12-16).52 Therefore, the motivation of empirical research is to expose 
                                                 
51
  Research on this topic is partly reviewed within the discussion of triggering events, see 
section 2.2.3.1. 
52
  It is important to note that managerial behaviour is not necessarily aimed to detriment shareholders’ 
wealth. It is also possible that managers use asset write-downs to signal new information (Rees et al, 
1996; Li et al, 2004). 
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the influence (or lack thereof) of reporting incentives on asset write-downs and thus 
stimulate discussions and provide support for standard setting action.  
An overview of the relevant findings in the research area of reporting incentives and 
their influence on asset write-downs is provided in the following sections. This 
literature review is categorised according to the main issues found in the academic 
discussion. 
2.2.2.3.1 Debt covenants 
The debt covenant discussion is based on the theory of agency conflicts existing in the 
contracts between different parties related to the company such as shareholders, 
lenders and managers. According to Watts & Zimmermann (1986), a number of 
contracts exist in the firm between these parties that can generally be categorised as 
‘principals’ (shareholders, lenders) and ‘agents’ (management). In a simplified setting, 
it can be said that the principals carry the major part of the costs to monitor agents’ 
performance and to ensure agents’ compliance with their own interests. In the relevant 
literature concerning contracts between principals and agents two mechanisms have 
been discussed to achieve the above: compensation plans designed to provide an 
incentive for the management to act towards shareholders’ interests and debt covenants 
securing a prioritised ranking of lenders’ interests (Watts & Zimmermann, 1986; 
Sellhorn, 2004). Compensation plans in this context are, however, not discussed here: 
although there has been some research concerning their relation with asset write-downs 
(Francis et al, 1996; Heflin & Warfield, 1997; Segal, 2003; Riedl, 2004; Beatty & 
Weber, 2005; Dorata, 2008), the general conclusion so far is that asset write-downs are 
hardly used to influence management compensation when based on accounting 
numbers.53   
The purpose of accounting-based debt covenants is to establish means of control and 
monitoring of agents’ activities for the sake of lenders interested in securing the 
repayment of the company’s debt. With the help of debt covenants company risk can 
be regulated, kept at a low level and management hindered to accumulate additional 
debts for further investments (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Trespassing on the 
limitations set in these contracts will usually trigger an ‘event of default’ for the 
                                                 
53
  Beatty (2007) notes that, contrary to debt contracts, executive compensation contracts are more 
flexible, particularly so, as regards the determination of the basis for bonus calculations. This 
explanation could account for the apparent lack of relation between managerial compensation and 
asset write-downs. 
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company’s debt leading to an obligation of immediate repayment. Research on 
lenders’ interests provides several interesting insights. While Watts (2003) postulates 
that accounting conservatism will improve the efficiency of debt contracts, Gigler et al 
(2009) find that lenders will benefit more from an early loss recognition (as opposed to 
timely) and, therefore, earlier loan covenant violations.54 Nevertheless, in spite of this 
finding, research seems to agree that lenders will profit by timely (as opposed to late) 
information about deterioration of the loan repayment ability of the firm and even 
reward such company behaviour by lowering the interest rates on loans to conservative 
borrowers (Zhang, 2008). This behaviour of lenders, however, also seems to affect the 
accounting precision of company information. Feltham et al (2007) report that 
companies will produce less accurate accounts if - post-poor financial performance - 
they fear loan covenant violations. And, in fact, there is a lot to fear: Gârleanu & 
Zwiebel (2009) find that covenant violations tend to occur shortly after contract 
inception (on average one year) and that - due to tight calculation of the loan covenants 
(also researched by Chava & Roberts, 2005) about 30% of loans are in violation at 
some point over their duration if net worth covenants are considered (42% if current 
ratio covenants are regarded). Frequent covenant violation leads to more frequent 
renegotiations of debt contracts, relaxations, waivers and record-keeping and thus 
increases significantly the respective costs.  
Considering these rather significant implications of debt covenant violations and the 
fact that their occurrence does not seem to be the exception to the rule managers might 
be induced to a certain extent to apply accounting methods that would avoid a breach 
of the restrictions of the covenant: the so-called debt-covenant hypothesis (Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002)55. Academic research has already undertaken the task of empirically 
investigating this issue. More specifically, in the context of this thesis, managers’ 
discretion concerning asset (goodwill) write-downs might be used to avoid possible 
breaches of the company debt covenants. In fact, Hall & Swinney (2004) find that 
firms tailor their accounting policies to avoid debt covenant violation. Additionally, 
Beatty et al (2002) report that companies will even pay higher interest rates on loans if 
this will allow them higher accounting flexibility. 
                                                 
54
  In support of Watts’ findings Nikolaev (2010) finds that accounting conservatism increases reliance 
on covenants for public debt contracts, however, only when there are no previous private debt 
contracts. 
55
  See also Feltham et al (2007). 
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A closer look at the accounting ratios used in debt covenants reveals that debt ratios 
are usually preferred, such as the debt-to-equity ratio (DTE ratio, also called gearing) 
or interest coverage (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Citron, 1992a; Dichev & Skinner, 
2002). Since access to actual debt covenant data is not readily available, especially for 
private debt agreements, earlier research in this area relies largely on the DTE ratio as 
a proxy in empirical studies (Collins et al, 1981; Daley & Vigeland, 1983; Leftwich, 
1983). Although later studies shift their methodology in favour of actual debt covenant 
details56 (Press & Weintrop, 1990; Beneish & Press, 1993; Mohrman, 1993; Smith, 
1993; Sweeney, 1994; Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Beatty et al, 2008; Frankel et al, 
2008), there is also evidence of the appropriateness of the DTE ratio as a proxy leading 
researchers to recommend its use (Duke & Hunt, 1990; Press & Weintrop, 1990). 
Beneish & Press (1993) for example also support the use of DTE ratio but recommend 
actual covenant information as the more appropriate method. Dichev & Skinner 
(2002), however, find only an insignificant link between DTE ratio and covenant slack 
(defined as the proximity to the loan covenant limits). They interpret this result as 
providing evidence of the noisiness of DTE ratio as a proxy.57 The authors explore a 
large database of US private lending agreements and include in their sample not only 
firms that violated debt covenant restrictions but also companies that managed to avoid 
breaches. Their results show that debt covenant violations are not necessarily caused 
by financial distress. In the UK, Citron (1995) finds that, for a sample of 108 UK 
public debt contracts, the DTE ratio (gearing variable) is not related to accounting-
based debt covenants. 
The fact that debt covenants are often based on accounting information together with 
Dichev & Skinner’s evidence of lack of connection between debt covenant breaches 
and company financial problems means that some of the violations might be due to the 
adoption of a new accounting standard or to a change in accounting choice under 
current regulations. Therefore, research concerning accounting-based debt covenants is 
directly related to research of the determinants of management’s accounting choices 
(Citron, 1992a). The information in accounting-based covenants is often presented 
according to local GAAP58 which can be either ‘frozen’ (the GAAP ruling that was 
                                                 
56
  Financial ratios used in debt covenants may vary across countries (Citron 1992a). 
57
  Georgiou (2005) also rejects the use of DTE as a proxy for debt covenant costs. Nevertheless, 
research on goodwill-related issues, indirectly related to debt covenant research, still uses the DTE 
ratio as a proxy for the debt covenant hypothesis (see among others Zang, 2003; Segal, 2003; 
Sellhorn, 2004). 
58
  There is also evidence, however, of the use of some GAAP modifications for purposes of 
accounting-based debt covenant calculation (for example Leftwich, 1983). 
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mandatory when the debt in question was issued) or ‘rolling’ where the current 
regulations at the time of calculation of the covenants are relevant (Leftwich, 1983; 
Citron, 1992a; Ormrod & Taylor, 2004; Sellhorn, 2004). According to Leftwich 
(1983), Citron (1992a) and Ormrod & Taylor (2004) debt covenants in private debt 
contracts in the US and the UK are more likely to be based on ‘rolling’ GAAP than on 
‘frozen’ GAAP. Citron (1992a) draws the conclusion that in these cases newly issued 
accounting regulations might lead to violations of the restrictions of the debt covenant. 
This is particularly important for the UK debt market where accounting-based 
covenants are mostly affirmative, meaning that ‘they apply at all times while the debt 
is outstanding’ (Citron, 1992a).59 The above results are confirmed in a study by Citron 
(1992b) in which a predominant view of bankers was to adjust the debt covenants 
following the issuance of a new accounting standard that might lead to violation of the 
restrictions. Ormrod & Taylor (2004) discuss debt covenants in the context of the 
introduction of IFRS in the UK and conclude that IFRS regulations are bound to have 
a significant impact on covenant violations. 
Research in the area of asset write-downs has already provided some useful findings 
related to accounting-based debt covenants. Discretionary write-downs are particularly 
interesting in this context, since they offer a choice between different accounting 
treatments which might be used in relation to covenant slack. Apart from some 
theoretical discussions (Heflin & Warfield, 1997), there are also empirical results 
showing little or no connection between write-downs and debt covenants under US 
GAAP (pre-SFAS 121, SFAS 121 and SFAS 142; see Segal, 2003; Riedl, 2004) while 
others find opposite evidence (Zang, 2003; Beatty & Weber, 2005). However, these 
studies compare write-downs under different regulatory regimes or investigate 
transitional write-downs. Another issue to discuss would be the question whether debt 
covenants influence management’s choice of alternative accounting methods under the 
same accounting regime. This issue has been discussed in the UK in the context of 
SSAP 22, which offered companies a choice between capitalisation of goodwill and 
immediate write-off against equity. Gore et al (2000) investigate whether 
management’s choices under SSAP 22 were motivated by debt covenants or 
compensation schemes. Since most companies actually chose the option to write 
goodwill directly against equity (thus modifying the DTE ratio), the authors were 
interested in the reasons behind the managerial decisions of the few firms that 
                                                 
59
  The author finds a similar trend in Australia, while US public debt contracts are mostly negative, i.e. 
apply only before a decision over issuance of new debt is made. 
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capitalised and amortised goodwill. The findings show that companies with covenants 
based on balance sheet ratios (DTE ratio) prefer to capitalise goodwill and amortise it 
in order to prevent equity decrease. In the case of debt covenants based on interest 
coverage, it is income statement effects that might lead to a violation of the 
restrictions, therefore managers are hypothesised to choose direct write-off of goodwill 
against equity. The latter hypothesis was also confirmed, although to a lesser extent.  
The study of Gore et al (2000) makes it clear that UK managers consider accounting-
based debt covenants when choosing an accounting treatment for goodwill. 
Furthermore, their study provides an insight into the motivation of companies to 
choose a particular accounting treatment (capitalisation) that was ignored by the 
majority of their peers. Some years later, FRS 10 provides a similar regulatory setting 
which can be explored: UK companies (94%, see Sproul & Higson, 2005) largely rely 
on amortisation of goodwill instead of impairment and a possible research question 
would be whether accounting-based debt covenants play a role in this choice60. The 
adoption year of FRS 10 is investigated by Wang (2003) who explores the 
characteristics of early adopters of the standard. The results provide evidence in 
support of the DTE hypothesis: firms with high gearing tended to take the accounting 
choice of early adoption. 
Two more recent studies also look at the effect of goodwill impairment losses on the 
efficiency of loan covenants. Frankel et al (2008) and Beatty et al (2008) argue that 
goodwill will only have an impact on covenants if a debt contract has net worth 
covenants and there is goodwill on the balance sheet. The impact of the goodwill (and 
its write-downs) can be eliminated by using the tangible net worth for covenant 
specifications. Frankel et al (2008) find that although lenders tend to use net worth 
covenants for companies with large amounts of goodwill (i.e. lenders recognise the 
significance of goodwill), this trend has decreased after the introduction of SFAS 141 
and SFAS 142. Finally, the authors report that the use of tangible net worth covenants 
(as opposed to covenants including intangibles as well) does not seem to impact 
covenant slack. 
Beatty et al (2008) find - similarly to Frankel et al (2008) - evidence showing that net 
worth covenants are more likely to be assigned to companies with substantial 
                                                 
60
  Although according to FRS 10 the accounting treatment of goodwill after initial recognition is 
determined by its expected useful life – definite or indefinite, in practice both definite or indefinite 
useful life can be justified in the case of goodwill. 
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intangibles in their balance sheets (or if the loan maturity is longer, or the loan is rather 
sizable). On the other hand, exclusion of intangibles from debt covenants is very likely 
when the danger of default is high for the company. The authors also find that, for 
conventional net worth covenants, goodwill impairment will decrease covenant slack, 
i.e. will have a conservative effect. Guay (2008) comments on these results: the author 
notes that when lenders exclude intangibles from the covenants of non-intangible-
intensive companies, they most likely try to capture possible future risks stemming 
from the purchase of further intangibles and from their increase in the balance sheet.61 
The author reasons that in the case of intangible-intensive companies lenders are aware 
of the importance of goodwill and attempt to gain at least some control over the 
possibility of future impairments by applying the conventional net worth covenant. 
In conclusion, it is noted that the role of debt covenants for managerial accounting 
choices has been well researched. Furthermore, debt covenant issues have been 
discussed not only based on US samples (as common for many other research areas) 
but also within the UK accounting environment. Overall, evidence of prior research 
shows that violations of loan covenants are not necessarily linked to financial distress 
and that companies are likely to manage their accounts in order to avoid covenant 
breaches. More specifically, as regards the relation between (asset) write-downs and 
debt covenants, US based research has provided conflicting evidence. This may be due 
to the different frameworks (different accounting standards, transitional periods etc) 
used in the investigations. More recent research shows that lenders recognise the 
importance of goodwill for intangible-intensive companies but are likely to ignore 
goodwill impairment in cases of companies with few intangibles or companies with a 
high default probability. 
In the UK prior research shows that the definition of loan covenants (on balance sheet 
basis or on income statement basis) was likely to influence managerial choices of 
goodwill accounting under SSAP 22 (Gore et al, 2000). Similarly, managers’ choices 
of early adoption of FRS 10 seemed to be motivated by the balance sheet 
characteristics of the specific company (Wang, 2003). 
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  Of course, lenders’ behaviour in such cases might simply mean that they consider a small amount of 
intangibles in the balance sheet as insignificant for the calculation of debt covenants and, therefore, 
inclusion in such cases would mean more cost than benefit.  
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2.2.2.3.2 Income smoothing 
A major issue in academic research on discretionary write-downs is the discussion of 
earnings management, i.e. managerial strategies used within the boundaries of relevant 
GAAP to achieve certain earnings’ level.62 While this description of earnings 
management can certainly imply managerial manipulation, this is not necessarily the 
case: earnings management might be not only used as part of opportunistic behaviour 
but also to signal new information to shareholders (Rees et al, 1996; Beneish, 2001; 
Sellhorn, 2004).  
Intuition suggests that management will usually try to achieve the highest level of 
earnings possible (Bernstein, 1993). However, academic research has shown that 
maximisation of earnings might not always be preferred. Under the assumption that 
investors interpret and welcome a steady unchanging flow of earnings as a signal for 
low risk, managers could expect a rise in their reputation, compensation and job 
security as long as they ensure that the earnings level remains even (Moses, 1987; 
Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995). Such managerial strategy is called ‘income smoothing’ 
(for example Zucca & Campbell, 1992) and discretionary asset write-downs are one 
way to achieve it. Earnings can be theoretically shifted from one period to another 
leading to intertemporal smoothing or within the income statement (between 
continuing operations and extraordinary items) – classificatory smoothing (Sellhorn, 
2004). 
Existing research on asset write-downs and their relation to reporting incentives 
includes several studies on income smoothing behaviour (Zucca & Campbell, 1992; 
Francis et al, 1996; Heflin & Warfield, 1997; Segal, 2003; Riedl, 2004; Jarva, 2009). 
However, the findings do not allow a consistent conclusion. Zucca & Campbell (1992) 
find some evidence for income smoothing in 28% of the sample, but the results were 
even more strongly in favour of ‘big bath’ behaviour (58%, see section 2.2.2.3.3). 
Their sample consists of negative special items found in the income statement which 
account for more than 1% of total assets. More specifically, Francis et al (1996) 
investigate among other items goodwill write-downs and categorise them as 
discretionary write-downs in their sample. Although they find that goodwill write-
downs are more likely to be influenced by reporting incentives than categories offering 
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  Although there is a very large body of literature in the area of earnings management, it is not 
discussed here as the focus of interest lies on the role of goodwill write-downs as means of earnings 
management. 
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less room for discretion, such as inventories, their evidence does not support the 
income smoothing hypothesis in particular. Jarva (2009) tests companies which did not 
report goodwill impairment although various signals indicated that goodwill might 
have been impaired. His results, however, do not suggest that managerial discretion 
was used to avoid impairments. Further two studies comparing asset write-downs 
under different regulatory regimes (Segal, 2003; Riedl, 2004) yield conflicting results. 
While Riedl (2004) does not find empirical support for the income smoothing 
argumentation before and under SFAS 121, Segal (2003) does so under SFAS 121 and 
later under SFAS 142.63 
Thus, a unanimous conclusion regarding the use of asset write-downs for income 
smoothing purposes cannot be made based on the above empirical results concerning 
asset write-downs. When the focus of interest is narrowed and only studies 
investigating goodwill are taken into account (Francis et al, 1996; Segal, 2003; Jarva, 
2009) the findings still remain inconsistent. Additionally, academic research in this 
area is mainly based on US companies, thus leaving the UK market uncovered.  
2.2.2.3.3 ‘Big bath’ 
As already discussed in section 2.2.2.2 a number of studies have shown that asset 
write-downs are often the result of economic difficulties of the company. However, the 
economic causes leading to goodwill or asset write-downs can often additionally 
provoke a particular type of managerial behaviour called ‘big bath’ behaviour. This 
phenomenon occurs when managers use the financial distress of the company to ‘take 
a bath’ and conduct – sometimes overstated – asset write-downs in the hope of 
improving future earnings expectations (White et al, 2003). This implies an attempt to 
present the asset write-down as good news to investors and is intended to signal 
enhancement in the financial situation of the firm. The ‘big bath’ phenomenon is 
particularly suitable as an explanation in cases of change in top management. In these 
cases the new manager might have an incentive to take a write-down, blaming it on 
his/her predecessor and their performance and thus ‘clean the house’ (Alciatore et al, 
1998; Sellhorn, 2004).  
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  The write-downs included in their samples differ though, which might serve as an explanation for 
the differing results: Riedl (2004) examines any reported long-lived asset write-downs, while Segal 
(2003) concentrates on goodwill. 
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There are numerous studies investigating the ‘big bath’ phenomenon and its relation to 
asset (goodwill) write-downs (Strong & Meyer, 1987; Zucca & Campbell, 1992; 
Elliott & Hanna, 1996; Francis et al, 1996; Rees et al, 1996; Heflin & Warfield, 1997; 
Segal, 2003; Riedl, 2004; Lapointe-Antunes et al, 2008). These studies concentrate on 
the US market. The findings, however, similar to research on income smoothing 
behaviour (see previous section) are not consistent. While some results provide 
evidence that ‘big bath’ behaviour might have motivated write-downs (Zucca & 
Campbell, 1992; Riedl, 2004; Lapointe-Antunes et al, 2008), there are quite a few 
studies that report no significant connection (Rees et al, 1996, for discretionary 
accruals; Heflin & Warfield, 1997; Segal, 2003; Sellhorn, 2004). Where asset write-
downs occur at times of bad company performance, they might well be a result of 
economic causes and not of ‘big bath’ behaviour. Elliott & Shaw (1988) find that 
many write-downs occur in the fourth quarter of the year: one possible explanation for 
this phenomenon which is also consistent with the ‘big bath’ hypothesis is that 
managers delay write-downs until the range of earnings is foreseeable and an 
adjustment can be made. 
A change in senior management is considered to be a clearer indication for ‘big bath’ 
behaviour by many researchers and empirical evidence supports this hypothesis 
(Strong & Meyer, 1987; Elliott & Shaw, 1988; Cotter et al, 1998; Zang, 2003; Beatty 
& Weber, 2005). Francis et al (1996) find a positive relationship between management 
changes and the size of the write-down. However, their results suggest also that the 
history of write-downs is positively connected with their size meaning that the write-
downs (of previous years) were underestimated. This contradicts the ‘big bath’ 
hypothesis. On the other hand, Lapointe-Antunes et al (2008) find that firms tend to 
report higher (transitional) goodwill impairment write-downs after a change of the 
CEO and when the goodwill write-down was expected. Segal (2003), however, fails to 
find evidence supporting the ‘big bath’ hypothesis. 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that research results concerning ‘big bath’ 
behaviour are mixed and are not necessarily a motivation for asset write-downs. 
Additionally, research concentrates mostly on US companies (Cotter et al (1998) 
explore Australian firms). 
Finally, an interesting aspect of the earnings management hypothesis is presented by 
Kirschenheiter & Melumad (2002) who develop an equilibrium model including both 
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income smoothing and ‘big bath’ phenomena. The authors show that both types of 
behaviour are the result of managerial effort to maximise company value when 
discretion is possible, depending on good or bad news signals. 
2.2.2.4 Regulatory changes 
A substantial amount of research on asset write-downs is motivated by regulatory 
changes of the relevant GAAP. Since the purpose of introducing a new accounting 
standard or an alteration of an old one is to improve financial reporting, such a change 
naturally raises issues of the adequacy of the new standard and whether it has managed 
or will manage to meet its objectives. Thus, investigations set during the adoption 
period provide a first insight into the usefulness of the standard. The transitional items 
offer a first chance to identify problems of the new regulation and respective reactions 
based on actual data instead of theoretical discussions prior to issuance. Additionally, 
what makes regulatory changes so interesting for academic research is the often 
discretionary nature of the transitory requirements. Most new standards allow for an 
adjustment period which companies can use to transfer their current reporting to the 
new regulations. The adjustment period often includes certain optional accounting 
treatments aimed to allow an easier reconciliation of old and new reporting. From an 
academic point of view, these can, under circumstances, provide an almost ideal 
setting to investigate company behaviour. Recent examples where goodwill is 
concerned are supplied by SFAS 142 and by IFRS 3. Under the transitional regulations 
of SFAS 142 managers had a choice to classify the transitional goodwill write-down in 
the adoption year either as a part of continuing operations or as a change in accounting 
principle (‘below-the-line’). Assuming that investors concentrate on items ‘above-the-
line’ this opportunity could be used to manage earnings. IFRS 3 offers a different 
transitional requirement: intangible assets that do not meet the new recognition criteria 
should be reclassified to goodwill at the first date when the new standard applies. 
However, intangibles previously reported as part of goodwill that can be recognised 
separately according to the new regulation, are not to be re-classified. This means, that 
goodwill in the adoption and first years after introduction of the new standard might 
well include different elements, than in later years. 
Many of the studies discussed in the previous sections concentrate on regulatory 
changes (for example Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Chen et al, 2004; Riedl, 2004; 
Sellhorn, 2004; Beatty & Weber, 2005; Long, 2005; Lapointe-Antunes et al, 2008, 
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2009) and derive conclusions from their results which might be useful to standard 
setters. These studies concentrate on the adoption of SFAS 142 (with the exception of 
Riedl (2004) who concentrates on SFAS 121) and test aspects of its adequacy in and 
around the adoption year (2002). Their results are mixed; however, a general trend can 
be spotted suggesting a presence of reporting incentives during the transitional period 
of SFAS 142 (Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Bens & Heltzer, 2005; Beatty & Weber, 2005; 
Long, 2005; Lapointe-Antunes et al, 2008, for Canadian companies).The magnitude of 
write-downs means that often results could be influenced by large firms – Bens & 
Heltzer (2005) and Sellhorn (2004) find evidence for this in their samples. Sellhorn 
(2004) shows that while transitional goodwill write-downs in small firms seem to be 
driven mainly by economic factors, management in large ‘visible’ companies seems to 
be influenced by reporting incentives. Chen et al (2004) investigate a sample of firms 
during 2001 and despite drawbacks report a ‘net benefit’ of the new standard. 
However, Beatty & Weber (2005) explore the same period and find a significant 
association between reporting incentives and accounting choices as does Zang (2003).   
Another finding concerning the timeliness of goodwill write-downs shows that during 
the transitional year of SFAS 142 companies used the requirements to ‘catch up’ with 
earlier impairments that had not been yet reported (Chen et al, 2004; Sellhorn, 2004). 
Long (2005) concentrates on issues influencing early vs. late adoption of SFAS 142. 
The author finds that with increasing complexity of the impairment test 
implementation firms tended to apply SFAS 142 earlier.  
Discussion around goodwill issues in the UK has concentrated on slightly different 
aspects. A very controversial issue was the adoption of FRS 10 which obliged 
companies to capitalise goodwill instead of writing off it directly against equity 
reserves (see section 2.1.1.1 for details). A major point in research on that issue is 
whether goodwill is seen as an asset at all. Using pre-FRS 10 data as well as data from 
the adoption year and up to one subsequent year (1993-1999) Wang (2003) 
investigates several issues related to goodwill. The results provide evidence that 
goodwill is seen as an asset but no significant evidence as to whether it is a wasting 
asset, i.e. should be amortised or whether it should be left on the balance sheet and 
tested for impairment. There is some evidence that goodwill is not depleted during 
several years after acquisition but no distinct pattern in this depletion could be found. 
The author points out several limitations of her study: due to the time period not many 
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companies were available that capitalised and amortised goodwill, since writing off 
against equity was recommended and preferred by companies prior to FRS 10. The 
study includes up to one year of FRS 10 data and can be extended with more recent 
data. Furthermore, Wang (2003) investigates the characteristics of early adopters of 
FRS 10 and finds a positive relation with debt covenants and a negative one with 
earnings. Finally, the characteristics of companies are investigated that reinstated ‘old’ 
pre-FRS 10 goodwill. One of the transitional requirements of FRS 10 included an 
option for companies to reinstate previously written-off goodwill on the balance sheet. 
Again, although the small sample size renders generalisation difficult to make, the 
findings show that firms close to a potential violation of their debt covenants chose to 
reinstate goodwill and firms with lower earnings didn’t. 
2.2.2.5 Impairment prior to disposal 
An interesting question, so far uncovered by academic research is whether managers 
use goodwill write-downs to manipulate gains from the disposal of the target. 
Intuitively, impairment charges (or the lack thereof) shortly before disposal of the 
company might be used to ‘clean the house’ so that for example in cases where the 
target has financial difficulties, its deteriorated situation is presented truthfully. On the 
other hand, management might also wish to avoid impairment prior to disposal in order 
to maximise the purchase price. A possible investigation in this area could be 
motivated by the existence of certain data abnormalities such as an increased number 
of goodwill impairment charges in the year prior to disposal. 
2.2.3 The Impairment calculation: Drivers of goodwill impairment 
and sources for managerial discretion 
A separate category of research on goodwill impairment concentrates on the 
impairment process and the impairment calculation. The impairment process - as 
structured by standard setters (see section 2.1.2) - provides several opportunities, if not 
necessities, for managerial judgement. For example, excellent chances for active 
management of the impairment process are supplied by the interpretation of what 
constitutes a triggering event, the definition of IGUs and the components of the 
impairment calculation (expected cash flows and the appropriate discount rates).  
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2.2.3.1 Triggering events 
According to standard setters goodwill must be subjected to impairment testing at least 
annually (under UK GAAP: if it is defined as an intangible asset with indefinite life) 
and, additionally, if a specific so-called ‘triggering event’ indicates risk of impairment. 
In order to illustrate what constitutes a triggering event standard setters have included 
lists in the respective accounting standards providing some guidance and examples of 
such phenomena (IAS 36, para. 12, SFAS 142, para. 28, FRS 11, para. 10). Research 
indicates, however, that these guidelines have so far been quite loosely interpreted by 
companies. A recent exploratory study by Comiskey & Mulford (2010) investigates 
the triggering events disclosed by companies in their 10-K-filings and finds a 
multitude of different examples. Research prior to this study also comments on the 
difficulty of categorising triggering events and on the necessity of some kind of system 
to capture their appearance (Conigliaro & Rudman, 2002; Glazer, 2002; Davidson & 
Vella, 2003; these studies discuss the list of triggering events published in SFAS 142). 
Seetharaman et al (2006) conduct a large survey of prior research to yield a 
comprehensive categorisation of triggering events both as a practical guideline for 
companies and as a basis for future research in this area. The authors define the 
following categories of triggering events64: 
• External indicators: 
o A significant change in business climate 
o Unanticipated competition 
o Adverse action or assessment by a regulator 
o Chance of business contract with major suppliers and distributors 
• Internal indicators: 
o Failure in budget forecasting 
o Loss of key personnel 
o Change in the company’s name 
o Failure in managing acquisition 
Clearly, this ongoing discussion shows that the definition and categorisation of 
triggering events is yet unfinished. Furthermore, initial empirical analysis and data 
collection (Comiskey & Mulford, 2010) report an even more diversified interpretation 
                                                 
64
  Additionally, Lynch & Gandhi (2010) note that triggering events can result from actions which are 
not primarily resulting from the quality of the financial performance of an individual firm, for 
example the global economic crisis in 2008 and 2009. 
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of this list in practice. Together, this evidence reveals significant potential for further 
research on managerial opportunism in the impairment process.  
2.2.3.2  The definition of the IGU structure 
The impairment process requires the structuring and organisation of the company into 
specific IGUs (FRS 11, para. 27). The defining of IGUs for impairment testing 
purposes is performed and coordinated by management itself. Therefore, this mainly 
internal process might offer some room for discretion.65 FRS 11 defines an IGU very 
broadly as a ‘largely independent income stream’ (see FRS 11, para. 27) which invites 
interpretation due to this vague wording. Nevertheless, in the case of IGUs it should be 
noted that any manipulation would most likely be a one-time event with primarily 
short-term effects. Once set, the IGU structure can only be altered on substantial 
grounds and requires an extensive justification on the part of management. 
Furthermore, in practice the segment structure often provides the framework for the 
IGUs, thus considerably limiting ongoing opportunities for manipulation. Moreover, in 
some companies, possible combinations for the IGU structure might be additionally 
reduced simply due to the lack of availability of financial reporting figures for any 
other combination than the broad, pre-set company division structure. 
Prior research on IGUs is available for US and for Australian companies. The results 
show some variety in the interpretation of the definition of a reporting unit. Carlin & 
Finch (2010a) find that companies in their sample mostly tend to settle on 1, 3 or more 
than 5 reporting units66. In an exploratory study preceding this one the authors had 
already highlighted the level of reporting unit aggregation as significant for goodwill 
impairment (Carlin & Finch, 2007a). In this paper they find that only about 35% of the 
investigated companies had the same number of reporting units as their business 
segments. Based on this evidence it appears that companies choose more often than not 
to deviate from the pre-set segment structure for purposes of the impairment test. Of 
course, the reason for such differences might not stem from managerial opportunism. 
As the IGU (or reporting unit) is roughly defined as the smallest level able to 
independently generate income (see section 2.1.2 for details under different accounting 
standards) companies might have been doing just that. Alternatively, the possibility 
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 The definitions and the criteria for the specification of IGUs must be discussed extensively and 
agreed upon with the auditors of the company. Therefore, the setting of IGUs cannot be described as 
an entirely internally based process. 
66
  It must be noted, though, that quite a large number of companies chose still another numbers of 
reporting units, therefore, the above result should not be overemphasised.  
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remains that various other difficulties in the implementation of the relevant standards 
have influenced the complicated structuring of the IGUs. In this context Hayn & 
Hughes (2006) comment on a KPMG survey from 2002 interviewing finance 
executives on their impressions of SFAS 142. About 2/3 of survey participants stated 
that implementation of SFAS 142 would be ‘complicated’. Hayn & Hughes (2006) 
interpret this result as a signal (among other things) about the difficulty of 
implementing an adequate reporting unit structure. 
2.2.3.3 The impairment calculation 
Beside the importance of IGU definition and structuring as well as the identification 
and the effect of triggering events, the core impairment process, i.e. the actual 
impairment calculation, must be considered when discussing the room for managerial 
discretion in goodwill impairment.67 According to UK GAAP regulations (and US 
GAAP, and IFRS, for that matter) one possibility to calculate a possible impairment 
loss is to compare the value in use of the IGU to its carrying amount.68 One possibility 
to determine the value in use is based on the discounted cash flow approach (DCF) 
which is the most widely used method for company valuation on international level 
(also for intangible-intensive companies, see Uzma et al, 2010): 
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ViU Value in use 
CFt Net (pre-tax) cash flows in reporting period t 
i Company-specific (pre-tax) discount rate 
According to this formula goodwill impairment is directly influenced by the projected 
pre-tax cash flows before interest and dividends and by the discount rate used in the 
calculation. More specifically, Gynther (1969) summarises the effects of the 
mathematical impairment calculation on goodwill value between any two measurement 
dates as follows: 
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  The issues of the correct allocation of assets and liabilities to the IGU as well as the identification 
and valuation of intangibles other than goodwill are not discussed here. 
68
  Alternatively, the net realisable value can be used which is defined as the selling price of an IGU less 
costs to sell. However, this is a value which is often hard to determine in practice as markets for IGU 
disposal or similar transactions, are not always available. Cash flow forecasts which can be used for 
the calculation of the value in use are, on the other hand, part of the budgeting process of most 
companies. Therefore, the value in use is used here as a basis for the discussion of managerial 
opportunism in the impairment calculation. 
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• A decrease of goodwill value due to the fact that the first cash flow projection in 
the previous year’s calculation is no longer taken into account for the calculation 
in the current period 
• An increase of goodwill value because all cash flow projections ‘move’ one year 
closer to the present in the current calculation, i.e. the discounting effect of last 
year’s calculation is reduced 
• An increase of goodwill value because one more year of cash flow projections is 
added at the ‘far end’ of the forecast period for the current calculation 
• Changes based on alterations of the cash flow estimates 
• Changes based on alterations of the discount rates 
While the effect of the first three issues in the above list can be described as the 
technical impact of ‘rolling the forecast’, the last two issues summarise the main points 
where managerial actions might result in a change of the goodwill impairment decision 
or amount. Referring to SFAS 142 Massound & Raiborn (2003) also discuss this issue 
and criticise the standard as being subjective in this respect and providing 
opportunities for managerial manipulation. 
2.2.3.3.1 Cash flows  
Since cash flows are independent of accounting regulations, there is not much room for 
manipulation based on accounting loopholes. However, where there are forecasts 
involved, there is also opportunity for discretion.69 According to FRS 11 forecasts and 
estimates have to be reasonable and based on the most up-to-date budget plans 
formally approved by management (FRS 11, para. 36). Nevertheless, the quantification 
of future expectations still involves a large amount of subjective judgement. In order to 
predict future cash flows, management has to consider various trends in the economic 
development on global, country, industry and company level. In particular, the 
company level could include aspects such as past and current performance of the firm, 
customer structure, work in progress, expansion plans, R&D expenditures and product 
development, restructuring plans, etc, in fact, anything potentially influencing the 
financial performance of and cash flows to the firm. On industry level, the current 
phase of the business cycle for the respective industry (for example market saturation) 
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  The body of literature on the uncertainty of future estimates and other forecast characteristics is 
substantial (among many Penman & Sougiannis, 1998; Sol & Ghemawat, 1999; Damodaran, 2006; 
Schumann, 2006). However, it is not discussed here on the grounds that it would exceed the scope of 
this thesis and is not primarily relevant to the research questions.  
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is relevant as well as the performance of the industry as a whole, competition and 
regulatory pressures. On global level, trends such as post 9/11-fear of terrorist attacks 
or the globalisation phenomenon might impact the future economic development of a 
particular firm. Depending on the motivation of management to achieve a particular 
result in the impairment process any of these aspects might be used as an argument 
behind a specific projection of the company key drivers and cash flows. 
Uzma et al (2010) discuss in their paper the advantages and shortfalls of the DCF 
approach specifically in the context of intangible valuations. The authors identify four 
issues which are raised by the influence of future discounted cash flow forecasts on 
intangible valuation (based on Cohen, 2005, pp. 82-84): 
• the unbiased expected future cash flow 
• the measurement of intangible risk (which might or might not be identical to the 
overall risk measure of the company) 
• issues related to the measurement of the beta factor based on CAPM theory 
• time-related riskiness changes.70 
FRS 11 additionally specifies that detailed cash-flow forecasts should not exceed a 
period of five years except in exceptional circumstances (FRS 11, para. 37). 
Furthermore, growth rates in the period beyond the detailed cash flow forecasts should 
not exceed the long-term average for the countries where the business operates (2.3%  
for the UK, see Ernst & Young, 2003 p. 1039). 
Furthermore, if the value in use is used as basis for the impairment review, the cash 
flows have to be monitored for five years after the impairment review. Where the 
forecasted cash flows significantly exceed the actual cash flows, the impairment 
review has to be conducted again using the actual cash flows. If an impairment is 
detected, it is then recognised in the current period (FRS 11, paras.54-55). This 
particular rule clearly represents an attempt to reduce (if not remove completely) the 
opportunity for manipulation at least when forecasting the cash flows. However, it still 
does not eliminate the possibility of manipulating the timing of the write-down since a 
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  The issues referring to risks are discussed in the next section as they are captured in the discount 
rate. 
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correction of a previous overstatement of the cash flows would result in a write-down 
which is conducted in the ‘wrong’ period.71 
2.2.3.3.2 Discount rates 
The value in use is calculated by discounting the sum of expected cash flows with the 
appropriate discount rate. This discount rate is the cost of capital defined as the 
opportunity cost investors have to bear for not investing in the next best alternative 
(see Pratt/Grabowski, 2008, p. 3f.). As the impairment decision is based on forward-
looking data, the cost of capital is also a forward-looking item and, ideally, an 
estimation of future costs of capital will be needed. In practice future estimations are 
based on projections of historical capital market data. Both UK GAAP and IFRS 
recommend various methods for the calculation of the appropriate discount rate (for 
example entity WACC, entity’s incremental borrowing rate, etc.). In practice, the 
WACC approach is most widely used (KPMG, 2010, p. 664). 
Although discount rates represent a material part of the impairment process, 
surprisingly few academic studies have concentrated on their role in the goodwill 
impairment process. It is essential for discount rates to be estimated as precisely as 
possible since they have an impact on both the goodwill impairment decision as well 
as on the write-down amount (similar to expected cash flows). For example, low 
discount rates will, ceteris paribus, lead to a higher value in use, and therefore, to a 
lower write-down amount or avoidance of goodwill impairment altogether. In fact, 
Carlin et al (2007a) show in two case studies that a 100 basis point increase in the 
discount rate will reduce the value in use by 8.5%, or 14.5% respectively, depending 
on the investigated company. Depending on the goodwill amount on the balance sheet 
(high) and the amount of the net profit of the company (low), such evidence implies 
that changes in the discount rate could, under certain circumstances, even overturn 
profit into a loss. 
Recognising the significance of these issues Stegink et al (2007) discuss and model in 
their paper the ‘appropriate’ discount rate. They, however, do not extend their study to 
include empirical investigations of their model or to test what practices are applied by 
companies. Accounting for this shortfall and also highlighting the importance of 
transparency of disclosures on goodwill impairment Carlin and various co-authors 
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 Furthermore, the wording of this regulation (‘significantly exceeding’) is also subject to individual 
interpretation. 
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(Carlin & Finch, 2007a; Carlin & Finch, 2007b; Carlin et al, 2007a; Carlin et al, 
2007b; Carlin & Finch, 2008; Carlin & Finch, 2009; Carlin et al, 2009; Carlin & 
Finch, 2010a; Carlin & Finch, 2010b; Carlin & Finch, 2010c; Carlin et al, 2010) have 
recently published a series of working papers on the quality of goodwill impairment 
disclosures under the Australian version of IFRS (hereafter referred to as ‘A-IFRS’). 
The studies explore different aspects of the disclosures of the impairment calculation 
including the number of cash generating units (CGUs), the discount and the growth 
rates used in the impairment assessment. The studies investigate A-IFRS disclosures 
starting from 2006 until up to 2008 in the form of case studies and analyses of samples 
between 50 and 200 firms (Australian and New Zealand companies). The authors 
conduct independent calculations of discount rates based on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM, see also chapter 3.1.3) and compare them to the discount rates 
disclosed by the companies. The main conclusions show that the disclosures made by 
companies are often inadequate and do not provide sufficient details for financial 
statements users in order to understand the impairment calculation, thus implying 
insufficient regulatory enforcement (Carlin et al, 2007a; Carlin & Finch, 2010).72 
Furthermore, the rates disclosed were significantly lower than the independently 
calculated rates (sometimes barely higher than the risk-free rate, see Carlin & Finch, 
2009; Carlin & Finch, 2010b), thus suggesting opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
Over time, however, it was noticeable that fewer companies disclosed discount rates 
lower than the independently calculated ones, while the companies disclosing 
significantly higher rates increased (Carlin & Finch, 2008).  These findings imply the 
use of more aggressive discount rates compliant with a ‘big bath’ phenomenon. The 
independent calculation in these studies relies either on beta factors behaving exactly 
like the reference index (i.e. ß=1, see Carlin et al, 2009; Carlin et al, 2010) or on beta 
factors which were calculated as the average of betas from three sources: capital 
market data providers Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis and Datastream and a regression 
based on weekly observations (Carlin & Finch, 2009).73 In all studies, however, only 
one value for beta was derived and used in the independent calculation. While the 
authors make some very significant conclusions on the quality of impairment 
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  Another recent study on the effects of SFAS 142 and IAS 36 also discusses discount rate disclosures. 
Comiskey & Mulford (2010) find that most companies in their sample did not disclose the actual 
discount rates used in the impairment calculation. Where such disclosures were available, the range 
of discount rates (cross-sectional) was between 10.5 and 32%. The authors recommend that future 
research investigate whether management is using discount rates to influence the goodwill 
impairment loss. 
73
  Carlin & Finch (2010a) calculate beta as an average monthly value over a period of 60 months.  
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disclosures and the discount rates used in the impairment calculations, they do not look 
at the reasons why the discount rates disclosed by the companies were so different than 
the ones calculated independently. They discuss possible managerial opportunistic 
behaviour but do not look at the manner in which such behaviour might be expressed. 
The papers discussed here make it clear, however, that discount rates are likely to be 
the target of managerial manipulation. One way this can be done is by varying (but not 
disclosing) the parameters of the derivation of the beta factor within the discretionary 
room available to practitioners in order to adjust the discount rate as needed by 
management. The beta factor can provide substantial opportunities to manipulate the 
discount rate and, through it, the goodwill write-down. This is due to several 
parameters, the alteration of which will lead to highly sensitive reactions of the beta 
factor. Moreover, most of the variation of such parameters is commonly used in 
practice and can, under circumstances be justified using underlying theory. Previous 
research shows that, most notably, the choice of the reference index to which the rates 
of return of the shares of the investigated company are compared, the length of period 
over which the rates of return are determined and the intervals used in the beta factor 
derivation have been discussed as the drivers of the beta factor calculation (Bartholdy 
& Peare, 2001; Dörschell et al, 2009). 
Following the assumptions of the CAPM74 the beta factor is derived based on the 
behaviour of the investigated share compared to the market portfolio as a benchmark. 
The market portfolio encompasses all classes of risky assets worldwide. In practice, it 
is not possible to find the theoretically defined market portfolio. Instead, there are 
various indices which can be used as a proxy. A central question discussed by 
practitioners and academic research concentrates on the best choice for such a proxy. 
Following the CAPM specifications, a worldwide index including as many different 
securities as possible could be chosen (see Bartholdy & Peare, 2001). However, 
Tobin’s capital market theory specifies that the market portfolio is defined by the 
personal preferences of the investors (i.e. by the so-called investment-opportunity-set). 
Lewis (1999) finds evidence suggesting that, despite the higher level of diversification 
in internationally spread portfolios, private investors tend to concentrate their 
investments in national securities (home bias). For institutional investors, there are 
often (company) regulations requiring investments in the home jurisdiction of the 
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  For a detailed description of the CAPM concept and its assumptions see Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965). The description of the deduction of the discount rate based on this approach is provided in 
(text)books narrating on the subject of cost of capital (for example Pratt & Grabowski, 2008) and 
also by many capital market information providers for example Bloomberg or Datastream. 
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company. Therefore, considering the investment-opportunity-set it might be wise to 
use a national reference index such as the FTSE 100 for the derivation of beta factors. 
These two aspects of the argument about the appropriate reference index provide 
management with opportunities for manipulation using argumentation which is backed 
by underlying theory or empirical research on each side. 
Furthermore, the weighting of the reference index (value-weighted or equally 
weighted) also provides room for discretion: although value-weighted indices are often 
recommended in practice, Bartholdy & Peare (2001) suggest that the application of an 
equally weighted index produces better results as it removes instability in the index 
resulting from changing weights of the index securities over time. The authors 
compare seven indices as reference indices for the beta derivation and find significant 
differences in the beta factors. Finally, the chosen index will be available as a price 
index or a total return index, where dividend effects on the share price have been 
included, thus, providing even more room for judgement. 
The length of the period over which the beta factor is determined is another substantial 
factor influencing the calculation. Since very long periods might include developments 
which are not current anymore and will lead to biased estimates of the beta factor, 
shorter time periods could be argued for. However, the shorter the time period, the 
fewer observations on rates of return can be made to derive the beta factor. Thus, the 
length of period applied is closely related to the intervals for the share price data 
collection. For example, while 1-year-data collection based on monthly intervals will 
yield only 12 observations, the same time period including daily intervals will provide 
250 observations. Still another difficulty arises from the fact that the more frequent the 
observations, the more noise the data include. In fact, beta factors have been found to 
differ materially depending on the interval used for the derivation (monthly, weekly or 
daily). This so-called intervalling effect has been researched empirically and showed in 
several studies (Bartholdy & Peare, 2001; Hawawini, 1980; Dimson, 1979; Rudolph & 
Zimmermann, 1998). 
In conclusion, it seems likely that management might use discount rates to influence 
the goodwill impairment loss. Discount rates appear particularly attractive as a source 
for manipulation since they do not have to be derived from pre-determined company 
numbers (which would be the case for cash flows derived from company budgets, see 
FRS 11, para. 36). Previous research (mostly on Australian companies so far) shows 
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significant discrepancies between discount rates calculated independently by 
researchers and the ones disclosed by companies. A reliable comparison is rendered 
difficult by the lack of detailed information available on the parameters of the discount 
rate calculation and, additionally by the discretionary nature of the beta factor (one of 
the components of this calculation). The determination of the beta factor provides 
virtually endless opportunities for managerial manipulation of the goodwill write-
down. Prior research, however, has not yet concentrated on these particulars of the beta 
factor and their relation to goodwill impairment.  
2.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Section 2.2 provided a literature review of topics related to the causes and impact of 
goodwill impairment. Based on this review and the gaps identified in existing literature 
on goodwill impairment the research questions of this thesis are specified in the 
following paragraphs. 
Altogether, the questions of goodwill impairment can be organised into four broad 
categories. The ‘If’ question targets the decision to impair goodwill or not. The ‘How 
Much’ question handles the amount of the impairment write-down resulting from the 
impairment calculation. The ‘Why’ question looks into the underlying drivers of the 
‘If’ and the ‘How Much’ questions. It does not, however, explain the means used to 
achieve the final result, i.e. which part of the calculation process primarily influenced 
the write-down (the ‘How’ question)75. While the causes of goodwill impairment need 
to be investigated, so do the means which allow managers to achieve their goals: 
Illustration 2.3: Questioning the goodwill impairment process 
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  This question can be raised in particular when the origins of managerial manipulation are 
investigated, i.e. whether the numerator or the denominator of the value in use equation was used to 
influence the impairment loss. 
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These broad categories are used to identify the research questions of this thesis. 
The literature review shows that the subsequent valuation of goodwill is an area 
offering abundant opportunities for academic research where regulations in different 
countries are mainly new or still do not entirely converge. While the IASB and FASB 
agree that annual impairment testing should be the only alternative regarding the 
subsequent valuation of goodwill, UK firms still enjoy a more lax regulatory 
environment that permits a de facto choice between amortisation and impairment. 
Accounting regulations for goodwill have been intensely discussed in recent years and 
many questions have been raised concerning the importance of goodwill, its meaning 
for companies and investors, proper presentation, valuation, etc. Due to this enormous 
variety of issues, it is only natural that academic research should focus on goodwill. 
However, while numerous studies have already explored problems related to goodwill, 
there are still noticeable gaps in the literature or even whole areas that have been left 
uncovered. First, as regards the impact of goodwill write-downs, while investor 
reaction has been well investigated, the debt market has remained almost entirely 
outside the scope of prior research. Additionally, it can be said that academic research 
covers almost exclusively the US market and that the transitional requirements of 
SFAS 142 have been investigated thoroughly. In the UK, major issues include the 
discussion (prior to the adoption of FRS 10 in 1997) whether goodwill should be 
capitalised or written off against equity and a possible relation to debt covenant slack. 
Furthermore, the value-relevance of goodwill impairment (Li & Meeks, 2006) as well 
as the transitional requirements of FRS 10 (Wang, 2003) have been addressed. 
However, although FRS 10 provides a unique regulatory framework, by installing the 
initial impairment test to capture overpayment and allowing alternative or even 
simultaneous use of amortisation and annual impairment testing, these issues have not 
been extensively investigated. Furthermore, while an impressive amount of literature 
exists on opportunistic managerial behaviour and asset write-downs, motivation for 
UK managerial choices in the area of goodwill accounting remains uncovered. 
Additionally, another issue – causes for goodwill write-downs undertaken prior to 
disposal of the target – has not been previously discussed in academic research. 
Finally, it is noticeable that where economic causes of goodwill write-downs are 
investigated, studies have concentrated on measures of the outcomes of economic 
performance while its drivers remain unexplored. Moreover, previous research has 
exclusively used quantitative methodology to test these issues.  
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As regards the impairment process and the impairment calculation, researchers have 
only recently started to produce empirical results. In particular, the issues of the 
identification and effect of triggering events, the structure of IGUs and the impact of 
discount rates used in the impairment calculation and their importance for 
discretionary tactics of management have been only just initiated in academic research. 
In this context there are still numerous questions waiting for answers. 
This thesis includes three empirical studies addressing gaps in literature on goodwill 
impairment as outlined below: 
The first empirical study (chapter 4) focuses on the impact of goodwill write-downs. 
This study is motivated by the lack of research on the role of goodwill impairment in 
the rating assessment process. While numerous studies discuss different aspects of the 
investor reaction to goodwill write-downs, only a few mention a possible relation to 
credit ratings and there is no study that entirely concentrates on such an investigation. 
This is surprising, considering the differing accounting treatments for goodwill under 
FRS 10, the sometimes substantial amounts of the write-downs/-offs and their impact 
on the balance sheet and on the income statement, the unavailability of details on the 
actual rating decision making process as well as the economic importance of rating 
agency decisions. 
Intuitively, since goodwill write-downs directly affect current profit figures, the 
balance sheet, and also provide signals about the quality of management, it seems 
likely that they might be incorporated at least to some extent in the rating decision 
making process. Additionally, since the write-downs might be considered as supplying 
information about the financial welfare of the company or as a signal about future 
developments, rating agencies might be interested in including them in their analysis 
of the firm. On the other hand, if impairment losses are seen as noise, rating agencies 
might disregard them altogether.  
An additional question raised in this context refers to the effects, not only of the 
introduction of FRS 10 and FRS 11 in 1997/8, but also of SFAS 141 and SFAS 142, 
and, later, of IAS 36. If rating agencies and analysts have disregarded goodwill 
amortisation prior to the introduction of these accounting regulations, would they 
change their policies following the trend in accounting? Are the new numbers more 
informative and useful for the rating assessment? Highlighting this issue, Massoud & 
Raiborn (2003) quote Meeting et al (2001): ‘When calculating ratios of comparable 
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companies, or comparing companies for investment, the old remedy remains the best 
remedy: remove goodwill from the balance sheet and the goodwill effect from the 
income statement.’ 
In this context chapter 4 explores whether goodwill write-downs are taken into 
consideration in the rating decision making process and whether different 
accounting treatments for goodwill – impairment, amortisation or immediate 
write-off against equity – are relevant for the rating calculation.  
One way, to explore this research question would require interviewing rating agencies 
about their policies and their motivation as regards goodwill impairment. However, 
since this information is not explicitly available to the public, direct answers might not 
be easily forthcoming, might be biased or related to specific circumstances. An 
alternative possibility would include an independent investigation of this issue. Such 
research would reflect implicitly the need of financial statement users (other than 
rating agencies) not only to understand goodwill impairment better but also its 
importance in the rating assessment and, ultimately, the company rating grade better. It 
also reflects the concern of regulators that such an independent deduction and 
understanding should be possible (Hayn & Hughes, 2006). Therefore, the research 
question is explored in an independent empirical investigation of rating agencies’ 
assessment process and the role of goodwill impairment in this process. Ultimately, it 
aims to provide a better insight into the impact of goodwill write-downs and thus to 
contribute to antecedent research in this area. 
The general motivation for the second empirical essay (chapter 5) which concentrates 
on causes for goodwill write-downs is provided by the regulations of FRS 10 in the 
UK. FRS 10 provides a very interesting setting for research on managerial choices and 
opportunistic behaviour related to goodwill, since it is the only framework (at least 
when UK GAAP, IFRS and US GAAP are considered) that allows simultaneous 
amortisation and impairment and thus offers additional possibilities for managerial 
discretion.  
Therefore, in this context, chapter 5 investigates the causes behind the managerial 
decision to conduct impairment additionally to systematic amortisation. 
Issues related to this research question are: is this accounting choice influenced by 
economic causes rather than reporting incentives? 
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The contribution of this investigation to prior research in this area is threefold. First, 
the investigation is split to explore the reasons behind the decision to impair goodwill 
(the ‘If’ question) and the reasoning behind the amount of the impairment charge (the 
‘How Much’ question). In this way the study attempts to provide more differentiated 
answers to the quest after the causes of goodwill impairment. So far prior research has 
concentrated either on the amounts of goodwill impairment charges (for example 
Francis et al, 1996; Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003), or, on probability predictions of 
goodwill impairment decisions (Hayn & Hughes, 2006), or, on a larger group of asset 
write-downs (Strong & Meyer, 1987; Loh & Tan, 2002; Kim & Kwon, 2001), or, on 
transitional write-downs (Sellhorn, 2004). Second, the above research question is 
investigated under UK GAAP regulatory framework. This regulatory setting allows 
considerable discretion among managers concerning their accounting choices for 
goodwill and thus provides unique opportunities for academic research. The results 
from the study can be also discussed in the context of the new IFRS which disqualifies 
systematic amortisation as accounting treatment of goodwill. Finally, by concentrating 
on the UK market, this study differs from prior research, which largely investigates US 
companies, more broadly defined asset write-downs, or write-downs conducted under 
the transitional requirements of a new accounting standard (SFAS 142, FRS 10). 
The third empirical essay (chapter 6) addresses gaps in the academic literature by 
exploring the underlying drivers of economic performance and their link to goodwill 
impairment. While a complete investigation of all such drivers would clearly represent 
a task beyond the scope of this thesis, the study concentrates on two variables – 
industrial regulation and competition – and their role for goodwill impairment. In this 
context the following research question is investigated:  
Why do companies impair goodwill (the ‘Why’ question): do drivers of the 
measures for economic performance provide better understanding of the 
managerial decision to impair goodwill?76 
The study benefits from a change in methodology and uses a qualitative approach to 
explore the research question (similar to recent studies testing other issues relating to 
the impairment process)77. In this context the focus of the study is extended:  
                                                 
76
  The research question can also be interpreted in the context of standard setters’ definition of 
triggering events (both investigated variables are discussed as triggering events by standard setters 
and prior research).  
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Does a change of methodology (case study approach) help to raise issues for 
future research?78 
Almost all studies to date in this area79 have been statistical by nature either 
investigating quantified outcomes of economic performance or collecting statistical 
information about (triggering) events related to goodwill impairment. Therefore, this 
study adds to existing research by providing further in-depth analysis of the relevance 
of economic performance drivers for the goodwill impairment decision. Additionally, 
the case study approach and the number of companies analysed (two) allow the 
extension of document analysis by means of further data sources (external to the 
company) such as analyst reviews. This is a feature which is also missing from prior 
research. In this context, the study is undertaking first steps to fill these gaps. 
The second objective of the study (chapter 6) is based on evidence gathered in 
previous research suggesting managerial opportunistic behaviour related to discount 
rates used in the goodwill impairment process. This study adds to prior research by 
illustrating some of the opportunities managers have at their disposal to adjust 
goodwill write-downs according to their specifications and needs. It explores the 
impairment disclosures of companies and compares them to an independently 
conducted calculation of the discount rates used in the impairment process. In this 
context, it also discusses the quality of the impairment disclosures and the information 
provided to an external user of the financial statements. The research question relating 
to the second objective of the study states as follows: 
How do companies impair goodwill (the ‘How’ question): are company 
impairment disclosures sufficiently transparent to allow a financial statement 
user to understand goodwill impairment? Do managers behave opportunistically 
when impairing goodwill by using the discretionary room available in the 
derivation of discount rates? 
As regards research on discount rates chapter 6 extends previous work on Australian 
and New Zealand companies (see section 2.2.3.3.2) by providing an in-depth analysis 
of the calculation of discount rates. While prior studies have calculated discount rates 
                                                                                                                                             
77
  For example Carlin et al (2010) use the case study approach to explore the quality of disclosures of 
Transpacific Industries Group Ltd. However, the authors are not interested in the drivers of financial 
performance; they focus on simulating the impairment process of the company and comparing their 
results with disclosed numbers. 
78
  More details on the methodology used for this study are provided in chapter 3.1.3. 
79
  See section 2.2.3. 
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by fixing the calculation assumptions based on certain parameters used in practice, this 
study relaxes the assumptions by testing several commonly accepted and widely used 
parameters in practice. In this way the investigation aims to reduce the possibility that 
the companies analysed might have used a different calculation constellation than the 
one used in the independent discount rate derivation. Additionally, this empirical 
design also serves to illustrate the numerous opportunities to influence the discount 
rate and, through it, the impairment write-down, which is yet another contribution to 
existing research. 
All three studies aim to increase the understanding of goodwill impairment, its 
calculation, causes and the effect it has on companies, standard setters, and users of the 
financial statements. The research questions are summarised in the following 
illustration: 
Illustration 2.4: Summary of research questions 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
SAMPLE 
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 The impact of goodwill write-downs on credit ratings 
There is little information on the way goodwill write-downs are considered by rating 
agencies in the company monitoring process. While S&P (2002) suggests that 
goodwill impairment be excluded from core earnings for purposes of rating, it is not 
clear exactly what adjustments are made on the balance sheet or whether S&P’s 
recommendation is followed by other rating agencies as well. There is some indication 
that rating agencies remain conservative when considering goodwill (S&P, 2005), 
although there are also statements by credit rating agencies that the impact of goodwill 
write-downs is the result of a complex assessment of numerous factors (Sellhorn, 
2004). Therefore, this study investigates the impact of goodwill write-downs on credit 
ratings.  
To explore the impact of goodwill write-downs on credit ratings an accounting 
predictive model on ‘as if’ basis is used with the purpose of estimating the role of 
goodwill write-downs/write-offs in the rating decision making process. 
Rating agencies use quantitative as well as qualitative information for their credit 
rating decisions but do not necessarily elaborate on the actual process of reaching the 
rating decision (although there is some information about the criteria that are important 
for the agency, see S&P, 2005). It is publicly known, however, that the quantitative 
part of their analysis relies heavily on information from the company financial 
statements (S&P, 2005). Therefore, accounting information might be expected to play 
an important role in the decision process of credit ratings.  
Since write-downs might be considered as supplying information about the financial 
welfare of the company or as a signal about future developments, rating agencies 
might be interested in including them in their analysis of the firm. Previous research 
provides some contradicting evidence as to whether managers perceive a link between 
goodwill write-downs and credit ratings (Gore et al, 2000; Sellhorn, 2004). 
Additionally, under current UK GAAP (FRS 10, 11) different accounting treatments 
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for goodwill are permitted each of which might be perceived differently by rating 
agencies. Therefore, the impact of goodwill write-downs on credit ratings can be 
investigated by raising the following research question: 
How do rating agencies view goodwill in their risk evaluation of companies, as 
reflected in the relevant accounting treatment of goodwill? 
Based on previous research (see section 2.2.1.3) the model for this investigation 
includes several variables calculated using publicly available accounting information. 
This information is used to categorise the company into a certain rating group (i.e. 
determine the rating). The rating predicted in the analysis is then compared to the 
actual rating of the company assigned by the rating agency. 
There are two methodology design issues which were further developed for purposes 
of this study. First, as rating agencies do not publish the exact models used to reach the 
credit rating decision, the model described in this chapter is tested using different 
combinations of variables in an attempt to approximate reality. 
Second, as UK GAAP allows differing accounting treatments of goodwill and, 
moreover, as rating agencies do not have to comply with GAAP for purposes of their 
rating calculations, the model is tested in different (goodwill accounting) scenarios, at 
one extreme ignoring goodwill completely and, in other versions using different 
accounting treatments of goodwill.  
Finally, the forecasting accuracy of the so generated model versions with different 
goodwill accounting treatments is compared between scenarios and variable 
combinations. The accounting treatment scenario with the highest percentage of 
correctly classified ratings (i.e. where the classifications produced by the model 
coincide best with actual ratings) and the variable combination with the highest 
explanatory power (i.e. which is most likely to mirror rating agency modelling) are 
considered to reflect best the raters’ view of goodwill and its write-downs. 
Based on these considerations the following hypothesis can be tested for this research 
question: 
H1: The correct classification and misclassification distribution of company 
credit ratings is the same whatever the way rating agencies view 
goodwill as reflected in its accounting treatment 
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This research differs from prior studies in two ways. First, the rating agencies’ 
decision-making process is simulated to test the importance of goodwill accounting 
treatments in this process, rather than looking at management’s understanding or 
expectations of rating agencies’ perception of goodwill. Furthermore, the methodology 
used has not been employed previously in relation to goodwill write-downs. 
The relation between goodwill write-downs and credit ratings (H1) is tested by 
investigating the role that goodwill write-downs might play in the rating decision 
making process. Since the exact proceedings towards reaching a credit rating decision 
are not open to the public but a lot of – sometimes – contradictory information is 
available, an important contribution of this study is to provide some insight into the 
mechanism of the credit rating decision and throw a light on its aspects related to 
goodwill write-downs. For this purpose, an accounting predictive model is used as 
common in prior research on the determinants of credit ratings (for example Horrigan, 
1966; Kaplan & Urwitz, 1979; Belkaoui, 1980; Molinero et al, 1996). However, 
instead of trying to predict the credit rating, the model is used to describe and 
categorise the credit rating decision on an ex post basis following the methodology 
used in connection with deferred tax accounting by Huss & Zhao (1991) and by 
Chattopadhyay et al (1997)80. Thus, the purpose of the study is to test whether different 
accounting treatments of goodwill change the predictive accuracy of the model 
measured as the correct ex post classification of credit ratings (model on ‘as if’ basis). 
Altman & Saunders (1998) provide an overview of the main research approaches used 
in predictive models for ratings based on accounting information. Typically, either 
univariate credit-scoring models are used, where the researcher ‘compares various key 
accounting ratios of potential borrowers with industry or group norms’ (see Altman & 
Saunders, 1998, p. 1723); or multivariate credit-scoring systems, where the accounting 
ratios are weighted and linked to be included in a more sophisticated system. 
According to the authors the multivariate credit-scoring system can be applied in the 
following ways: (1) the linear probability model, which is based on a linear regression 
using accounting variables; (2) the logit model, which includes an assumption of a 
logistical distribution of the probabilities; (3) the probit model; (4) the multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) which includes accounting and market-based variables. 
Based on the methodologies of Huss & Zhao (1991) and by Chattopadhyay et al 
                                                 
80
  Hann et al (2007) use a similar methodology calculating alternative models on as if basis to test 
value and credit relevance of fair-value vs smoothing pension accounting under US GAAP. The 
authors, however, do not use MDA for their investigation. 
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(1997) hypothesis H1 is tested here by using the methodology of multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA). The basic idea of MDA is that the dependent variables are classified 
into groups based on significant differences in respect to several characteristics 
(Backhaus et al, 2003). Since MDA is not used to actually predict credit ratings but 
rather to compare different accounting treatments for goodwill using the same sample 
and same methodology, possible disadvantages of using this particular methodology 
against others can be ignored (Chattopadhyay et al, 1997). 
Following Chattopadhyay et al (1997) and Huss & Zhao (1991) the model simulates 
the credit rating decision on an ex post basis and includes 19 financial ratios primarily 
used in prior research in this area81. Since goodwill and its write-down charges affect 
directly the income statement and the balance sheet, ratios including these figures will 
change as a consequence of different accounting treatments for goodwill. Such ratios 
are marked with * (14 ratios): 
Table 3.1: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: financial ratios (explanatory 
variables) 
Financial ratios (explanatory variables) Variable 
cash ratio = (cash + short term investments)/current liabilities CaR  
income before tax and exceptional items/net assets* IBTE
NA
 
operating cash flow/total long term debt CF
TLTD
 
income before tax and exceptional items/sales* IBTE
S
 
income before tax and exceptional items/total assets* IBTE
TA
 
income before tax and exceptional items/total long term debt* IBTE
TLTD
 
income before tax and exceptional items/total liabilities* IBTE
TL
 
net assets/total long term debt* NA
TLTD
 
                                                 
81
  Rating agencies do not publish detailed information regarding their ratio analysis of companies but 
only key ratios indicating the direction of the analysis (S&P, 2005; Moody’s, 2003). Therefore, it 
would not be feasible to rely solely on such scarce information for the construction of the model. 
The ratios used here have been selected based on prior academic research in the area. However, 
information available from rating agencies has also been incorporated in the model (for example 
variables, definitions, etc.). 
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total long term debt/total assets* TLTD
TA
 
current ratio = current assets/current liabilities CR  
operating cash flow/total liabilities CF
TL
 
operating cash flow/total assets* CF
TA
 
working capital/sales WC
S
 
operating cash flow/net assets* CF
NA
 
total liabilities/total assets* TL
TA
 
net assets/total liabilities* NA
TL
 
total asset turnover = sales/total assets* TAT  
sales/net assets* S
NA
 
interest coverage = EBIT/gross interest expense* EBIT
GIE
 
The financial ratios reflect the activity, liquidity, solvency and profitability of the 
company and can be used to depict an overall image of the company’s present situation 
and give an indication of its future development (White et al, 2003). 
The accounting predictive model is defined as follows: 
, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 ,
(
)
j y
j y
IBTE CF IBTE IBTE IBTE IBTECRAT CaR
NA TLTD S TA TLTD TL
NA TLTD CF CF WC CF TL NACR
TLTD TA TL TA S NA TA TL
S EBITTAT SIZE
NA GIE
β β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β β
β β β β
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + +
+ + +
 
CRATy,j describes the rating category of the company j at a point in time y. The 
company ratios are calculated based on the annual accounts immediately preceding the 
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issuance of the credit rating, thus representing the financial situation of the company 
used in the rating assessment process.82 
To investigate the role of goodwill write-downs in this process the financial ratios are 
calculated for five different scenarios: 
• Scenario 1: on the basis that the company uses capitalisation and annual 
impairment as an accounting technique for goodwill; or 
• Scenario 2: based on capitalisation and goodwill amortisation data; or 
• Scenario 3: in the case that neither amortisation nor impairment based goodwill 
write-downs are taken into account for the credit rating assessment (i.e. while 
goodwill write-downs are ignored, goodwill itself is recognised as an asset in 
the rating calculation); or 
• Scenario 4: as if the goodwill has been written-off against equity (i.e. goodwill 
is not recognised as an asset for purposes of the rating calculation); or 
• Scenario 5: using the actual capitalisation and impairment and amortisation 
data, i.e. not undertaking any adjustments to the income statement or the 
balance sheet (i.e. ‘numbers as they are’). 
The different accounting treatments of goodwill lead to changes in both the income 
statement and the balance sheet. They result in adjusted financial ratios as the total 
assets, the income before tax and exceptional items (IBTE), the earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) and the net assets are altered: 
Table 3.2: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: adjustments for companies 
amortising goodwill and additionally conducting impairment 
Adjustments 
 
                Scenarios 
Income Statement  
(IBTE, EBIT) 
Balance Sheet  
(total assets, net assets) 
Scenario 1: 
Impairment,  
no amortisation 
Add back amortisation charge for the 
current year (i.e. IBTE , EBIT include 
only the impairment charge for the 
current year) 
Add back amortisation charge for the 
current year to the net book value 
(NBV) of goodwill83 
                                                 
82
  A control variable SIZE (number of employees in the company) is used to account for the inclusion 
of big and small companies in the sample. 
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Scenario 2: 
Amortisation,  
no impairment 
Add back impairment charge for the 
current year (i.e. IBTE , EBIT include 
only the amortisation charge for the 
year) 
Add back impairment charge for the 
current year to the NBV of goodwill 
Scenario 3: 
No impairment,  
no amortisation 
Add back impairment and 
amortisation charges for the current 
year (i.e. IBTE, EBIT include neither 
impairment nor amortisation) 
Add back impairment and 
amortisation charges for the current 
year to the NBV of goodwill 
Scenario 4: 
Goodwill written-off 
against equity 
Add back impairment and 
amortisation charges for the current 
year (i.e. IBTE, EBIT include neither 
impairment nor amortisation) 
Deduct goodwill from total assets 
(and from shareholder’s equity) 
Scenario 5: 
‘Numbers as they 
are’ 
No changes No changes 
Virtually all companies in the data sample have conducted both goodwill impairment 
and amortisation in the relevant period. Therefore, actual data are used for the 
calculation of the ratios where available (see procedure in supplement B to chapter 4 
for companies which did not have amortisation).84  
In each of the five scenarios the credit rating is categorised as a function of the 
financial ratios by using the multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) technique. Finally, 
the percentage of correctly categorised ratings is compared across the different 
scenarios. The accuracy of these categorisations serves to analyse the role of the 
different accounting treatments in the rating decision making process. 
The ratings in the dataset were split into two groups: (1) cases with a rating of A or 
higher were placed in the first group, and (2) all other rating categories were placed in 
the second group. This was done as there were too few cases in some of the rating 
categories in order to form a separate group in the study. The procedure of combining 
smaller groups into bigger ones is a standard one in MDA and is recommended 
particularly for small samples (Backhaus et al, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
                                                                                                                                             
83
  Accumulated amortisation is not added back due to two reasons. First, such a procedure would 
involve too many judgements (for example if there were no amortisation, impairments might have 
occurred more often in the past); second, it is unlikely that a rating agency would proceed to reverse 
amortisation to such great extent. 
84
  In the rare cases where goodwill amortisation data is not available, the notional amortisation charge 
for the year is calculated on as if basis. A detailed explanation of this calculation is provided in the 
supplement to this chapter. 
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All quantitative data (i.e. the financial ratios) are recalculated for the five different 
scenarios according to the procedure described in Table 3.2. As the exact combination 
of ratios used by the rating agencies is not publicly known, several combinations of 
variables are used. This procedure is based on the method used by Chattopadhyay et al 
(1997) and Huss & Zhao (1991). The variable combinations differ regarding (1) the 
method of MDA (direct or stepwise) and (2) the predictors included. In 2002 S&P 
issued a recommendation that goodwill impairment should be excluded from core 
earnings for purposes of rating (S&P, 2002). However, it is not entirely clear whether 
or to what extent this recommendation has been followed for the balance sheet. This 
recommendation is accounted for by testing predictor combinations where ratios based 
on earnings/income statement data are excluded (V2, V8, V11). Further tests 
concentrate on predictors with essential importance for the model (V10, V11 and 
V12).85 In order to account for possible critique that different predictors might be 
included in the stepwise method (V1-V3) or in V10-V12 and possibly result in 
differences across scenarios which are not due to alternative goodwill accounting 
treatments, more analyses were conducted where all the variables chosen in the 
different scenarios were combined and tested uniformly (V4, V5, V6 and V13, V14, 
V15). An overview of all variable combinations used in the study is provided below: 
Table 3.3: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: overview of variable 
combinations 
Variable comb. Predictors / Variables MDA-Method 
V1 All variables Stepwise 
V2 Balance sheet variables (predictors containing earnings numbers 
excluded) 
Stepwise 
V3 Income statement variables (predictors containing only balance 
sheet numbers excluded) 
Stepwise 
V4 All variables selected in V1 in the different scenarios Direct 
V5 All variables selected in V2 in the different scenarios Direct 
V6 All variables selected in V3 in the different scenarios Direct 
V7 All variables Direct 
V8 Balance sheet variables (predictors containing earnings numbers 
are excluded) 
Direct 
V9 Predictors containing only balance sheet numbers are excluded Direct 
V10 All variables over 0.3 in the structure matrix in V7 Direct 
V11 All variables over 0.3 in the structure matrix in V8 Direct 
V12 All variables over 0.3 in the structure matrix in V9 Direct 
                                                 
85
  The cut-off point for these predictor combinations was set at 0.3 of the structure matrix coefficients. 
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V13 All variables selected in V10 in the different scenarios Direct 
V14 All variables selected in V11 in the different scenarios Direct 
V15 All variables selected in V12 in the different scenarios Direct 
The above combinations allow for the research question to be explored in altogether 75 
settings (15 variable combination and five scenarios per variable combination) to 
which the appropriate MDA procedure is applied. The use of this large number of 
settings has three purposes: first, the possibility that rating agencies might use a 
different set of financial ratios for their annual analyses than modelled in V1 is 
accounted for and a number of variable combinations were built to reflect this 
possibility. Second, the impact of S&P’s recommendation is assessed by splitting the 
predictors into combinations excluding income statement variables and, alternatively, 
in combinations based exclusively on them.86 Finally, the settings were used for 
purposes of robustness testing.87 
3.1.2 Causes of the managerial choice to conduct an impairment 
charge additional to systematic amortisation 
If financial reporting regulations are followed, write-downs should ideally reflect a 
loss in the value of the asset. However, regulations for some assets, among them 
especially goodwill, allow considerable managerial discretion concerning issues such 
as the timing or amount of the write-downs. Since in the case of goodwill it is often 
possible to argue for the use of either definite or indefinite useful life, managers could 
under certain circumstances be motivated to choose between amortisation and 
impairment for reasons unrelated to the economic depletion of the asset.  
This study investigates the causes behind the managerial choice to recognise an 
additional impairment charge besides systematic amortisation of goodwill at a 
specific point in time rather than another. 
The research question is further specified within the following hypotheses: 
H2: The goodwill impairment loss additionally charged to the systematic 
amortisation of goodwill is: 
                                                 
86
  A still better way to test the S&P’s recommendation would have been to additionally limit the 
sample to observations only after 2002. However, this would have resulted in an extremely small 
estimation sample (and no validation sample) including only 25 cases. Such estimation sample 
would have been inadequate for testing a model including up to 20 predictors (minimum 14 variables 
would have been included). 
87
  For this purpose also different versions of the dataset were tested, see chapter 4. 
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H2a: negatively related to variables for the financial performance of the 
company. 
H2b: positively related to variables reflecting managerial reporting incentives 
(with the exception of the ‘big bath’ variable where a negative relation 
is expected). 
The research question is additionally split into the following settings: 
The ‘If’ question targets companies’ decision to conduct goodwill impairment. It 
looks at this issue without taking into account the amount of the goodwill write-down. 
The question asked here is what events would induce a company to impair goodwill 
(as opposed to what events would induce a company to conduct a goodwill impairment 
of that particular amount). 
The ‘How much’ question concentrates on the question about the amount of goodwill 
impairment and the underlying reasons to write-down this particular amount. This 
setting is explored using the complete sample available and, again, using only 
companies which had impairment in the relevant period (the ‘How Much’ question 
revisited). 
Based on prior research (Francis et al, 1996; Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Sellhorn, 2004) 
a linear regression is used to test the hypotheses of the research question. The 
explained variable is
1,tjGWIMP representing the goodwill impairment write-down in 
the current reporting period. Depending on the particular setting (see above) this is 
either the amount of the goodwill impairment loss before tax (a positive number) 
deflated by the company’s total assets at the end of the prior year (
1,tjGWIMPTA , for 
the ‘How Much’ and the ‘How Much’ revisited questions); or, a dichotomous variable 
indicating the presence of an impairment write-down in a particular year (= 1) or its 
absence (= 0) (
1,
_ tjDummyGWIMP , for the ‘If’ question). 
The literature review shows that prior research has detected a relation between asset 
write-downs and indicators of the financial performance of the firm, as originally 
intended by standard setters. Therefore, the following measures of company-level 
financial performance are included which were also used in prior research (for 
example Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Sellhorn, 2004; Long, 2005): jMB5∆ , the change in 
the market-to-book ratio of the company over the five years prior to the impairment 
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write-down; the cumulative stock return over the same period, jRET5 ; and the change 
in return on assets over the five years prior to the relevant write-down year, jROA5∆ . 
In order to test how long the lag between the deterioration of financial performance 
and its impact on goodwill is, these variables were also calculated over a three-year 
and a one-year period and tested separately. 
The correlation between the goodwill impairment write-down and the firm 
performance measures is expected to be negative, since the greater the deterioration in 
the company performance, the greater the likelihood that this company will report or 
increase a goodwill impairment loss. Additionally, this expectation is supported by the 
fact that annual impairment testing is assumed by standard setters to reflect the 
economic depletion of goodwill and amortisation is seen as noise by previous research 
(for example Moehrle et al, 2001; Jennings et al, 2001). 
Furthermore, variables are included to account for trends in industry performance, 
since declining performance within the industry of the specific firm is likely to 
influence the managerial decision to undertake impairment and its amount as well. 
Here, again, as impairment testing regulations are aimed at providing a more truthful 
image of goodwill value than systematic amortisation, it is expected that the 
coefficients of industry-specific variables will be negative. The particular industry 
variables used in this model are – based on Long (2005) – the medians of firms within 
the same industry as the goodwill write-down firm for the following: IndMB _5∆ , 
IndRET _5 , IndROA _5∆ which are the same variables selected as proxies for the 
financial performance of the individual sample companies but calculated on industry 
basis for the five years prior to the write-down year. Additionally, the variables were 
calculated over a three- and a one-year period to correspond to the respective variables 
for financial performance of the individual firm. 
Apart from relation between goodwill write-downs and company performance prior 
research also provides evidence that goodwill write-downs might be due to managerial 
reporting incentives and not to financial distress. This is especially true in the case of 
goodwill compared to other asset write-downs, since goodwill accounting is perceived 
to allow greater amount of managerial discretion than in other cases, for example 
inventory (Francis et al, 1996). Therefore, it is possible that an impairment charge is 
motivated not by the wish of the management to better reflect changes in the financial 
performance of the firm, but by other incentives, such as earnings management, and 
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the avoidance of an impairment write-down may be motivated by the intention to 
create a bigger covenant ‘slack’. For this reason, several variables for managerial 
reporting incentives are included in the model to test sub-hypothesis H2b. Evidence 
shows that managerial opportunistic behaviour has been linked to asset or specifically 
goodwill write-downs in the following situations: the presence of debt covenants for 
the specific firm, earnings management (income smoothing and ‘big bath’ behaviour), 
and change in top management. Therefore, variables are included to reflect these 
phenomena. The debt-to-equity (DTE) ratio of the company for the year prior to the 
write-down year is used as a variable for debt covenants in a particular company based 
on the methodology in prior research (for example Gore et al, 2000; Wang, 2003; 
Sellhorn, 2004; Long, 2005): 
0,tjDTE . The earnings management variables are 
calculated according to the methodology of Francis et al (1996), who separate the 
phenomena of income smoothing and ‘big bath’ based on unexpected operating return-
on-assets, jUOROA  calculated as follows: 
 
 
The income smoothing hypothesis states that managers will undertake impairment in 
years of exceptionally good earnings in order to keep earnings levels steady (for 
example Zucca & Campbell, 1992).Therefore, a relation between unexpectedly good 
earnings (i.e. jUOROA >0) and goodwill impairment loss might be an indication for 
income smoothing behaviour of the management: this effect is captured by the variable 
jIS  which is equal to jUOROA if jUOROA > 0, and zero otherwise. 
‘Big bath’ behaviour on the other hand is found to occur in year of unexpectedly bad 
earnings. According to the explanation provided in the literature (for example White et 
al, 2003), managers take this opportunity to record (sometimes overstated) write-
downs in order to improve future earnings. Therefore, the variable jBB  is used to 
capture the influence of ‘big bath’ behaviour on goodwill impairment losses: jBB  is 
equal to jUOROA  if jUOROA < 0, and zero otherwise
88
. 
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  The ‘big bath’ variable will be negative per definition when operating income before taxes and 
excluding the write-down has decreased as compared with the previous reporting period. 
1 0
1
j,t j,t
,
0
(operating income before taxes and before write down operating income before taxes )
total assets at end of tj t
UOROA
− −
=
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Additionally, changes in top management are accounted for, based on the methodology 
of Long (2005) by including two dichotomous variables: jMGT∆  which is equal to 1 if 
there was a change in the top three executive positions of firm j during the reporting 
period prior to the write-down (t0), and zero otherwise; and jCFO∆  which is equal to 
1 if there was a change of the chief financial officer of firm j during t0, and zero 
otherwise. These variables are included since prior research suggests a positive relation 
between change in top management and goodwill write-downs: incentives might exist 
for the new management to undertake write-downs in their first year which could 
potentially be ‘blamed’ on actions of the previous management and thus ‘clean the 
house’ and improve artificially future earnings. 
For all managerial reporting incentive variables a positive and significant relation to 
goodwill impairment charge is expected based on evidence in prior research (Francis et 
al, 1996; Segal, 2003; Zang, 2003; Sellhorn, 2004; Long, 2005) and on the assumption 
that the decision for this particular managerial choice is motivated by the above 
incentives. Per definition the ‘big bath’ variable, however, is expected to be negatively 
related to goodwill impairment write-down. 
Finally, control variables for goodwill amortisation 
1,tjGwam and the lagged impact of 
goodwill impairment 
0,tjGwimp were added. This was done, in particular, to test 
whether a goodwill impairment write-down would trigger a further impairment during 
the following reporting period. Both of these variables are defined as dichotomous 
variables: the presence of goodwill impairment in the period directly preceding the 
investigated year leads to a recording of 1 for 
0,tjGwimp  and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
1,tjGwam equals 1 if goodwill amortisation was reported in the current period and 0 
otherwise. 
 The model used to estimate the relation between the goodwill impairment loss and the 
above predictors can be thus described as follows89: 
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  The term ‘X’ in the financial performance variables stands for the period of time over which these 
variables were calculated: five, three or one years. 
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3.1.3 Sources of goodwill impairment 
Research related to the impairment calculation has been scarce with only a few authors 
discussing the different milestones of the impairment calculation and their effect on the 
final result of this calculation (the impairment loss). Nevertheless, the few recent 
studies available have identified the importance of several issues in the impairment 
process (see literature overview in chapter 2.2.3). In particular, the identification and 
interpretation of triggering events, the level of aggregation into IGUs and the 
importance of discount rates is highlighted as significant for the goodwill write-down. 
However, empirical tests of these issues are still rare and previously mostly 
concentrating on Australian (IFRS) or US (US GAAP) companies. Additionally, as 
regards investigations of discount rates and their role in the impairment process, 
research so far has not concentrated on the discretionary room provided by the 
characteristics of the beta factor and its importance for goodwill impairment. 
Therefore, this study raises the following research questions: 
Why do companies impair goodwill (the ‘Why’ question): do drivers of the 
measures for economic performance provide better understanding of the 
managerial decision to impair goodwill? Does a change of methodology (case 
study approach) help to raise issues for future research? 
How do companies go about making the goodwill impairment calculation (the 
‘How’ question): are company impairment disclosures sufficiently transparent to 
allow a financial statement user to understand goodwill impairment? Do 
managers behave opportunistically when impairing goodwill by using the 
discretionary room available in the derivation of discount rates? 
This study is exploratory by nature. Exploratory research methodology is regularly 
used in social sciences whenever new problems must be investigated, where the 
underlying theory is not yet developed or the available literature and empirical 
research are not extensive. Alternatively, the exploratory framework can be used 
whenever previously researched issues are challenged and addressed from a new point 
of view. Whatever the problem being investigated, exploratory research offers the 
fundamental advantage of open-end methodology: whether new research questions or 
new aspects of ‘old’ research questions, this method is likely to result in more 
questions than the ones raised at the start (Fry et al, 1999). Therefore, this research 
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method is often used to uncover new paths in academic research. The flexibility of the 
exploratory approach helps to address ‘Why’ questions and supports the analysis of 
preliminary data leading to the formulation of more precise research questions and 
hypotheses (descriptive and causal research, Babbie, 1989). 
Due to its flexibility exploratory research is not clearly defined and often relies on the 
support of secondary research methods. This study uses case the study approach in 
order to conduct the analysis and present the results in an adequate manner. The case 
study approach is often used to categorise and present information about a certain topic 
and can be applied to new topics or new aspects of already researched topics (Cooper 
& Morgan, 2008; Stake, 2000). It is a complementary method of research which 
usually combines a number of data collection methods (such as research of documents, 
interviews, observations) and research methods (qualitative and quantitative, Stake, 
2000). According to Yin (1989) this approach is particularly appropriate to answer 
‘Why’ and ‘How’ questions in empirical research. The case study approach aims to 
provide paths for new research. Therefore, generalisation of the results obtained 
through case studies is usually not the concern or primary aim of the studies 
themselves but is rather seen as the task of future research expanding on said case 
studies’ results. 
Considering the research questions of this exploratory study (‘How’ and ‘Why’ 
questions) the case study approach is applied for the investigation of two companies. 
The case studies are built based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative methodology is used to explore the effect of specific economic 
factors (industrial regulation and competition) on goodwill impairment. It includes 
document review of different sources, internal and external to the companies 
(qualitative methodology) and analysis of the reviewed information for both 
companies.90 
The methodology for the analysis of the discount factors relies on quantitative and 
qualitative techniques. It is used to provide an independent investigation based on 
publicly available information (linear regression) and comparison to the discount rates 
                                                 
90
 Lys & Vincent (1995) have used similar data collection and analysis methods in their study on the 
acquisition of NCR by AT&T. Case studies have often been used in financial accounting studies, see 
Merino & Neimark (1982), Neimark (1992) and Xiang (1998). For an overview on case study 
research in accounting see Cooper & Morgan (2008). 
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disclosed by the companies (case studies). This combined methodology serves the 
purpose of illustration of the discretionary opportunities of management.  
The aim of the investigation is not to determine a specific value or a range of values 
for the discount rates of the companies but to compare independently calculated 
discount rates to the ones disclosed by the companies. If the information disclosed is 
transparent and sufficient for the understanding of end users, there should be no 
material discrepancies between the independently calculated and the disclosed discount 
rates. The independent discount rates are calculated using publicly available company 
information as well as commonly applied parameters to derive beta factors (either 
discussed in previous research or used by widely accepted financial information 
providers such as Bloomberg, see also section 3.2). 
Since capital can be provided to the firm in the form of equity or debt, the discount rate 
(i.e. the cost of capital) includes two components accounting for the corresponding 
return requirements of shareholders and lenders. The cost of capital is calculated by 
weighing these return requirements with the percentage of the respective capital 
(equity or debt) to total capital – this calculation of the cost of capital is known as the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most widely used model to determine the cost of equity is the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) which is based on the Capital Market Theory (CMT).91 
According to this model the cost of equity is the sum of a risk-free rate and a certain 
premium which investors would require for a risky investment (a risk premium): 
                                                 
91
 For a detailed discussion of the CAPM and its adequacy for cost of equity calculations see Pratt & 
Grabowski (2008). Since the aim of this study is to illustrate discretionary opportunities for goodwill 
impairment calculations a more detailed investigation of the theoretical background of CAPM is not 
included. Additionally, alternative methods are not discussed here, as, assuming the same company 
environment and conditions, all methods for the derivation of the cost of equity should yield the 
same results (see Pratt & Grabowski, 2008, p. 80). 
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The risk-free rate represents the return requirement for an investment with a certain 
maturity which is free of default and reinvestment risk. Per definition this rate can best 
be derived from zero bond92 (no reinvestment risk) spot rates for government securities 
(virtually no default risk assumed) with the same maturity as the individual investment 
being analysed (see Damodaran, 2006). Ideally, zero bonds of every possible maturity 
would be listed so that the relationship between the maturities and the respective 
interest rates is described by a (continuous) interest rate curve which serves as the 
basis for the estimation of the risk-free rate for valuation or impairment purposes. 
However, in practice, zero bonds are rarely traded in European markets. Therefore, for 
a direct derivation of the risk-free rate one must resort to the so-called stripping of 
coupon bonds.93 Since these, however, also lack in liquidity compared to other bonds 
and, more importantly, such STRIPS are not available for every maturity, the 
estimation of a (hypothetical) interest rate curve as a basis for the derivation of risk-
free rates yields the best compromise between theory and practice. 
There are several methods for the estimation of the interest rate curve which are used 
in different countries. More generally, the methods used can be split into parametric 
and non-parametric methods.94 The most widely used parametric method is the 
estimation method developed by Svensson (Svensson 1994, 1995)95. It includes several 
parameters describing the short-term and the long-term behaviour of the (hypothetic) 
interest rate curve. A number of European Banks make use of this method including 
the European Central Bank and the German Bundesbank. In the UK, the Bank of 
                                                 
92
  Zero-bonds do not include coupon payments per definition. Therefore, investments in zero-bonds are 
not considered to be subject to reinvestment risk. 
93
 Stripping was introduced in 1997, see Anderson & Sleath (1999). 
94
 Methods for estimating the risk-free rate using swaps or strips (Separate Trading of Registered 
Interest and Principal Securities) are not discussed here as this study does not concentrate on the 
advantages and disadvantages of different methods for the derivation of the risk-free rate. For further 
details on the methodology of the estimation of the risk-free rate see Brennan (1997), p. 81f.; 
Copeland et al (2004), p. 259f; Dörschell et al (2009). 
95
 This method was originated by Nelson and Siegel and was further developed by Svensson (Nelson & 
Siegel, 1987; Svensson, 1994, 1995)). 
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England applied the Svensson method in the 1990s as well (Anderson & Sleath, 1999 
and 2001).96 However, in November 1999, Anderson & Sleath proposed for the UK 
market a non-parametric method which claimed to rectify some of the shortcomings of 
the Svensson method. The variable roughness penalty (VRP) method introduced 
previously by Waggoner in the US is a non-parametric approach using a cubic spline-
procedure to estimate the interest rate curve (Anderson & Sleath, 1999, Waggoner, 
1997). The method claimed to deal better than the Svensson method with issues such 
as the short-term end of the interest rate curve and the stability of the curve regarding 
changes at its long-term end.97 The three criteria according to which the merits of the 
VRP method are evaluated refer to the smoothness of the projected interest rate curves, 
their flexibility to accommodate changes of the term structure and their robustness to 
changes in individual maturities (Anderson & Sleath, 1999; Waggoner, 1997).  
One of the essential issues to be solved when considering the interest rate curve refers 
to the maturity equivalence of the observed spot rates and the investment (in this case, 
the income generating unit) to be analysed. Since companies generally operate under 
going concern assumption, a risk-free rate would be needed which incorporates this 
assumption. However, the available maturities which can be observed in capital 
markets do not abide by this assumption; they have finite maturities.98 The question 
how to model the long-term end of the curve can be solved by using several methods. 
First, if the Svensson method is used, the estimated curve can be extrapolated to reach 
beyond the longest observable maturity. However, due to volatility of the individual 
parameters of the Svensson equation this method has been found to be unreliable 
(Anderson & Sleath, 1999). Another method is based on the extension of the interest 
rate curve by using implied forward rates derived by the spot rates of the last two 
maturities available. Caution is, however, advised in cases where these two last 
available spot rates differ from each other substantially to avoid volatility in the 
extension of the curve. In practice, the spot rate of the longest maturity available is also 
often used to describe the run of the curve after that (Dörschell et al, 2009). 
                                                 
96
 Prior to using the Svensson method, the Bank of England had applied the non-parametric method of 
Mastronikola (Mastronikola, 1991). 
97
 There are several other proposed solution paths claiming to solve the shortcomings of the Svensson 
model. For example the German Bundesbank resolves the issues at the short-term end of the curve 
by excluding spot rates under 3 months (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006). 
98
 Maturities usually range up to 30 years (for a more detailed discussion see also Dörschell et al, 
2009). 
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When estimating the risk-free rate by referring to government bonds the issue of the 
riskiness of the basis arises. In other words, government bonds of different countries 
do not qualify as risk-free in the same way. Their (lack of) riskiness is closely related 
to the credit standing of the respective country instead. Thus, differences in inflation 
expectations, economic difficulties or the political risk of different countries are bound 
to influence the level of the rates required for their bonds issued. The cash flows of the 
IGU being analysed or a company being valued should be matched to a risk-free rate in 
the same currency so that some of these effects are accounted for (Damodaran, 2006). 
Additionally, Damodaran proposes to account for variations in political risk in the risk-
free rate by using default spreads related to the ratings of the respective countries (see 
www.damodaran.com). 
The next component of the cost of equity refers to shareholders’ requirement s for 
investing in a risky asset (as opposed to investing in a risk-free asset). This 
requirement is quantified in the equity risk premium, (rm-rf), which represents the 
difference between the rate of return on a market portfolio and the risk-free rate 
(Armitage, 2005). There are two approaches to determining the equity risk premium. 
The first one uses directly the expectations of investors and analysts regarding the 
equity risk premium. Ilmanen (2003) reported a relationship between past and 
expected returns in a survey on private investors’ opinions.  However, the information 
collected in questionnaires and surveys can sometimes offer serious challenges in 
terms of data collection and analysis (Dimson et al, 2003; Welch, 2001). Another way 
to estimate future equity risk premiums is based on the dividend discount model. 
However, such estimation would include assumptions of constant dividend growth and 
would depend on the reliability of analysts forecasted dividends (Armitage, 2005). 
Best & Byrne (2001) provided information on the expected equity risk premium in the 
US and the UK by using the dividend discount model and then comparing the 
predicted premiums with the ones that were actually observed. For the UK, the 
estimations were based on GDP forecasts from Consensus Economics’ Consensus 
Forecasts as long-term dividend growth was assumed to behave as ten-year GDP 
growth. While the values of the expected (2.1% per half-year) and the realised (2.5% 
per half-year) premium for the period 1982 to 1999 were close to each other, the 
volatility of the realised premium was significantly higher (20.0% standard deviation 
of the realised mean vs. 1.2% for the expected). 
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The second approach concentrates on estimation of future equity risk premiums based 
on the mean (arithmetic or geometric) of historical data. There are a number of 
academic studies concentrating on the identification of past equity risk premiums and 
their adequacy for forecasting purposes (for the UK: for example Armitage, 2005; 
Dimson et al, 2002, 2003, 2008; Barclays Capital, 1999, updated on an annual basis; 
Credit Suisse First Boston, 1999; for the US: Siegel, 1992, 1998, 1999; Schwert, 1990; 
Ibbotson Associates, SBBI Yearbook 2000, updated on an yearly basis; Bimberg, 
1993; Stein & Uhlir, 1994). The estimation of future equity risk premiums on the basis 
of historical data includes the following aspects: choice of the market portfolio which 
will provide the returns to measure the premium; the length of the period over which 
the historical data are collected; choice of the risk-free reference assets to measure the 
risk-free rate; bias of the data collected (such as survivorship bias)99; choice of the 
mean (arithmetic vs. geometric). In the CAPM world the ideal market portfolio is 
composed of all kinds and categories of risky assets (Sharpe, 1964; Damodaran, 2006). 
In practice, however, some kind of approximation must be made in order to find a 
representative portfolio for the whole market. Prior research has mostly concentrated 
on national indices as a representative for the respective equity market, or, researchers 
have constructed their own indices for investigation periods when data were not 
available from databases (see Dimson et al 2003). Most of the studies aim for a long-
term perspective arguing that short periods of time (even a decade) cannot be always 
representative for future development due to specific phases of the markets. Thus, 
Dimson et al (2003) note that while the 1990s have been a time of high equity returns 
(in the US market, returns amounted to as much as 36% in 1995), the early 2000s saw 
a massive downturn of stock prices after the burst of the technology bubble. The 
authors argue that to base future estimations on each of these phases might introduce a 
bias in forecasts. Furthermore, they point out that government bonds performed well in 
the same time that share prices fell which would have led to a derivation and prediction 
of a negative equity risk premium – a number with no financial sense as – if investors 
are assumed to act rationally – they would simply invest in the risk-free asset at this 
point. Dimson at al (2002, 2003, 2008) calculate equity risk premiums for 16 countries 
evaluating data over a period which is longer than a century100. While recognising that 
long time periods can also cause problems for the estimation of future equity risk 
                                                 
99
  Although, according to Dimson et al, 2003, this is not a major concern where equity risk premium 
studies are concerned. The authors consider the length of the investigation period to be a much more 
important criterion. 
100
  The authors have been regularly updating their study starting in the early 2000s. 
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premiums, especially since the development of stock prices has evolved enormously in 
the 20th century, the authors maintain that a longer time period is still bound to 
eliminate or at least mitigate short-term effects of stock price movements. This is a 
view generally supported by other studies as reported in table 3.4 below: 
Table 3.4: Overview of some studies reviewing the equity risk premium based on 
UK data (based on Dörschell et al, 2009) 
Authors Investigation Period Nr of years
(G)eometric / 
(A)rithmetic Mean ERP (G) ERP (A)
Dimson/Paul/Staunton 1900-2003 103 A/G 4.20% 5.90%
Credit Suisse 1925-2002 77 A n.a. 3.30%
Barclays Capital 1899-2003 104 A/G 4.17% 5.44%
Credit Suisse First Boston 1869-2003 134 A/G 4.63% 5.75%
 
For purposes of the calculation of the cost of equity in this study the arithmetic mean 
according to Dimson et al (2003) is used.101 
The final component of the cost of equity is the beta factor.102 According to the CAPM 
the cost of capital is determined based on the opportunity cost of the next best 
alternative investment. In an ideal market a well-diversified investor would be able to 
eliminate all idiosyncratic (or diversifiable) risk from his/her portfolio and will bear 
only systematic (or non-diversifiable) risk. This systematic risk is reflected by the beta 
factor of a company (Sharpe, 1964; Fama, 1970).103 The beta factor is determined 
based on historical return data. The observed returns of the individual investment are 
matched in a regression to the returns of a reference index. The slope of the regression 
line is the beta factor.  
The CAPM assumes a linear relationship between the rate of return of the market rm 
and the rate of return of the individual security ri. Therefore, a linear regression is used 
to describe the model and to derive the beta factors: 
 
 
 
                                                 
101
 See argumentation of Armitage (2005), p. 88f. At the time when this study was conducted, the 
results of the Dimson et al (2003) study were available and were applied. Further updates yield 
similar equity risk premiums. 
102
 For a detailed discussion of the derivation of the beta factor in practice see Dörschell et al (2009). 
103
 Academic research discusses several shortcomings of the CAPM related to the assumption of the 
complete diversification of idiosyncratic risk and the application of a total beta approach instead 
(Camp & Eubank, 1981; Butler & Pinkerton, 2006; Tofallis, 2008). However, this discussion is not 
relevant to this study and is, therefore, not incorporated here. The aim of this study (chapter 6) 
requires calculation of discount rates based on the most widely accepted models and parameters used 
by companies in practice. This requirement suggests that the CAPM approach is used. 
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The returns for the linear regression are determined based on spot prices for the 
individual company and the selected stock index (here: FTSE 100, MSCI and 
Mexbold). As the distribution of the discrete rates of return tends to be skewed to the 
right a transformation into continuous rates of return is used, following Fama (1965), 
to ensure a normal distribution (Dörschell et al, 2009). 
The parameter βi (the beta factor) represents the systematic risk of the company under 
investigation. No specific expectations can be made regarding the direction or the 
range of the beta factors since a beta factor can have both a positive or a negative sign 
(or be equal to zero) depending on the way the rates of return of the stock price of the 
company are behaving compared to the rates of return of the reference index.  
FRS 11 requires that discount rates used in the impairment calculation are pre-tax 
(FRS 11, para. 44). Therefore, the independently calculated discount rates are grossed 
up to reflect this requirement. Ideally, an iterative process would be used to calculate 
the pre-tax discount rate based on the assumption that discounting post-tax cash flows 
with the post-tax discount rate and discounting pre-tax cash flows with the pre-tax rate 
will yield the same result. Since, however, the pre-tax cash flows of the IGUs are not 
disclosed by the companies, the grossing up calculation is used as an approximation 
for the pre-tax discount rate. This is a method which has been used in previous 
research (Carlin & Finch, see chapter 2.2.3.3.2 for various papers), is recommended by 
practitioners (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 1044) and also by some regulators (see IFRS, 
Appendix to IAS 36).  
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
The data sample includes all non-financial UK companies listed in the FTSE 350 as at 
16th March 2006 which have recorded goodwill and a goodwill impairment write-down 
under UK GAAP between 1999 and 2005. This time frame was chosen since this was 
the period when FRS 10 and FRS 11 were applied by listed firms in the UK. 
Information on listings of UK companies is collected from the London Share Price 
Database (LSPD) and from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. 
The final sample which was used as a basis for all three studies included 97 
companies. Goodwill impairment and amortisation data are collected from Datastream 
and Worldscope. Since such data were available in Worldscope only back to 2001, data 
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for 2000 and 1999 were hand-collected from the annual reports of the companies. 
Company annual reports were obtained from the Perfect Filings database. All balance 
sheet, income statement and cash flow items for the studies were downloaded from 
Worldscope. A portion of the downloaded numbers (ca. 20%) was verified manually 
by using the annual reports and no significant deviations were identified. Data on 
management changes used in the study of causes of goodwill impairment in chapter 5 
were hand-collected from company annual reports. Industry variables were 
downloaded from Worldscope and the categorisation of industries follows the 
definitions in this database. 
For purposes of the credit rating study (chapter 4) credit rating information is provided 
by S&P’s historical database (URL: http://www.standardandpoors.com). Since not all 
companies from the basis sample were rated the final sample for chapter 4 included 97 
observations for 46 companies in the relevant period. Credit rating reviews at S&P are 
undertaken every three months and a summary report is issued annually. Additionally, 
various event-driven rating actions may be undertaken (S&P, 2005). For purposes of 
this study, the credit ratings were collected from the annual summary reports which 
were produced around the end of the accounting year (one month before to three 
months after the year-end). The reason for using these credit ratings was that they were 
most likely to be directly influenced by the accounting-year-end results (i.e. the 
financial ratios basing on these results).104 The model used in this study to simulate the 
rating decision making process may not apply in cases of event-driven rating actions 
where other forms of information (additionally to quantitative financial ratios) are 
likely to impact the rating decision. 
For purposes of the study of the managerial reasoning behind impairment additional to 
goodwill amortisation (chapter 5) the original data sample was tested as follows: the 
samples used for the ‘If’, the ‘How much’, and the ‘How Much’ revisited questions 
include the following numbers in the investigation period: 
                                                 
104
  While the audited annual reports are not usually available to the public until several months after the 
financial year end, the rating process is not limited by public availability of these data. The 
researcher’s own experience of a rating process in 2007 (on the side of the company being rated) as 
well as an informal interview with a S&P employee in July 2006 revealed that rating analysts have 
access to company information long before the audited financial statements are published. As a 
matter of fact, S&P also briefly comments on this, stating that it ’does not perform an audit in 
connection with any credit rating and may, on occasion, rely on unaudited financial information’ 
(S&P, 2005). Therefore, although the majority of the credit ratings for the sample in chapter 4 were 
issued well after the financial year end of the respective company, where a credit rating was issued 
shortly before year end, it was included in the sample as, in practice, the analysts would have already 
had access to at least an unaudited version of the company’s accounts. 
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Table 3.5: Sample size according to investigation setting and year 
Nr. Companies 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
‘If’ 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
‘How Much’ 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
‘How Much’ revisited 24 49 54 56 38 26 16 
The sample used for the ‘How much’ question revisited is based on the same 97 
companies per year as the other questions but has been further reduced to include only 
companies which had goodwill write-downs in the respective years. Therefore, the 
sample size for this question differs from year to year as companies did not conduct 
goodwill impairment in every year of the investigation period. 
For purposes of the exploratory study on sources of goodwill impairment (chapter 6) 
two companies of the general data sample were chosen according to the following 
criteria. The relevant companies had to be operating in a fast moving industry sector as 
this would increase the possibility that the investigation period includes different life 
phases of the companies analysed as well as of the industry sector itself. Furthermore, 
the selected industry sector had to be strongly competitive and heavily regulated in 
order to provide background information on the selected drivers of economic 
performance (competition and industry regulation). These criteria led to the choice of 
the telecommunications sector which was subject to changing industry regulations in 
numerous geographic locations, especially during the second part of the investigation 
(2002-2005).105 Further criteria for the selection of the industry sector were the 
importance of intangible assets (relative to other sectors). More specifically, the 
industry sector chosen offered ample opportunity for goodwill creation, partly due to 
intensive acquisition activity in the relevant period and, partly, as a substantial number 
of the purchased assets was of intangible nature (due to the nature of the 
telecommunications’ business). Finally, an attempt has been made to select companies 
which have impaired goodwill in more than one year during the study period. The 
selected companies had substantial amounts of goodwill on their balance sheets (over 
50% and over 20% of total assets respectively, at a certain point within the 
investigation period). They were also sufficiently large so that it could be assumed that 
                                                 
105
  Both companies which were analysed belong to the same industry sector in order to ensure that they 
were subject to similar regulatory actions and competitive environment. This allows a more in-depth 
analysis as well as cross-investigation of both company disclosures and external information. 
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management would have access to the data and resources necessary for a precise 
determination of the write-down. 
The two companies selected for this study are Vodafone Plc. and Cable & Wireless 
Plc. 
Financial information about the two selected companies as well as information about 
the development of their goodwill and M&A activities during the investigation period 
was hand-collected from their respective annual reports. Furthermore, these reports 
provided information about the development of business activities, market 
development, economic and financial well-being, competition, regulatory events and 
risks as perceived and presented by the companies. To substantiate and complement 
this data external information was also collected: analyst reports on the companies 
issued by various sources (S&P, Moody’s, CreditInsights, Fitch Ratings, etc) were 
downloaded from the Bloomberg and S&P historical databases.106 
Discount rates used for goodwill impairment were (partially) disclosed by the 
companies in their annual reports and also calculated independently using information 
provided in the Bloomberg database as well as by the Bank of England and KPMG’s 
Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey (2010).  
Since no information was disclosed by the companies regarding the specific 
parameters of the beta factor derivation, the parameter constellation for the calculation 
of the discount rates is varied using parameters which have been discussed in previous 
research and are commonly used in practice. 
As reference indices the MSCI All Country World Index (international index) is used 
and, alternatively, the FTSE 100 Total Return index and Mexbold index (both 
national). All three indices are total return indices meaning that dividend payments are 
accounted for in the total value of the index. The MSCI All Country World Index 
includes 48 indices in industrial and developing countries. The choice of the indices 
was motivated by several requirements: the MSCI index was chosen to include as 
many securities as possible in order to approximate the requirements of the CAPM as 
                                                 
106
 Of course, analyst reports should not be considered as the only external sources of information 
available. Further opportunities to be considered include an analysis of media sources possibly 
combined with interviews of management and / or financial journalists (see also section 7.2.2 and fn. 
133). However, a search of the Factiva database using several combinations of key words yielded 
over 20.000 media sources of information on Vodafone. Considering that the analysis of this 
information would clearly exceed the scope of the thesis, such analysis is suggested as an 
opportunity for further research.  
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best as possible. Alternatively, the FTSE 100 and the Mexbold107 were selected to 
reflect the perspective of the investment opportunity set corresponding to private and 
institutional investors. Another requirement for the choice of reference index was that 
as few non liquid shares are included as possible so that a possible intervalling effect is 
reduced. 
The length of period during which the rates of return for the derivation of the beta 
factors were collected was set at 1, 2, 3 or 5 years. The intervals for the data collection 
for the rates of return were daily, weekly and monthly. These parameters are 
commonly used in empirical research as well as in practice.108 
                                                 
107
 The Mexbold index was selected for the investigation of a Mexican subsidiary of Vodafone, see 
section 6.5.2.1. 
108
 For example Bartholdy & Peare, 2001, p. 4, Armitage, 2005, p. 292; Dörschell et al, 2009. Ibbotson 
Assoviates, Chicago / USA, London Business School Risk Measurement Service use for example 5-
year-monthly beta factors. The standard constellation for the derivation of beta factors in Bloomberg 
is 2-year-weekly betas but also daily and weekly-based derivations are available. 
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4 THE IMPACT OF GOODWILL WRITE-DOWNS ON 
CREDIT RATINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The discretionary nature of goodwill, the large amounts of its write-downs and 
potential adverse effects on balance sheet, net income, key performance indicators and 
even (indirectly) cash flows motivate research on goodwill impairment (see section 
2.2). Additionally, significant regulatory changes on worldwide level in the past 
decade have brought on a wave of goodwill-related studies. However, while there has 
been ample research on various aspects of goodwill accounting and their relevance for 
shareholders, investors and managers109, the ‘debt side’ of the market has been so far 
somewhat neglected regarding these issues. Such neglect is hardly justified especially 
considering that while a substantial portion of managers have no choice but to report 
goodwill under the new IFRS, lenders’ analyses and decisions are not necessarily 
bound to regulatory standards and hence might offer a quite different insight into 
goodwill perception. Evidence in academic studies suggests for example that 
violations of debt covenants are not necessarily linked to financial distress (Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002) but might be due to changes in accounting treatments. In the case of 
(discretionary) write-downs, studies show a possible link between debt covenants and 
the choice of the accounting treatment on the managers’ side (Beatty & Weber, 2005, 
and Zang, 2003, in the US; Gore et al, 2000, and Wang, 2003, in the UK). More recent 
studies show that lenders recognise the importance of goodwill impairment, at least for 
intangible-intensive companies (Beatty et al, 2008; Frankel et al, 2008). 
Another big group of users of financial statements in the debt market – rating agencies 
– has so far remained unexplored regarding the role and perception of goodwill 
accounting. The role of a rating agency lies in providing valuable information to 
investors at low cost, thus decreasing the costs of obtaining new information and 
monitoring company performance in a market where rapidity provides valuable 
advantages.  
Although rating agencies themselves do not elaborate on their exact decision making 
process (Chattopadhyay et al, 1997), it is common knowledge that the quantitative 
                                                 
109
  See section 2.2.1.1 for details. 
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information included in the rating analysis is normally based on the data available in 
the company’s financial reports (S&P, 2005). Therefore, accounting information is 
expected to play an important role in the decision process of credit ratings. Although 
previous academic research shows that rating agencies react to accounting information 
and to the announcement of asset write-downs (Elliott & Shaw, 1988; Elliott & Hanna, 
1996) and that accounting information is used in the rating calculation110 the 
implication of goodwill and its write-downs in the credit rating assessment has not 
been explored yet. 
Therefore, the following research question is raised in this study:  
How do rating agencies view goodwill in their risk evaluation of 
companies, as reflected in the relevant accounting treatment of goodwill? 
Related to this research question the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1: The correct classification and misclassification distribution of company 
credit ratings is the same whatever the way rating agencies view 
goodwill as reflected in its accounting treatment. 
This study is conducted in the form of an independent investigation. Rather than 
interviewing rating agencies about their best practice an independent test of their 
treatment of goodwill in the rating assessment process provides information about this 
process as well as about their response to goodwill impairment. An independent study 
is thus not influenced by corporate disclosure policies or personal opinions. In this 
manner, this investigation reflects the concern of regulators, investors and the public in 
general that rating grades be transparent and understandable to external users. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are provided Table 4.7 in supplement A to this 
chapter. There were 4 cases in the sample (4.1%) where the companies did not have 
amortisation charges (only impairment). A notional amortisation charge was calculated 
according to the procedure described in Table 4.8 in supplement B to this chapter. 
                                                 
110
  See section 2.2.1.3. 
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Descriptive statistics – which are based on a total of 97 impairment observations for 46 
companies in the investigation period111 - show that goodwill per balance sheet 
represented on average 29.3% of total assets. However, considering a median of 
goodwill at £ 476 mln, most companies had a lower percentage of goodwill at 10.3% 
of total assets. The mean impairment write-down amounted to £ 215 mln and 
represented 60.7% of EBIT while annual amortisation was £ 48 mln on average. 
To account for the influence of severe outliers on the analysis, between 0 and 10% of 
the sample was winsorized by removing outliers beyond the limits of [ ]3x σ± , i.e. the 
threefold distance of the standard deviation from the mean. Robustness checks were 
also made for the limits of [ ]4x σ±  and [ ]2x σ± . The improvement of the outlier 
influence, while substantial when compared to the original sample, was not 
qualitatively different between the robustness checks. 
The dataset was split into an estimation and a holdout (validation) sample. The 
estimation sample is used to estimate the model simulating the rating decision. The 
model is then tested on the holdout sample (see also Chattopadhyay et al, 1997). The 
estimation sample included data from the earlier years in the relevant period (1999 – 
2003, 66 observations). The validation sample comprised cases from the end of the 
relevant period (2004 – 2005, 31 observations). 
4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The explanatory power of the discriminant functions is assessed using a χ2 
transformation of Wilks’ Lambda.112 The results of this evaluation are provided in the 
table below: 
                                                 
111
  For more details on data collection, see section 3.2. 
112
  Wilks’ lambda represents the proportion of the total variance of the discriminant scores not 
explained by differences between the two categories. Its χ2 transformation provides information 
about the statistical significance of the model. 
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Table 4.1: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: explanatory power of the 
discriminant function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, an overwhelming majority of the discriminant functions (97.3%) have high 
explanatory power at the 0.05 level. Only 2 settings (2.67%, V12, S1 and S3) are not 
significant and both are in a variable combination based on income statement figures. 
This evidence suggests that rating agencies might not rely solely on profit and loss 
figures for their annual analyses but are more likely to include both figures from the 
balance sheet and the income statement.113 
In order to examine differences between the scenarios due to goodwill accounting 
specifics the classification results of the MDA analysis are discussed next. In particular 
due to the variety of scenarios and variable combinations used to test the research 
questions (overall 75 settings without the robustness analysis) a few considerations 
about the possible outcome of the analysis are in order. The investigation in this 
chapter includes three aspects: first, the question about the role of goodwill accounting 
in the rating process (presented in the five different scenarios described in section 
3.1.1). Second, different variable combinations are tested (V1 to V15, also set out in 
section 3.1.1) in an attempt to approximate statistically the rating assessment process. 
Finally, the model is tested on different samples (estimation and holdout samples) in 
order to strengthen the findings. 
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  This suggestion was supported in the robustness analysis. Although the results of the robustness 
checks were qualitatively similar and provided an overall of 4.29% insignificant models in tests of 
overall 350 settings (see section 4.4), most of these were found in variable combinations based on 
income statements figures. 
χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig.
V1 25.602 0.000 26.745 0.000 26.734 0.002 31.462 0.000 34.735 0.000
V2 26.844 0.001 26.571 0.000 26.458 0.000 30.687 0.000 25.953 0.000
V3 32.419 0.000 31.403 0.000 27.638 0.000 31.083 0.000 35.698 0.000
V4 33.487 0.004 35.665 0.002 34.009 0.003 34.163 0.003 34.423 0.003
V5 28.930 0.001 28.859 0.001 28.736 0.001 30.686 0.001 28.957 0.001
V6 34.653 0.001 32.761 0.003 29.155 0.010 32.158 0.004 34.577 0.002
V7 40.530 0.003 35.811 0.016 37.382 0.011 40.294 0.005 36.132 0.010
V8 28.754 0.002 28.681 0.003 28.554 0.003 30.477 0.001 28.771 0.002
V9 34.653 0.001 32.761 0.003 29.155 0.010 32.158 0.004 34.577 0.002
V10 25.776 0.007 26.370 0.006 24.506 0.027 26.606 0.005 30.667 0.001
V11 26.255 0.002 25.774 0.001 25.752 0.001 29.033 0.001 26.063 0.002
V12 17.425 0.065 20.018 0.045 18.749 0.066 21.719 0.010 27.475 0.001
V13 23.143 0.002 21.243 0.003 21.255 0.003 23.961 0.001 21.647 0.003
V14 24.337 0.001 24.345 0.001 24.153 0.000 26.088 0.000 24.462 0.001
V15 16.148 0.013 14.138 0.028 12.945 0.044 15.412 0.017 18.560 0.005
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5
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As regards the first of these issues, intuitively, if standard setters are correctly 
interpreting goodwill and successfully translating its nature into accounting 
regulations, then – based on recent developments in accounting (IFRS) – rating 
agencies could well be expected to include goodwill and its impairment write-downs in 
the rating calculation. Additionally, amortisation should be ignored for purposes of the 
assessment process, in particular, if agencies are following results of academic 
research (see chapter 2) suggesting that amortisation numbers do not provide new 
information to financial statement users. On the other hand, however, considering the 
accounting history of goodwill in the UK and the fact that, before the introduction of 
amortisation and impairment, most companies preferred to immediately deduct 
goodwill from equity, raters may well decide that goodwill and its write-downs are 
irrelevant for their assessment purposes. This expectation is also supported by the fact 
that prior research which is used to discuss expectations for this study is largely based 
on the interests and reactions of investors who have a differing set of interests than 
lenders.  
Second, it is expected that models based on both income statement and balance sheet 
variables are most likely to provide the highest statistical significance as – in 
particular, where long-term ratings are concerned – analysts are likely to take into 
account as much information as possible and, also, as concentrating on income 
statement variables only will ignore cash flow effects (including balance sheet based 
variables, on the other hand, would account for such effects).  
Finally, the results of the holdout vs the estimation sample are discussed in section 4.4. 
The classification results indicate the percentage of the sample that was classified in 
the correct rating category within the discriminant analysis. Five alternative goodwill 
treatment scenarios were tested using fifteen model variations including balance sheet 
and / or income statement ratios (for details and categorisation, see section 3.1.1): 
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Table 4.2: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: classification results114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Settings of the estimation samples provide classification results in the range of 68.2% 
to 87.9% (i.e. depending on scenario and variable combination this is the percentage of 
companies classified in the correct rating category).115 The lowest classification results 
are found in V12 and V15 (based on income statement figures and with certain 
variables excluded). These findings are consistent with the smaller explanatory power 
of the settings including income statement predictors. The highest value is 87.9% and 
is found in V7, S4 where both variables from the income statement and the balance 
sheet are included and goodwill is written off immediately against equity.  
It should be noted that similar classification results across scenarios in variable 
combinations based on stepwise MDA analysis (V1-V3) might not be due to 
irrelevance of goodwill accounting in the rating decision making process as in these 
models the predictors are chosen individually for each scenario according to their 
                                                 
114
 The table shows classification results for the five explored scenarios (columns) in the 15 different 
variable combinations (rows). The scenarios reflect differing accounting treatments for goodwill and 
its write-downs (S1: capitalisation of goodwill and impairment-only approach; S2: capitalisation of 
goodwill and amortisation-only approach; S3: capitalisation of goodwill but exclusion of all write-
downs; S4: deduction of goodwill from equity reserves (i.e. also exclusion of write-downs); S5: 
inclusion of all numbers as reported by companies, see also table 3.2). Variable combinations are 
discussed in detail in table 3.3: they include combinations based only on balance sheet variables 
(V2,V5, V8, V11, V14), on income statement variables only (V3, V6, V9, V12, V15) and models 
including both kinds of variables (V1, V4, V7, V10, V13). In addition, in V1, V2 and V3 a stepwise 
MDA is performed while all other models rely on direct MDA analysis. Combinations V10, V11 and 
V12 include only predictors with statistical significance for the model. Finally, in order to account 
for the concern that in some variable combinations (V1-V3 and V10-V12) different scenarios may 
lead to the inclusion of different variables in the model, V4-V6 and V12-V15 include the statistically 
significant variables from all scenarios in V1-V3 and V10-V12 respectively. 
115
  The results of the holdout samples are discussed in section 4.4. 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
V1 77.3% 77.3% 78.8% 81.8% 77.3% 83.9% 83.9% 80.6% 100.0% 80.6%
V2 78.8% 77.3% 77.3% 81.8% 78.8% 74.2% 74.2% 74.2% 87.1% 74.2%
V3 81.8% 78.8% 74.2% 78.8% 81.8% 77.4% 77.4% 77.4% 93.5% 77.4%
V4 77.3% 77.3% 80.3% 77.3% 77.3% 90.3% 93.5% 83.9% 96.8% 93.5%
V5 75.8% 77.3% 75.8% 81.8% 77.3% 80.6% 77.4% 80.6% 80.6% 77.4%
V6 83.3% 81.8% 78.8% 83.3% 80.3% 77.4% 77.4% 80.6% 90.3% 80.6%
V7 80.3% 80.3% 81.8% 87.9% 81.8% 90.3% 90.3% 83.9% 100.0% 90.3%
V8 77.3% 80.3% 77.3% 81.8% 77.3% 77.4% 77.4% 77.4% 90.3% 77.4%
V9 83.3% 81.8% 78.8% 83.3% 80.3% 83.9% 77.4% 80.6% 90.3% 80.6%
V10 74.2% 71.2% 77.3% 77.3% 74.2% 83.9% 83.9% 83.9% 87.1% 83.9%
V11 75.8% 77.3% 77.3% 81.8% 77.3% 80.6% 89.6% 87.1% 87.1% 77.4%
V12 68.2% 75.8% 68.2% 75.8% 72.7% 80.6% 80.6% 77.4% 80.6% 77.4%
V13 74.2% 74.2% 74.2% 74.2% 72.7% 74.2% 77.4% 74.2% 77.4% 71.0%
V14 75.8% 74.2% 74.2% 81.8% 75.8% 71.0% 71.0% 71.0% 71.0% 71.0%
V15 74.2% 68.2% 71.2% 68.2% 74.2% 80.6% 77.4% 74.2% 77.4% 80.6%
ScenarioScenario
Estimation Sample Holdout Sample
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statistical meaning for the model. A similar argumentation can be applied for the 
predictor combinations where variables are excluded according to their (lack of) 
importance in the structure matrix (V10 to V12). However, a possible repeated 
occurrence of similarities across scenarios of the same class in other predictor 
combinations could suggest lack of differences based on goodwill accounting. Based 
on this consideration as well as on previous evidence suggesting that models based 
only on income statement variables are not used by rating agencies (see p. 118) 
variable combinations V7 (based on both balance sheet and income statement variables 
and direct MDA method) and V8 (based on balance sheet variables and direct MDA 
method) are subjected to further analysis. For purposes of this more detailed analysis 
both settings are presented separately below116: 
Table 4.3: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: classification results for V7 
and V8 
 
 
The classification results suggest that that scenario 4 (goodwill immediately written-
off against equity) produces the strongest results in both of these variable 
combinations.117 In fact, scenario 4 seems to produce highly correct classification 
results in 12 out of 15 variable combinations118 as Table 4.4 (a summary of table 4.2) 
below suggests: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
116
  Table 4.3 represents and extract from table 4.2 and is presented separately for clarification purposes. 
It does not convey additional information to table 4.2. 
117
  Actually, scenario 4 provides the highest classification results in 7 of the variable combinations, all 
of which are either based on all variables or on balance sheet variables (see table 4.2). There is no 
clear trend as to which scenario performs well in variable combinations including only income 
statement figures.  
118
  Scenario 4 produces classification results with higher accuracy than all other scenarios in nearly half 
of the variable combinations (7 combinations). If V12 and V15 are excluded (due to lower statistical 
significance) this percentage increases to 54%. 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
V7 80.3% 80.3% 81.8% 87.9% 81.8% 90.3% 90.3% 83.9% 100.0% 90.3%
V8 77.3% 80.3% 77.3% 81.8% 77.3% 77.4% 77.4% 77.4% 90.3% 77.4%
Estimation Sample Holdout Sample
Scenario Scenario
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Table 4.4: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: a summary of classification 
results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, scenario 4 seems to reflect best the rating prediction as it produces the 
highest percentage of correctly classified ratings.119 These findings can be interpreted 
that raters ignore goodwill altogether not including either goodwill or its write-downs 
(amortisation or impairment) in their regular annual analyses.120  
The findings are in accordance with UK business reality for three reasons. First, before 
FRS 10 and FRS 11 entered into force in 1997/1998, the preferred treatment of 
goodwill in the UK was a direct write-off against equity even though under SSAP 22 
companies were offered an accounting choice between an immediate write-off against 
equity and amortisation. Many UK companies at the time chose to deduct goodwill 
from equity and their number rose to impressive 93.4% in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Nobes, 1992). Considering the heated discussion around and the opposition to 
the introduction of FRS 10 and FRS 11 (see section 2.1.1.1), it is well possible that this 
preferred treatment, although prohibited after 1998, still persists where the rating 
decision process in the UK is concerned. Furthermore, according to their own 
statement rating agencies aim to produce long-term ratings (S&P, 2005). Therefore, it 
is conceivable that they choose not to evaluate goodwill in the annual company 
analyses in order to avoid unnecessary volatility of results in the rating. Finally, 
                                                 
119
  Also, even in the holdout samples with the smaller number of cases distorting the predictive 
accuracy of the models, scenario 4 outperforms the other scenarios (see section 4.4) 
120
  Of course, in the case of event-driven analyses the perception of goodwill and amortisation or 
impairment write-downs may be quite different. However, event-driven rating analyses are not 
discussed in this study. 
Variable 
Combination
Highest % of correct 
classifications
(scenario)
V1 S4
V2 S4
V3 S1/S5
V4 S3
V5 S1/S4
V6 S4
V7 S4
V8 S1/S4
V9 S3/S4
V10 S4
V11 S2/S4
V12 S1/S2/S3/S4
V13 S4
V14 S4
V15 S1/S5
 123 
research evidence on loan covenants showing that banks deduct goodwill from equity 
in the definition of loan covenants is in line with the findings of this study.121  
Considering the fact that one of the main reasons quoted for the introduction of the 
IFRS regulations is to increase the transparency of financial statements this evidence 
certainly provokes questions. It appears that rating agencies who should be among 
those in favour of the concept of a transparent company are not likely to benefit from 
the intended improvement in goodwill accounting (under IFRS). As far as annual 
rating assessments of UK companies are concerned these aspects of IFRS 3 and IAS 
36 do not seem to be quality enhancing but rather pointless. These new accounting 
regulations might not be successful in changing rating agencies’ attitude towards 
goodwill. Instead, the results of the data analysis point to irrelevance of goodwill 
write-downs and – for that matter – of goodwill accounting for the UK debt market. 
4.3.1 Chi-square tests  
So far this study provides evidence suggesting that rating agencies are likely to discard 
goodwill and its write-downs and ignore them in their annual analysis. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the differences observed between scenario 4 and the rest of 
the scenarios are statistically significant in order to make a conclusive statement. For 
this purpose chi-square tests were performed on the estimation sample at a significance 
level of 0.05 comparing the probability of distribution for correctly and incorrectly 
classified rating cases for scenario 4 and the other scenarios:122  
                                                 
121
  The results contradict evidence in more recent studies showing that lenders do care about goodwill 
when they consider intangible-intensive companies (Beatty et al, 2008; Frankel et al, 2008). These 
studies, however, do not cover the UK debt market which – considering the peculiarities of UK 
goodwill accounting – might explain this inconsistency. 
122
  Since the dataset was not large enough to allow for five-category comparison, two category-tests 
were performed where scenario 4 was compared to each of the other scenarios. Furthermore, since 
the dataset is small, Fisher’s exact test was also performed as it is suitable for small samples. The 
results were equivalent. 
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Table 4.5: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: statistical significance of 
differences in goodwill accounting treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results provided in table 4.5 above indicate independence of the probability of 
distribution for scenario 4 vs the other scenarios. Therefore, differences between 
scenario 4 and the rest of the scenarios can be considered statistically significant at a 
level of 0.05 which confirms the basis for the interpretation and conclusions of the data 
analysis (see sections 4.3 and 4.5).  
4.4 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
For purposes of robustness analysis the data sample was reorganised into 7 classes, 
differing regarding (1) the F-cut-off point in the stepwise analyses and (2) the 
distribution of the cases into the estimation and the holdout sample. An overview of 
these classes is given below: 
Table 4.6: Goodwill write-downs and credit ratings: overview of classes of the 
sample123 
Class F-cut-off point Estimation sample Holdout sample 
C1 1.0 1999-2003 2004-2005 
C2 2.0 1999-2003 2004-2005 
C3 0.5 1999-2003 2004-2005 
C4 0.5 1999-2004 2005 
C5 0.5 1999-2005 --- 
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  The different F-cut-off points allow for more variables to be included in the stepwise discriminant 
analysis (see Chattopadhyay et al, 1997, and Huss and Zhao, 1991). In C6 and C7 the end years 
(1999 and 2005) of the sample period are excluded to account for possible deviations around the 
application start of FRS 10 and 11 and the application start of IFRS in 2005. 
Original split used 
in the study 
χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig. χ2 Sig.
V1 30.675 0.000 39.691 0.000 33.866 0.000 30.675 0.000
V2 33.866 0.000 30.675 0.000 30.675 0.000 33.866 0.000
V3 25.390 0.000 26.811 0.000 25.918 0.000 18.132 0.000
V4 21.34 0.000 28.307 0.000 19.935 0.000 28.307 0.000
V5 27.885 0.000 30.675 0.000 27.885 0.000 30.675 0.000
V6 20.767 0.000 18.333 0.000 20.960 0.000 23.469 0.000
V7 5.285 0.042 10.544 0.006 6.195 0.031 12.019 0.003
V8 30.675 0.000 28.359 0.000 30.675 0.000 30.675 0.000
V9 20.967 0.000 18.333 0.000 20.960 0.000 23.469 0.000
V10 22.976 0.000 24.834 0.000 45.189 0.000 29.867 0.000
V11 27.885 0.000 30.675 0.000 30.675 0.000 30.675 0.000
V12 5.811 0.020 4.376 0.043 18.153 0.000 5.500 0.024
V13 24.065 0.000 24.065 0.000 30.795 0.000 21.660 0.000
V14 45.833 0.000 42.275 0.000 45.833 0.000 45.833 0.000
V15 21.557 0.000 34.275 0.000 31.429 0.000 15.865 0.000
S4*S1 S4*S5S4*S2 S4*S3
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C6 0.5 2000-2003 2004-2005 
C7 0.5 1999-2003 2004 
Classification results are qualitatively similar across the different classes of the same 
scenario and can be therefore considered as robust to variations in the sample.  
Furthermore, classification results in holdout samples and cross-validation results of 
the estimation samples are used for purposes of robustness analysis. 
The results in the holdout samples are based on very few (13 – 31) observations. Due 
to the small number of sample companies that are rated and, additionally, had goodwill 
impairment charges in the relevant period, larger holdout samples were not obtainable. 
Therefore, the holdout samples cannot be considered for purposes of scenario 
comparison as they have diminished reliability. Rather than that they are used to 
provide general tendency of the model validation. Their classification results are in the 
range 67% to 100% which is a nearly identical span with the one of the estimation 
sample results. Therefore, the classification results of the estimation samples are 
considered to be robust and reliable. 
Cross-validation classification results are used to indicate whether the number of 
predictors used in the model is too large. The cross-validation classification results 
were considered in combination with the indicators of the explanatory power of the 
model. They are qualitatively equivalent to the estimation sample classification results.  
4.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The findings suggest that rating agencies ignore both goodwill as an asset and 
goodwill write-downs for purposes of their rating calculations. This is consistent with 
the preferred treatment of goodwill prior to the introduction of FRS 10 and FRS 11 in 
the UK and with the aim of rating agencies to achieve long-term stability in the rating 
assessment.  
With regard to the new IFRS regulations it seems that the struggle to improve the 
transparency of goodwill accounting might not be as beneficial to raters as intended. 
Of course, it should be noted that the results of this study are limited to annual rating 
assessments and to UK companies only. It is possible that goodwill and goodwill 
impairment are reviewed separately from these annual analyses. For example, a 
goodwill impairment charge might lead to a placement on the credit watch list or 
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provoke an event-driven rating analysis possibly leading to a downgrade of the rating. 
These possibilities can be tested by analysing goodwill accounting choices and their 
role in event-driven analyses or in placements on the credit watchlist. As regards the 
usefulness of IFRS goodwill regulations research should be extended to cover 
companies in other countries applying IFRS in order to generalise the findings of this 
study. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is possible that the models used in this 
study do not render exactly the rating calculation as conducted by rating agencies. 
This study does not consider the reasons why rating agencies disregard goodwill and 
its write-downs in their calculations. Intuitively, a possible argumentation could be 
based on their belief that goodwill write-downs express managerial incentives rather 
than the financial situation of a company.124 In this context the results of this study are 
further discussed in combination with the findings presented in chapter 5 which 
investigates the managerial choices related to goodwill accounting. 
                                                 
124
  Such argumentation would find support in the findings of prior research, see also section 2.2.2.3. 
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Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
k£ Mean Median Variance Std Deviation Min Max
Goodwill Impairment 214,575.51 23,400.00 375,328,524,973.05 612,640.62 1,000.00 4,353,000.00
Goodwill Amortisation 47,610.51 38,500.00 4,261,283,928,444,57 2,064,287.75 0.00 12,929,000.00
Goodwill per Balance Sheet 3,955,125.03 475,700.00 217,845,827,406,688.00 14,759,601.19 0.00 92,833,000.00
Total Assets 13,337,700.70 4,631,200.00 838,444,692,317,563.00 28,955,909.45 218,700.00 162,226,000.00
Total Liabilities 6,499,040.73 2,736,000.00 91,105,545,804,403.50 9,544,922.51 454,500.00 58,929,789.00
Net Assets 9,890,594.23 3,456,300.00 634,292,278,321,204.00 25,185,159.88 84,400.00 148,547,000.00
Total Long Term Debt 2,055,120.96 1,021,000.00 9,232,948,144,560.43 3,038,576.66 97,500.00 16,245,000.00
Operating Cash Flow 803,497.10 321,300.00 6,113,785,421,334.01 2,472,607.01 -5,696,000.00 14,441,456.25
Income before Tax & Extr. 168,612.15 144,000.00 6,494,367,342,572.97 2,548,404.86 -13,539,000.00 11,391,562.50
EBIT 353,472.77 251,800.00 6,407,910,203,921.84 2,531,385.04 -12,568,000.00 11,822,756.25
Descriptive Statistics of the Predictor Variables
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Cash+STI)/CL 0.3151781 0.420232442 0.245599152 0.247807149 0.080159763 0.203683761 0.283124995 0.451313373 0.003987189 0.048576214 1.272460873 2.118753652
IBTE/NA 0.105089046 -0.030627786 0.100079851 0.031991891 0.038361709 0.072098943 0.195861453 0.268512463 -0.396170597 -1.138744031 0.648977395 0.434981685
CF/TLTD 0.813390748 0.095692135 0.433505575 0.259024922 1.57271033 0.534339394 1.254077482 0.730985221 -1.788822948 -4.397710446 5.220358968 1.032388664
IBTE/S 0.050426115 -0.045208453 0.082436815 0.022143812 0.037977666 0.04869823 0.194878593 0.220676756 -0.715316285 -1.046613145 0.333480834 0.152123995
IBTE/TA 0.061584073 -0.02362667 0.070443088 0.021342536 0.011928627 0.026063818 0.109218252 0.161442926 -0.297868397 -0.668488364 0.328126701 0.209991158
IBTE/TLTD 0.615329578 -0.06491362 0.330382852 0.068679639 2.028878018 0.612288751 1.424386892 0.782488818 -2.384272997 -5.006602972 5.660718627 0.715249663
IBTE/TL 0.087857027 -0.023565931 0.107007336 0.02770707 0.046052202 0.040643328 0.214597768 0.201601904 -0.671402676 -0.911694532 0.513281117 0.236712818
NA/TLTD 5.752014296 2.795770736 3.940463458 2.449039726 31.68785509 2.454166579 5.629196665 1.566577984 1.114558326 0.277631579 31.06343546 7.854443456
TLTD/TA 0.183468834 0.319442594 0.146201703 0.275119397 0.013534315 0.035176433 0.116337076 0.187553813 0.017785314 0.08657134 0.517169507 1.068336594
CA/CL 1.045834884 1.255685766 1.013377142 1.057282478 0.124244274 0.308224212 0.352483013 0.555179441 0.468996063 0.451701018 1.972360558 3.106106655
CF/TL 0.153792522 0.036931039 0.169070853 0.092137829 0.024850566 0.038451813 0.157640623 0.196091338 -0.429914666 -0.808405065 0.480899321 0.341670389
CF/TA 0.090392241 0.018781853 0.101718114 0.055825998 0.007999961 0.026391012 0.089442501 0.162453107 -0.220569591 -0.615189789 0.271198433 0.23872679
WC/S 0.0263659 0.08342324 0.006393001 0.01597822 0.07684368 0.049716912 0.277206927 0.222972896 -0.349568035 -0.318533894 1.414941012 0.806877263
CF/NA 0.151244336 0.033312737 0.155381188 0.078228107 0.025837661 0.07597833 0.160740976 0.275641669 -0.297230668 -1.059934662 0.536383208 0.494505495
TL/TA 0.617567999 0.742935184 0.634600145 0.696534037 0.031040724 0.051701776 0.176183778 0.227380245 0.17658424 0.381021369 1.016838813 1.596095951
NA/TL 1.282854822 0.970901872 1.023505048 0.929303667 0.842737130 0.124633002 0.918007151 0.353033996 0.417238422 0.18569857 4.543184256 2.118821293
S/TA 0.809888324 0.959686468 0.874967371 1.012589263 0.201220415 0.150097134 0.448575986 0.387423713 0.091307563 0.371785585 2.29577548 2.064014632
S/NA 1.386585717 1.534398157 1.374397335 1.491444209 0.880120731 0.641948158 0.9381475 0.801216674 0.117674408 0.459403123 4.493285947 4.366591535
EBIT/IE 6.264310984 0.509643078 4.488017429 2.002303495 191.7863277 54.25054652 13.84869408 7.365497031 -29.01242236 -40.59332106 72.18152707 9.75
SIZE 58,280 39,599 43,383 29,693 2,452,249,232 2,352,194,498 49,520 48,499 2,890 2,787 226,208 329,886
Notes:
1. Number of companies n=46 (impairing companies with credit ratings, number of impairments: 97)
2. Definition of Groups: Group 1 includes companies rated A or higher, Group 2 includes all other companies.
3. For variable definitions see table 3.1 in chapter 3
MaxMean Median Variance Std Deviation Min
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4.7 SUPPLEMENT B (CHAPTER 4) 
Adjustments for companies which reported only impairment charges during the 
investigation period 
In the 4 cases where goodwill amortisation data are not available125, the amortisation 
charge for the year is calculated on as if basis. This adjustment only affects scenario 2 
where the following changes have been performed: 
Table 4.8: Adjustments for companies which reported only impairment charges 
(no amortisation) 
Adjustments 
 
                Scenario 2 
Income Statement  
(IBTE, EBIT) 
Balance Sheet  
(total assets, net assets) 
Scenario 2: 
Amortisation,  
no impairment 
• Add back impairment charge for 
the current year 
• Deduct notional amortisation 
charge for the current year ( = 
NBV of goodwill at start of the 
current year / 20 years) from 
IBTE, EBIT (the rationale for this 
calculation is set out below) 
• Add back impairment charge for 
the current year to the NBV of 
goodwill 
• Deduct notional amortisation 
charge for the current year from 
the NBV of goodwill (the 
rationale for this calculation is set 
out below) 
The amortisation calculation is based on three assumptions: 
1. useful life: the useful life of goodwill is assumed to be 20 years for purposes of 
this calculation which is the longest period allowed by FRS 10 without 
requirement to conduct annual impairment tests. The reason for this assumption 
lies in the fact that the actual data used are based on annual impairment testing 
of goodwill which implies indefinite useful life. Therefore, in order to ensure 
that re-calculation of the financial ratios on the basis of systematic amortisation 
is plausible, the maximum duration possible is used.126 
2. method of amortisation: the straight-line method of amortisation is assumed  
as it is the most commonly used method in the UK and is recommended in FRS 
10, para. 30. 
                                                 
125
  There are no similar cases where notional goodwill impairment had to be calculated as the data 
sample includes only companies that have conducted impairment during the relevant period. 
126
  Additionally, this is the most commonly used duration of useful life for goodwill and it would be 
easy to undertake alternative calculations using shorter useful life (for example 5 or 10 years). 
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3. calculation basis of amortisation charge for the year: ideally, every 
acquisition should be traced back to its origin in order to calculate the 
appropriate goodwill amortisation charge for the current year. However, the 
data are not available for this. Therefore, the goodwill figure of the previous 
year is used as the basis for amortisation calculation. 
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5 CAUSES OF THE MANAGERIAL CHOICE TO 
CONDUCT GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT ADDITIONAL 
TO SYSTEMATIC AMORTISATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A large portion of research on goodwill impairment has been fuelled by two main 
questions: what is the effect of - or the reaction to - goodwill impairment write-downs 
(discussed for example in the substantial body of research on shareholders’ reaction to 
goodwill write-downs, see section 2.2.1.1), and also, what causes goodwill impairment 
write-downs (see section 2.2.2). The latter aims, in particular, to discover whether 
goodwill impairment is recorded to, in fact, reflect the economic situation of a 
company, or, whether it incorporates the efforts of management to meet a certain 
reporting target. In this context, questioning the causes of goodwill impairment 
inquires into the efficiency of financial reporting regulations. 
Accordingly, prior research has mostly concentrated on the issue whether write-downs 
reflect managerial actions more than the economic depletion of goodwill. These issues 
have been well investigated in the context of the introduction of SFAS 141 and 
SFAS 142 in the US in 2001. Therefore, previous studies have mostly deducted their 
findings on the basis of samples consisting of US companies, thus leaving the UK 
market largely uncovered.127.  
Of course, the question might arise, why it is important to test causes for goodwill 
impairment under UK GAAP at all. Given the problematical nature of goodwill 
accounting standard setters are making every effort to restrict managerial discretion by 
increasing GAAP rigidity (elimination of writing-off-against-equity option in the UK 
or of amortisation in the US and under IFRS). Nevertheless, there are still 
opportunities for discretion when reporting goodwill write-downs. UK GAAP provides 
a very useful framework for goodwill research as it still offers a de facto choice 
between amortisation and impairment or, even simultaneous application in cases where 
goodwill impairment is judged to be needed beyond the already used systematic 
amortisation. One implication of this dual system could be that impairment amounts 
                                                 
127
  A significant exception is research on accounting-based debt covenants which have in general been 
intensely discussed in the UK, see section 2.2.2.3.1. However, also in this area there has been little 
research specifically related to goodwill impairment (Wang (2003)). 
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are smaller than in regulatory systems where amortisation has been dispensed with, 
thus also decreasing the magnitude, and, therefore, the efficiency of (and motivation 
for) managerial manipulations. Additionally, if amortisation includes ‘noise’ as 
suggested by previous research (see section 2.2.1.1.2), the additional impairment loss 
might have a higher chance (being a residual or an ‘exceptional’ goodwill write-down 
besides the repetitive annual charge) of providing useful information about the 
financial situation of a company in such a dual system. This suggestion is also 
supported by Chambers (2007) who shows that a system combining both goodwill 
amortisation and impairment would provide the most value-relevant goodwill 
accounting by testing his hypothesis on ‘as if’ basis.   
Additionally, although UK GAAP is no longer relevant for listed firms for accounting 
periods starting on 1 January 2005 or later due to substitution through IFRS, research 
under this framework will remain highly relevant in the near future in order to provide 
empirical evidence for discussion of the respective IFRS regulations (IFRS 3, IAS 36). 
In fact, data availability under UK GAAP at times when extensive data under IFRS 
cannot yet be collected and avoidance of transitional IFRS regulations which could 
reduce the level of generalisation of the results provide further arguments for 
transferring research on goodwill impairment to the UK GAAP framework (Hirschey 
& Richardson (2002) and Hirschey & Richardson (2003) reason in a similar manner as 
regards their research of the then new SFAS 142). 
In this context the research question in this study is specified as follows: 
What are the causes behind the managerial decision to recognise an additional 
impairment charge besides systematic amortisation of goodwill at a specific point 
in time rather than another? 
Previous research shows that while asset write-downs in general seem to reflect the 
economic impairment of the asset, in the case of goodwill write-downs, managerial 
incentives also play an important role as a cause for the write-down (see sections 
2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3). Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H2: The goodwill impairment loss additionally charged to the systematic 
amortisation of goodwill is: 
H2a: negatively related to variables for the financial performance of the 
company. 
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H2b: positively related to variables reflecting managerial reporting incentives 
(with the exception of the ‘big bath’ variable where a negative relation 
is expected). 
The research question is further split into the following sub-questions: 
The ‘If’ question explores the decision to conduct goodwill impairment. It looks at 
this issue without taking into account the amount of the goodwill write-down. The 
question asked here is what events would induce a company to impair goodwill (as 
opposed to what events would induce a company to conduct a goodwill impairment of 
that particular amount). 
The ‘How Much’ question concentrates on the underlying reasons explaining the 
amount of goodwill impairment. This setting is explored using the complete sample 
available and, again, using only companies which reported impairment in the relevant 
period (the ‘How Much’ question revisited). 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in tables 5.4 and 5.5 in the 
supplement to this chapter. The descriptive statistics are based on the whole sample 
including 97 companies which exhibited impairment charges at least once during the 
investigation period (see also section 3.2).  
Descriptive statistics show that, on average, goodwill was a substantial part of total 
assets in the investigation period, ranging between 23% and 27% (with the exception 
of 1999-2000). Thus the sample reflects information from prior research pointing out 
that goodwill constitutes a significant part of firm assets. It appears that while goodwill 
was increasing until 2001, it was significantly reduced between 2002 and 2004 
following substantial impairments, amortisation and – possibly – divestures and / or 
sales.  
Goodwill impairment in sample companies ranges on average between 2.8% of 
balance sheet goodwill in 2004 and 24.8% of balance sheet goodwill in 1999 with 
higher percentages found in the years 1999 to 2003. 
Total assets of sample companies were generally increasing with the exception of 
2004. The EBIT numbers decrease until 2002 before improving in later years again. 
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Overall, the sample structure reflects the economical development in the early 2000s 
including macroeconomic effects such as the merger wave in the late 1990s as well as 
the impact of the crash of the internet bubble in the early 2000s. 
5.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.3.1 The ‘If’ question  
The empirical results including financial performance variables calculated over a five-, 
a three- and a one-year period128 are presented in table 5.1 below: 
                                                 
128
  The samples including financial performance variables calculated over a five-, a three- and a one-
year period are referred to as five-, three- and one-year samples respectively. 
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Table 5.1: Empirical Results for the 'If' question: linear regression with a dummy variable for goodwill impairment (dependent variable)
Model
5-year sample
Dependent Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,173 0,409 0,825 0,545 0,760 0,780 0,577
MB5 (-) -0,077 0,542 -0,098 0,319 0,089 0,513 -0,040 0,711 0,075 0,508 0,034 0,730 -0,033 0,827
RET5 (-) -0,092 0,408 -0,197 0,100 0,017 0,899 -0,102 0,475 0,080 0,634 -0,018 0,869 0,111 0,342
ROA5 (-) -0,150 0,257 0,404 0,036 -0,210 0,314 -0,291 0,014 0,180 0,125 -0,182 0,083 -0,127 0,271
MB5_ind (-) 0,206 0,149 0,302 0,003 0,118 0,296 -0,119 0,249 0,009 0,931 -0,216 0,051 0,156 0,183
RET5_Ind (-) 0,111 0,400 0,080 0,420 -0,239 0,048 -0,026 0,854 -0,231 0,157 0,004 0,977 -0,128 0,267
ROA5_ind (-) -0,263 0,112 -0,189 0,087 0,085 0,466 -0,173 0,102 0,068 0,535 -0,014 0,905 0,068 0,554
DTEto (+) 0,099 0,362 0,170 0,105 0,038 0,696 0,129 0,219 0,005 0,962 0,059 0,530 0,090 0,543
IS (+) -0,085 0,459 0,352 0,048 -0,396 0,052 -0,056 0,617 0,041 0,695 0,118 0,240 0,298 0,006
BB (-) -0,041 0,724 -0,039 0,719 -0,254 0,118 -0,104 0,305 -0,091 0,458 -0,099 0,314 -0,046 0,699
MGT (+) 0,084 0,473 0,044 0,657 -0,092 0,369 0,066 0,501 -0,186 0,084 0,023 0,823 -0,028 0,792
CFO (+) -0,029 0,805 0,153 0,175 -0,034 0,739 0,055 0,605 0,072 0,485 -0,083 0,378 -0,006 0,955
Gwimpto (?) -0,107 0,346 0,039 0,706 0,284 0,011 0,218 0,032 0,156 0,142 0,290 0,002 n.a. n.a.
Gwamt1 (?) 0,091 0,426 0,225 0,046 0,226 0,032 0,054 0,610 0,254 0,016 0,375 0,000 0,103 0,341
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
97 97 97 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003 2002
MBX, RETX, ROAX, MBX_ind, RETX_ind, ROAX_ind, DTEto, IS, BB, MGT, CFO, Gwimpto, Gwamt1
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
GWIMP Dummy
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,1234 0,2698 0,2451 0,2709 0,2110 0,3316 0,1946
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,558 ,010 ,024 ,009 ,074 ,001 ,083
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Table 5.1 (cont'd): Empirical Results for the 'If' question: linear regression with a dummy variable for goodwill impairment (dependent variable)
3-year sample
Dependent Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
GWIMP Dummy (Constant) 0,008 0,620 0,374 0,628 0,625 0,258 0,267
MB3 (-) 0,083 0,479 -0,028 0,794 0,080 0,557 -0,049 0,644 0,077 0,477 -0,156 0,095 -0,032 0,832
RET3 (-) -0,146 0,205 -0,265 0,041 0,073 0,597 0,093 0,449 0,192 0,279 -0,027 0,818 0,096 0,419
ROA3 (-) 0,030 0,813 0,321 0,086 -0,070 0,722 -0,437 0,003 0,248 0,023 0,033 0,748 -0,071 0,513
MB3_ind (-) 0,009 0,945 0,124 0,347 -0,121 0,312 0,027 0,785 -0,100 0,315 -0,139 0,229 -0,005 0,967
RET3_Ind (-) -0,021 0,878 0,070 0,568 0,093 0,522 -0,082 0,556 -0,342 0,052 0,039 0,772 -0,141 0,234
ROA3_ind (-) 0,069 0,581 -0,127 0,355 -0,173 0,212 -0,024 0,833 -0,002 0,985 0,025 0,829 -0,049 0,674
DTEto (+) 0,048 0,661 0,182 0,095 0,041 0,672 0,142 0,170 0,004 0,971 0,085 0,366 0,096 0,519
IS (+) -0,171 0,143 0,196 0,235 -0,244 0,213 -0,139 0,289 0,075 0,456 0,161 0,117 0,306 0,006
BB (-) 0,008 0,947 0,032 0,832 -0,291 0,086 -0,144 0,158 -0,076 0,475 -0,065 0,512 0,016 0,884
MGT (+) 0,110 0,385 -0,008 0,939 -0,069 0,513 0,045 0,648 -0,168 0,108 0,117 0,235 -0,038 0,732
CFO (+) -0,001 0,994 0,126 0,298 -0,034 0,735 0,077 0,457 0,058 0,563 -0,043 0,646 -0,011 0,920
Gwimpto (?) -0,107 0,376 0,060 0,589 0,300 0,009 0,191 0,061 0,173 0,086 0,263 0,007 n.a. n.a.
Gwamt1 (?) 0,162 0,159 0,213 0,076 0,222 0,029 0,083 0,473 0,235 0,022 0,363 0,000 0,120 0,278
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
97 97 97 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003 2002
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,0896 0,1767 0,2416 0,2541 0,2447 0,3148 0,1662
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,824 ,192 ,028 ,018 ,025 ,002 ,184
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Table 5.1 (cont'd): Empirical Results for the 'If' question: linear regression with a dummy variable for goodwill impairment (dependent variable)
1-year sample
Dependent Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
GWIMP Dummy (Constant) 0,068 0,807 0,198 0,316 0,883 0,462 0,672
MB1 (-) 0,111 0,312 -0,016 0,909 0,149 0,260 -0,028 0,779 0,021 0,851 0,047 0,636 -0,027 0,796
RET1 (-) 0,020 0,870 -0,100 0,413 0,148 0,259 -0,018 0,923 0,063 0,709 0,047 0,792 -0,006 0,959
ROA1 (-) 0,077 0,475 -0,040 0,737 -0,210 0,196 -0,285 0,027 0,013 0,919 -0,083 0,456 -0,158 0,143
MB1_ind (-) 0,028 0,853 -0,249 0,044 -0,397 0,002 -0,310 0,150 0,102 0,360 -0,149 0,150 -0,132 0,311
RET1_Ind (-) -0,025 0,871 0,130 0,262 0,314 0,022 -0,182 0,428 -0,299 0,070 -0,087 0,636 0,047 0,700
ROA1_ind (-) 0,124 0,309 0,028 0,796 -0,212 0,079 0,191 0,311 -0,070 0,537 0,062 0,548 -0,121 0,370
DTEto (+) 0,065 0,552 0,190 0,184 -0,020 0,836 0,078 0,451 0,024 0,811 0,052 0,586 0,080 0,457
IS (+) -0,147 0,210 0,135 0,301 -0,278 0,084 -0,132 0,326 0,052 0,628 0,147 0,158 0,280 0,012
BB (-) 0,026 0,824 -0,177 0,112 -0,376 0,015 -0,026 0,825 -0,165 0,189 -0,072 0,459 0,063 0,574
MGT (+) 0,148 0,235 0,014 0,891 -0,077 0,447 0,048 0,636 -0,137 0,212 0,060 0,551 -0,004 0,972
CFO (+) -0,008 0,947 0,128 0,292 -0,071 0,463 0,047 0,660 0,046 0,661 -0,051 0,593 -0,001 0,989
Gwimpto (?) -0,067 0,554 0,137 0,247 0,299 0,004 0,152 0,147 0,196 0,060 0,271 0,006 n.a. n.a.
Gwamt1 (?) 0,146 0,205 0,237 0,062 0,191 0,048 0,030 0,777 0,222 0,039 0,377 0,000 0,094 0,383
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
97 97 97 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003 2002
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,0972 0,1609 0,3058 0,2235 0,1946 0,3051 0,1764
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,120 ,002 ,141,770 ,277 ,002 ,050
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The findings show that F-tests are mostly significant at the 95% confidence level for 
the 5- and 3-year samples with the exception of the so-called ‘border years’ (mainly 
1999 and 2005).129 This suggests that especially around the time of initial adoption of 
FRS 10 and FRS 11 as well as around the time of the transfer to IFRS additional 
factors might have been present which were influencing the managerial decision to 
impair goodwill. Intuitively, in times of regulatory change it might not be unusual to 
base the impairment decision on factors other than financial performance or 
managerial incentives. For example an increased rigidity (real or perceived) of new 
regulations or lack of understanding of and/or experience with the new regulations 
could prompt a premature (or delayed) write-down (see also results from KPMG 
survey on the understanding of the newly introduced SFAS 142 in 2002, p. 75).130  
Significant predictors at the 95% confidence level (2-tailed test) included mostly 
variables for financial performance. These findings suggest that when managers make 
the decision whether to conduct a goodwill impairment write-down or not they are 
likely guided by the financial situation of the firm. Significant predictors are found 
among the financial performance variables of all samples (with variables depicting 
financial performance calculated on 1-, 3- or 5-year basis). Therefore, no clear 
conclusion can be made as to how long the lag between financial performance 
indicators and their impact on goodwill is. Both industry and individual financial 
performance indicators are found to be material and the coefficients of the significant 
predictors are mostly following the expected direction specified in the hypothesis (with 
minor exceptions, most notably in the 5-year sample for 2004). 
Furthermore, evidence of income smoothing is found in 1999 for all three samples 
suggesting that at least at some point in time managerial incentives also had an effect 
on the question whether to impair goodwill or not. Interestingly, 1999 is the first year 
of joint application of FRS 10 and FRS 11 (FRS 10 was introduced in 1997 and 
FRS 11 in 1998). Thus, if the opposition of UK practitioners to the new FRS standards 
was derived from a fear of more volatile profits after their implementation this 
evidence of income smoothing in the year 1999 might possibly imply an attempt to 
resolve or, at best, postpone the problem by smoothing net income. 
                                                 
129
  The regressions performed on data from 1999 did not include the goodwill impairment lag variable 
as FRS 11 was only introduced in 1998. 
130
  However, these questions are not part of this research question and are, therefore, suggested as a 
possibility for future research. 
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Finally, the lag effect of goodwill impairment write-downs was continuously present 
through all years of the investigation period. This evidence leads to the conclusion that 
companies which have once impaired goodwill are likely to conduct another 
impairment write-down in subsequent years. It is consistent with the other findings: 
when a company is in financial trouble it might take several years to recover and, 
hence, if goodwill impairment decisions are taken for financial performance reasons, 
several subsequent impairments might occur. 
5.3.2 The ‘How Much’ question 
The investigation of the ‘If’ question suggests that when facing the decision whether to 
impair goodwill or not managers might be guided by the financial situation of the 
company. This evidence follows the aim of standard setters where goodwill accounting 
is concerned: the write-down of goodwill should reflect the economic depletion of the 
asset. However, the ‘If’ question only provides the answer to one of two questions. 
The goodwill impairment decision includes not only the question whether to impair 
goodwill or not. It also contains the question regarding the amount of the goodwill 
write-down: the ‘How Much’ question. Empirical results for all three samples for the 
‘How Much’ question are provided in table 5.2:  
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Table 5.2: Empirical Results for the 'How Much' question
Model
5-year sample
Dependent 
Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,156 0,832 0,944 0,586 0,763 0,808 0,134
MB5 (-) -0,019 0,877 -0,102 0,343 -0,079 0,564 -0,079 0,401 -0,024 0,748 -0,058 0,595 -0,080 0,610
RET5 (-) 0,044 0,691 0,141 0,280 0,046 0,740 0,111 0,375 0,123 0,267 -0,126 0,303 0,010 0,936
ROA5 (-) -0,036 0,784 0,028 0,892 -0,218 0,302 -0,347 0,001 0,121 0,119 -0,192 0,099 -0,059 0,625
MB5_ind (-) 0,043 0,759 0,022 0,837 -0,016 0,890 -0,016 0,858 0,032 0,654 -0,142 0,244 -0,152 0,218
RET5_Ind (-) -0,137 0,296 -0,035 0,749 -0,086 0,478 -0,032 0,794 -0,120 0,263 0,106 0,468 -0,113 0,350
ROA5_ind (-) -0,132 0,418 -0,138 0,251 0,041 0,728 0,079 0,389 -0,023 0,747 0,021 0,870 -0,094 0,438
DTEto (+) 0,010 0,928 0,182 0,114 0,068 0,486 -0,002 0,983 -0,022 0,744 0,056 0,588 0,051 0,742
IS (+) -0,059 0,606 0,306 0,114 0,044 0,828 0,397 0,000 0,757 0,000 0,191 0,087 0,249 0,027
BB (-) -0,124 0,288 0,037 0,755 -0,328 0,046 -0,307 0,001 -0,046 0,566 -0,045 0,676 0,039 0,755
MGT (+) 0,146 0,207 -0,138 0,204 0,084 0,417 -0,008 0,926 -0,036 0,613 -0,022 0,843 -0,030 0,792
CFO (+) 0,019 0,872 0,082 0,504 -0,105 0,308 -0,053 0,569 0,178 0,010 0,078 0,455 -0,016 0,887
Gwimpto (?) -0,214 0,058 0,087 0,475 0,033 0,766 0,018 0,834 -0,055 0,433 -0,001 0,996 n.a. n.a.
Gwamt1 (?) -0,060 0,594 -0,005 0,966 0,044 0,679 0,035 0,704 0,035 0,606 0,268 0,016 -0,041 0,717
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
97 97 97 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003 2002
MBX, RETX, ROAX, MBX_ind, RETX_ind, ROAX_ind, DTEto, IS, BB, MGT, CFO, Gwimpto, Gwamt1
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2001 2000 1999
GWIMPTA
2005 2004 2003 2002
0,1351 0,1273 0,2283 0,4446 0,6585 0,1831 0,1057
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,461 ,525 ,043 ,000 ,000 ,163 ,622
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Table 5.2 (cont'd): Empirical Results for the 'How Much' question
3-year sample
Dependent 
Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,186 0,486 0,676 0,814 0,905 0,298 0,273
MB3 (-) 0,088 0,433 -0,019 0,865 -0,126 0,344 -0,023 0,799 -0,027 0,704 0,041 0,691 -0,046 0,766
RET3 (-) -0,062 0,577 0,164 0,209 -0,042 0,757 0,148 0,163 0,133 0,251 -0,135 0,306 -0,017 0,888
ROA3 (-) 0,275 0,027 0,006 0,974 -0,383 0,050 -0,487 0,000 0,189 0,008 0,031 0,784 -0,083 0,461
MB3_ind (-) 0,084 0,524 0,016 0,906 0,006 0,956 -0,050 0,561 -0,022 0,727 -0,031 0,808 0,038 0,754
RET3_Ind (-) -0,071 0,592 0,192 0,124 0,176 0,221 -0,097 0,416 -0,118 0,299 0,109 0,473 -0,088 0,472
ROA3_ind (-) -0,094 0,437 -0,198 0,157 -0,105 0,436 0,189 0,059 -0,104 0,114 0,006 0,964 0,143 0,244
DTEto (+) -0,006 0,957 0,189 0,088 0,051 0,597 0,007 0,934 -0,022 0,729 0,052 0,620 0,040 0,796
IS (+) -0,126 0,263 0,361 0,032 -0,040 0,836 0,249 0,028 0,785 0,000 0,242 0,036 0,235 0,039
BB (-) -0,044 0,708 -0,013 0,934 -0,230 0,165 -0,297 0,001 -0,030 0,668 0,001 0,993 0,031 0,790
MGT (+) 0,170 0,167 -0,125 0,240 0,043 0,675 -0,008 0,926 -0,015 0,823 0,037 0,735 -0,027 0,811
CFO (+) 0,050 0,655 0,046 0,705 -0,092 0,352 -0,079 0,375 0,167 0,013 0,103 0,324 -0,034 0,760
Gwimpto (?) -0,155 0,184 -0,033 0,767 0,017 0,877 0,015 0,865 -0,042 0,515 -0,026 0,804 n.a. n.a.
Gwamt1 (?) -0,014 0,901 0,144 0,236 0,062 0,526 -0,029 0,772 0,001 0,991 0,266 0,017 -0,052 0,653
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
97 97 97 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003 2002
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
GWIMPTA
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,1513 0,1517 0,2727 0,4546 0,6803 0,1475 0,0981
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,340 ,337 ,009 ,000 ,000 ,367 ,688
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Table 5.2 (cont'd): Empirical Results for the 'How Much' question
1-year sample
Dependent 
Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,027 0,446 0,717 0,671 0,977 0,381 0,284
MB1 (-) 0,050 0,641 -0,150 0,307 -0,103 0,435 -0,091 0,314 -0,037 0,600 0,104 0,339 -0,016 0,884
RET1 (-) 0,066 0,578 0,120 0,336 0,037 0,779 -0,133 0,436 0,061 0,567 -0,066 0,735 -0,046 0,703
ROA1 (-) -0,050 0,639 0,022 0,854 -0,451 0,007 -0,114 0,317 0,168 0,043 -0,142 0,242 -0,048 0,671
MB1_ind (-) 0,053 0,717 -0,102 0,411 -0,120 0,345 -0,366 0,058 -0,099 0,162 -0,077 0,491 -0,029 0,833
RET1_Ind (-) -0,200 0,185 0,027 0,816 0,120 0,376 0,199 0,332 -0,062 0,549 0,047 0,815 -0,055 0,671
ROA1_ind (-) 0,088 0,463 -0,147 0,181 -0,132 0,274 0,122 0,470 -0,128 0,081 0,151 0,185 0,064 0,652
DTEto (+) -0,010 0,922 0,077 0,596 -0,002 0,981 -0,031 0,740 -0,006 0,929 0,022 0,833 0,011 0,919
IS (+) -0,100 0,388 0,322 0,017 -0,092 0,568 0,382 0,002 0,717 0,000 0,228 0,046 0,238 0,041
BB (-) -0,105 0,368 -0,005 0,966 -0,320 0,038 -0,214 0,041 0,009 0,906 -0,043 0,682 0,048 0,687
MGT (+) 0,204 0,100 -0,115 0,286 0,039 0,701 -0,024 0,786 -0,004 0,950 -0,003 0,977 -0,028 0,805
CFO (+) 0,033 0,774 0,054 0,661 -0,132 0,178 -0,066 0,489 0,195 0,004 0,090 0,389 -0,031 0,781
Gwimpto (?) -0,210 0,064 0,038 0,753 0,044 0,670 -0,003 0,976 -0,037 0,576 0,009 0,933 n.a. n.a.
Gwamt1 (?) -0,020 0,860 0,190 0,140 0,022 0,820 0,035 0,704 -0,018 0,789 0,279 0,011 -0,052 0,646
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
97 97 97 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003 2002
GWIMPTA
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,1207 0,1317 0,2981 0,3811 0,6747 0,1747 0,0838
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,580 ,489 ,003 ,000 ,000 ,201 ,802
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Similar to the findings for the ‘If’ question, the F-tests are significant at the 95% 
confidence level for the period 2001-2003 in all samples (which is consistent with the 
results summarised in the previous section, see p. 134).  
Evidence shows a presence of significant variables reflecting managerial incentives, 
most notably income smoothing and, to some extent, ‘big bath’. The income statement 
variable is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level for all samples and for 
most years of the investigation period (for the ‘big bath’ variable this is the case in 
2002 and 2003). Additionally, the findings show some evidence of financial 
performance influence which is, however, substantially weaker than in the tests for the 
‘If’ question. The signs of the estimates of the significant predictors predominantly 
follow expectations. 
This evidence implies that, once the fundamental decision whether to record a 
goodwill impairment write-down has been made (reflecting the financial situation of 
the firm), managers might also consider reporting incentives when looking at the 
amount of the goodwill write-down.  
Finally, contrary to the results of the ‘If’ question, goodwill impairment write-downs 
in previous years are not found to be linked to write-downs in subsequent periods. It 
seems that while the presence of an impairment loss in the previous year might affect 
the decision to repeat it next year, it does not have an impact when the amount is 
considered. 
5.3.3 The ‘How Much’ question revisited 
Finally, in order to further substantiate the investigation of the research question, the 
sample was revised to include only companies with goodwill impairment write-downs 
in the relevant year. This procedure led to a smaller sample size which was different in 
every year as companies did not report goodwill impairment every year. The main 
findings for the five-, three- and one-year samples are presented in table 5.3: 
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Table 5.3: Empirical Results for the 'How Much' question revisited
Model
5-year sample
Dependent 
Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,589 0,346 0,068 0,837 0,813 0,428 0,002
MB5 (-) 0,039 0,906 -0,048 0,770 -0,157 0,327 -0,077 0,550 -0,030 0,732 -0,318 0,300 0,408 0,060
RET5 (-) -0,351 0,429 0,687 0,237 0,044 0,776 0,156 0,240 0,040 0,665 -0,456 0,224 -0,047 0,581
ROA5 (-) 0,311 0,444 -0,386 0,375 0,395 0,083 -0,367 0,024 -0,167 0,076 -0,062 0,905 0,935 0,038
MB5_ind (-) 0,021 0,973 -0,180 0,346 0,223 0,174 0,037 0,773 0,147 0,061 0,163 0,765 -0,913 0,012
RET5_Ind (-) 0,143 0,758 -0,119 0,498 -0,300 0,091 -0,010 0,936 0,036 0,702 -0,082 0,892 -1,070 0,013
ROA5_ind (-) -0,649 0,377 -0,139 0,453 -0,091 0,475 0,160 0,242 -0,087 0,214 -0,410 0,318 0,423 0,029
DTEto (+) 0,252 0,528 0,023 0,888 0,126 0,196 -0,117 0,379 0,025 0,778 0,426 0,128 -0,400 0,065
IS (+) -0,465 0,505 0,080 0,824 1,030 0,000 0,387 0,014 0,828 0,000 0,065 0,885 0,503 0,017
BB (-) 0,198 0,667 0,006 0,977 -0,298 0,138 -0,275 0,043 -0,240 0,012 0,184 0,548 0,748 0,050
MGT (+) 0,101 0,842 -0,210 0,218 0,101 0,335 -0,056 0,662 -0,051 0,511 0,148 0,679 -0,538 0,022
CFO (+) -0,140 0,778 -0,047 0,804 -0,069 0,495 -0,096 0,469 0,125 0,123 0,114 0,749 1,690 0,004
Gwimpto (?) -0,295 0,367 -0,108 0,577 -0,070 0,521 0,034 0,801 0,050 0,447 -0,042 0,885 -0,998 0,007
Gwamt1 (?) -0,204 0,639 -0,383 0,479 n.a. n.a. 0,057 0,632 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,275 0,100
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
24 49 54 56 38 26 16
2005 2004 2003 2002
MBX, RETX, ROAX, MBX_ind, RETX_ind, ROAX_ind, DTEto, IS, BB, MGT, CFO, Gwimpto, Gwamt1
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
GWIMPTA
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,4539 0,2244 0,6348 0,4776 0,9183 0,5527 0,9983
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,778 ,676 ,000 ,004 ,000 ,304 ,011
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Table 5.3 (cont'd): Empirical Results for the 'How Much' question revisited
3-year sample
Dependent 
Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,216 0,300 0,966 0,683 0,075 0,304 0,009
MB3 (-) 0,054 0,880 0,057 0,742 -0,016 0,911 0,007 0,953 -0,056 0,470 0,018 0,927 0,427 0,298
RET3 (-) -0,400 0,378 0,689 0,076 0,092 0,516 0,162 0,188 -0,018 0,853 -0,939 0,012 0,237 0,257
ROA3 (-) -0,098 0,761 -0,244 0,526 -0,582 0,001 -0,460 0,013 -0,251 0,006 0,503 0,108 -0,335 0,429
MB3_ind (-) -0,182 0,683 0,045 0,825 -0,015 0,907 -0,069 0,587 -0,009 0,885 -0,035 0,924 0,859 0,040
RET3_Ind (-) -0,323 0,381 0,339 0,068 0,097 0,468 -0,048 0,706 0,193 0,056 0,195 0,485 -1,151 0,019
ROA3_ind (-) -0,094 0,785 -0,401 0,082 -0,044 0,751 0,195 0,180 -0,094 0,195 -0,407 0,260 0,732 0,020
DTEto (+) 0,410 0,360 -0,017 0,909 0,118 0,206 -0,111 0,420 0,068 0,371 0,292 0,127 -0,733 0,141
IS (+) -0,696 0,290 0,404 0,176 0,209 0,196 0,270 0,102 0,853 0,000 0,112 0,718 0,297 0,110
BB (-) 0,172 0,726 -0,185 0,526 -0,354 0,059 -0,282 0,030 -0,228 0,006 0,398 0,122 0,131 0,622
MGT (+) 0,180 0,773 -0,168 0,290 0,107 0,261 -0,015 0,905 -0,037 0,577 0,129 0,492 -0,682 0,037
CFO (+) -0,053 0,914 -0,083 0,633 -0,018 0,852 -0,137 0,282 0,124 0,063 0,283 0,245 1,125 0,043
Gwimpto (?) -0,062 0,880 -0,101 0,537 -0,061 0,559 -0,005 0,970 0,064 0,242 0,046 0,831 -0,974 0,010
Gwamt1 (?) -0,303 0,476 -0,273 0,435 n.a. n.a. 0,087 0,459 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0,561 0,061
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
24 49 54 56 38 26 16
2005 2004 2003 2002
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
GWIMPTA
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,3826 0,3241 0,6792 0,4784 0,9415 0,6838 0,9938
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,895 ,264 ,000 ,004 ,000 ,071 ,039
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Table 5.3 (cont'd): Empirical Results for the 'How Much' question revisited
1-year sample
Dependent 
Variable Predictors
Exp.
sign Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig. Estimates sig.
(Constant) 0,481 0,054 0,325 0,535 0,090 0,661 0,133
MB1 (-) 0,155 0,725 -0,204 0,351 -0,107 0,490 -0,134 0,278 -0,005 0,913 -0,557 0,246 -1,479 0,333
RET1 (-) -0,311 0,284 0,165 0,422 0,076 0,612 0,132 0,330 -0,034 0,577 0,001 0,996 -1,086 0,117
ROA1 (-) -0,104 0,866 0,258 0,309 -0,191 0,274 0,138 0,472 -0,058 0,427 -0,482 0,135 -0,835 0,288
MB1_ind (-) 0,269 0,432 0,000 1,000 0,126 0,339 -0,441 0,169 -0,205 0,010 -0,643 0,199 0,911 0,481
RET1_Ind (-) -0,275 0,492 0,059 0,723 -0,131 0,245 0,810 0,062 0,159 0,023 0,378 0,308 -0,799 0,587
ROA1_ind (-) 0,352 0,332 -0,277 0,130 -0,080 0,536 -0,565 0,195 -0,113 0,134 0,631 0,150 -0,061 0,935
DTEto (+) 0,100 0,822 0,054 0,733 0,064 0,509 -0,122 0,359 -0,001 0,990 1,006 0,063 -0,327 0,821
IS (+) -0,434 0,537 0,372 0,058 0,545 0,002 0,579 0,002 0,792 0,000 0,119 0,725 0,659 0,349
BB (-) 0,377 0,260 0,115 0,538 -0,303 0,121 -0,190 0,176 -0,149 0,053 -0,431 0,178 -1,017 0,251
MGT (+) 0,464 0,341 -0,214 0,174 0,057 0,586 -0,162 0,250 0,003 0,963 -0,111 0,663 -0,740 0,331
CFO (+) -0,183 0,691 -0,051 0,782 -0,084 0,400 -0,082 0,554 0,082 0,153 0,399 0,247 0,704 0,540
Gwimpto (?) -0,162 0,586 -0,046 0,788 -0,071 0,526 0,029 0,831 0,064 0,186 0,004 0,988 -1,351 0,089
Gwamt1 (?) -0,093 0,860 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,101 0,402 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0,848 0,286
R2
F-test
Sample Size 2001 2000 1999
24 49 54 56 38 26 16
2005 2004 2003 2002
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
GWIMPTA
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
0,4989 0,2409 0,6490 0,4541 0,9609 0,5153 0,8879
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
,000 ,400 ,538,680 ,509 ,000 ,008
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Altogether, a similar trend regarding R2 and F-test results is noted as in the tests for the 
‘If’ and the ‘How Much’ questions. The F-tests for the years 2000-2003 were 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level while results based on the ‘border’ 
years diverge from expectations and are not significant. Furthermore, the 3-year 
sample seems to provide a better fit for the model while the 1-year sample yields 
insignificant F-tests and relatively low R2 results. If supported by further evidence of 
relevant significant predictors this finding could be interpreted as evidence that 
financial performance indicators do not lead immediately to an impairment write-down 
but that the influence is rather lagged over a certain period of time (three years). 
The signs of the significant estimates are found to mostly follow predictions. 
Consistent with the results of the ‘How Much’ question the findings here show 
continuous presence of managerial incentives in the period between 2001 and 2003, in 
particular, income smoothing and ‘big bath’ behaviour. Furthermore, the 3-year sample 
shows a continuous influence of return-on-assets of the individual company on 
goodwill impairment. Such influence is absent from both the 5- and the 1-year samples 
providing at least partial support for the results of the F-tests, namely that there is 
likely to be a three-year lag between financial performance indicators and a goodwill 
write-down.  
If the findings for all questions are linked together a possible explanation suggests that, 
in the big picture, managers are guided by the financial situation of their companies 
(the ‘If’ question) but they might also manage the goodwill write-down following 
reporting incentives (the ‘How Much’ questions). Considering the aim of the new 
IFRS to ensure higher transparency of financial statements and to secure the causality 
between the financial situation of the firm and goodwill impairment these findings 
show that, while an important part of the work has been done (the ‘If’ question), 
standard setters still have a lot to do. 
Due to the relatively small size of the samples in different years the results of the 
regressions for the ‘How Much’ question revisited should be considered and 
interpreted with caution. The number of cases in 1999 (16) and in 2005 (24) is 
particularly small. Considering the large number of predictors included in the model 
(thirteen) the results in these years might not be entirely reliable. 
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5.4 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In order to increase the data basis for robustness analysis purposes the annual cross-
sections were pulled into a panel sample for the whole investigation period (1999-
2005). The results of the panel regression were qualitatively similar to the results of the 
cross-section analysis.131 
The dependent variable for the ‘How Much’ and ‘How Much’ revisited questions was 
goodwill impairment deflated by total assets (GWIMPTA). Results based on 
alternative deflators (goodwill, equity) yielded only immaterial differences. 
As some of the predictors were not distributed normally they were transformed to test 
the stability of the model and the results. Transformations, however, led only to 
immaterial changes of the regression results. 
Multicollinerarity tables for predictor variables are provided in tables 5.6 and 5.7 in the 
Supplement to this chapter. Overall, statistical tests indicate that the variables are not 
highly intercorrelated suggesting that findings are robust.132 
5.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study investigates the reasons behind goodwill impairment under UK GAAP. The 
aim of this research is an attempt to locate the causes of goodwill impairment in a 
regulatory environment allowing alternative accounting models. The research question 
was split into three investigations in order to test the decision whether to conduct 
goodwill impairment or not (the ‘If’ question) and how much to impair once the 
decision to impair has been made (the ‘How Much’ question and the ‘How Much’ 
question revisited). The findings provide some evidence to suggest that while 
managers are likely be guided by the financial situation of the firm when deciding 
whether goodwill needs to be impaired or not, they might also consider reporting 
incentives when determining the impairment amount, most notably income smoothing 
and ‘big bath’. Furthermore, they are also likely to include in their ‘If’ decision the 
                                                 
131
  As the results of the panel analysis did not provide any additional information (besides information 
for robustness purposes) relevant to this chapter, and, in order to avoid potential confusion stemming 
from the presentation of too many analyses in the chapter, the researcher has excluded this analysis. 
132
  Condition indices exceeding a value of 15 (30) suggest potential (material) problems with 
collinearity. Therefore, the statement in the text above is only partially correct where the goodwill 
amortisation variable is concerned. Consequently, goodwill amortisation was excluded from some of 
the regressions (mainly from regression for the ‘How Much’ question revisited, see tables 5.1, 5.2 
and 5.3). The remaining regressions show no material change of findings in tests including or 
omitting this variable.  
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consideration of previous goodwill impairment write-downs although, however, not of 
their amounts. As financial underperformance often stretches over a longer period of 
time this result is also consistent with the finding that the basic decision to impair 
goodwill is prompted by the financial situation of the company. 
Considering standard setters’ efforts to streamline goodwill accounting the evidence 
suggests that while regulators are on the road to success their aim has not ultimately 
been reached just yet. The groundwork for improvement of financial statements and 
their ability to reflect the company situation in a true and fair manner has been laid. 
However, loopholes still provide managers with the opportunity to use accounting 
regulations to their individual advantage and at their discretion. Considering that under 
IFRS impairment is the only option for subsequent measurement of goodwill after 
initial recognition standard setters would be well advised to look carefully at the events 
or circumstances which it reflects. 
One of the main motives for placing this study within the UK accounting framework 
was that goodwill impairment is an accounting option besides goodwill amortisation. 
In previous research goodwill amortisation has been discussed as noise for investors 
having little information content. On that note impairment was introduced in several 
countries to replace amortisation and thus increase the information content of financial 
statements. However, under UK GAAP both accounting treatments were allowed 
implying that even where amortisation might fail, impairment should succeed. While 
amortisation might capture noise, impairment should provide most valuable signals for 
the users of financial statements. According to results, the answer to this attempt is: not 
quite. 
On the other hand ‘not quite’ also means ‘to some extent’. According to the results of 
chapter 4 the debt side of the market has made a decision to ignore goodwill altogether 
when assessing the credit ratings of companies. Rating agencies tend to deduct 
goodwill immediately from equity and dispense with goodwill write-downs for 
purposes of their calculations. Combined with the results of the study above the 
conclusion can be made that their actions are only partly correct. Although the amount 
of the impairment write-down seems to also reflect reporting incentives, the presence 
of such a write-down in the income statement is likely to genuinely depict a 
deterioration of the financial prosperity of the company. 
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This study provides the groundwork for future research. Beside limitations such as the 
small sample available for the ‘How Much’ question revisited which can be extended 
in future research, an interesting question is raised by the results (or lack thereof) for 
the so-called ‘border years’. None of the factors which are significant or present in the 
core investigation period are influential during the ‘border years’. Additionally, 
statistical tests for the overall goodness of the model (R2 and F-test) yield substantially 
lower (mostly insignificant at the 95% confidence level) results in these years. These 
findings suggest that other factors might have been influential during the times of 
adoption of FRS 10, 11 and, later, IFRS 3 and IAS 36. 
5.6 SUPPLEMENT (CHAPTER 5) 
Table 5.4: Managerial choices in goodwill accounting in the UK: descriptive 
statistics of the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Goodwill Impairment 52 172 42 107 102 369
as % of goodwill 3.8% 2.8% 6.7%
Goodwill Amortisation 6 13 11 12 15 29
Goodwill per Balance Sheet 1,630 9,075 1,350 7,739 1,510 9,154
as % of Total Assets 26.2% 23.1% 24.8%
Total Assets 6,221 18,365 5,848 17,560 6,087 18,960
Net Assets 4,400 13,468 4,300 13,627 4,507 15,359
Cash Flow 672 2,192 571 1,775 426 1,709
EBIT 493 1,844 381 1,437 227 1,525
Sample size (no. companies) 97 97 97
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Goodwill Impairment 273 727 184 545 42 105 16 18
as % of goodwill 15.5% 18.2% 17.0% 24.8%
Goodwill Amortisation 21 65 20 57 11 39 3 7
Goodwill per Balance Sheet 1,508 9,007 1,756 9,403 1,008 2,950 247 733
as % of Total Assets 24.4% 26.7% 16.0% 6.7%
Total Assets 6,183 18,894 6,579 20,058 6,311 18,463 3,684 7,109
Net Assets 4,566 15,235 4,810 16,193 4,651 14,886 2,450 4,869
Cash Flow 171 1,418 415 1,319 555 1,512 415 940
EBIT 11 1,763 268 1,354 511 1,396 406 872
Sample size (no. companies) 97 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003
2001 2000 1999
k£
k£
2002
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Table 5.5: Managerial choices in goodwill accounting in the UK: descriptive 
statistics of the predictor variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
MB5 -5,34 37,13 4,19 26,34 -5,70 59,70
MB3 -3,13 29,17 2,80 20,93 -9,07 55,76
MB1 -7,23 50,08 10,67 60,75 -6,73 52,45
RET5 -2,18 11,97 -1,73 10,02 -0,75 7,76
RET3 -0,72 5,92 -2,12 6,70 -2,47 9,23
RET1 0,39 3,07 -0,11 2,62 -1,02 2,87
ROA5 -2,86 10,28 -8,38 15,96 -11,85 23,14
ROA_3 1,57 10,91 -5,95 17,97 -9,14 21,71
ROA1 2,76 11,54 2,72 18,76 -4,46 15,80
MB5_ind -0,08 0,84 0,05 1,51 -1,28 1,65
MB3_ind 0,21 0,47 -0,12 0,58 -0,85 0,78
MB1_ind 0,14 0,23 0,42 0,25 -0,71 0,50
RET5_ind 0,57 1,45 0,58 0,92 0,69 0,85
RET3_ind 0,29 0,94 -0,77 1,79 -0,55 1,54
RET1_ind 0,60 0,34 0,37 0,52 -0,42 0,90
ROA5_ind -2,03 2,67 -3,45 4,18 -3,53 3,34
ROA3_ind -0,39 1,99 -2,31 2,53 -3,25 3,66
ROA1_ind 0,42 0,91 0,00 0,95 -1,01 1,11
DTEto 0,13 6,81 0,66 15,98 0,55 6,36
IS 0,04 0,06 0,07 0,14 0,10 0,29
BB -0,01 0,02 -0,01 0,05 -0,02 0,05
MGT (Y/N) 0,38 0,49 0,37 0,49 0,42 0,50
CFO (Y/N) 0,14 0,35 0,16 0,37 0,16 0,37
Gwimpto (Y/N) 0,47 0,50 0,54 0,50 0,54 0,50
Gwamt1 (Y/N) 0,53 0,50 0,96 0,20 0,96 0,20
Sample Size 97 97 97
2005 2004 2003
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
MB5 0,82 12,31 -3,07 39,78 2,56 14,73 -0,04 11,76
MB3 0,10 15,69 -1,34 47,39 -0,61 38,95 -0,24 12,80
MB1 -1,03 13,49 -4,67 39,76 2,43 19,12 1,09 31,88
RET5 1,76 5,34 4,87 9,58 4,58 10,11 4,58 9,79
RET3 -0,14 7,16 3,02 9,51 3,28 8,64 3,82 9,74
RET1 -0,52 5,06 1,54 10,17 1,36 6,07 1,96 5,98
ROA5 -5,70 14,43 -0,70 10,06 0,33 7,76 2,33 8,07
ROA_3 -6,69 12,41 -3,13 11,72 -1,00 11,58 1,95 7,21
ROA1 -4,26 12,26 -0,31 9,74 -2,00 9,13 -0,68 5,50
MB5_ind -0,73 0,96 -0,02 0,83 1,16 1,14 0,37 1,76
MB3_ind -0,28 0,98 -0,39 2,70 -0,05 1,26 -0,11 1,36
MB1_ind -0,44 0,76 -0,43 0,77 0,21 1,02 -0,74 1,54
RET5_ind 1,83 2,09 4,22 5,76 2,60 2,51 2,79 3,67
RET3_ind 0,87 1,84 3,27 5,92 1,67 2,30 2,27 3,77
RET1_ind -0,46 2,15 2,04 5,99 0,82 2,39 1,39 3,96
ROA5_ind -3,10 4,91 -0,35 2,12 0,88 2,94 2,49 2,83
ROA3_ind -3,12 4,65 -0,96 2,54 -0,22 2,00 0,77 2,23
ROA1_ind -1,86 2,26 -0,23 2,71 -1,40 2,58 -0,16 1,96
DTEto 0,82 3,82 0,94 5,11 0,04 8,27 0,31 2,91
IS 0,03 0,06 0,03 0,13 0,05 0,11 0,02 0,04
BB -0,03 0,06 -0,04 0,08 -0,02 0,04 -0,03 0,09
MGT (Y/N) 0,32 0,47 0,40 0,49 0,40 0,49 0,23 0,42
CFO (Y/N) 0,13 0,34 0,22 0,41 0,16 0,37 0,11 0,32
Gwimpto (Y/N) 0,36 0,48 0,26 0,44 0,16 0,37 0,10 0,31
Gwamt1 (Y/N) 0,95 0,22 0,91 0,29 0,67 0,47 0,57 0,50
Sample Size 97 97 97 97
2001 2000 19992002
 151
 
                  
Table 5.6: "If" and "How Much" questions: Multicollinearity table for regression variables
5-year-sample
Dimension Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index
1 4,066 1,000 5,000 1,000 5,324 1,000 4,988 1,000 4,318 1,000 4,496 1,000 3,853 1,000
2 1,827 1,492 1,795 1,669 1,733 1,753 1,585 1,774 1,570 1,659 1,673 1,639 2,096 1,356
3 1,519 1,636 1,220 2,025 1,449 1,917 1,236 2,009 1,450 1,726 1,366 1,814 1,322 1,707
4 1,164 1,869 1,117 2,116 1,129 2,172 1,171 2,064 1,133 1,952 1,070 2,050 1,201 1,791
5 1,024 1,992 0,984 2,254 1,024 2,280 1,032 2,199 1,046 2,032 0,971 2,152 1,056 1,910
6 0,924 2,098 0,919 2,333 0,968 2,345 0,801 2,496 0,950 2,132 0,900 2,235 0,763 2,247
7 0,757 2,318 0,812 2,482 0,735 2,692 0,713 2,645 0,855 2,247 0,799 2,372 0,638 2,457
8 0,704 2,403 0,524 3,090 0,503 3,254 0,610 2,861 0,736 2,423 0,656 2,619 0,502 2,769
9 0,566 2,680 0,472 3,256 0,379 3,750 0,549 3,014 0,619 2,642 0,597 2,744 0,492 2,799
10 0,477 2,920 0,432 3,401 0,318 4,093 0,532 3,063 0,449 3,101 0,477 3,071 0,417 3,041
11 0,369 3,322 0,339 3,843 0,180 5,437 0,319 3,954 0,364 3,442 0,456 3,141 0,298 3,594
12 0,312 3,608 0,253 4,443 0,147 6,025 0,283 4,201 0,327 3,635 0,291 3,933 0,254 3,898
13 0,194 4,584 0,120 6,459 0,096 7,460 0,163 5,532 0,139 5,577 0,169 5,156 0,108 5,978
14 0,099 6,405 0,015 18,230 0,016 18,097 0,019 16,078 0,044 9,931 0,079 7,527 n.a. n.a.
3-year-sample
Dimension Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index
1 3,851 1,000 5,040 1,000 5,604 1,000 4,455 1,000 4,227 1,000 3,758 1,000 3,397 1,000
2 1,831 1,450 1,880 1,637 1,813 1,758 1,598 1,669 1,642 1,605 1,617 1,525 2,061 1,284
3 1,472 1,618 1,426 1,880 1,353 2,035 1,363 1,808 1,398 1,739 1,398 1,639 1,417 1,548
4 1,181 1,806 1,174 2,072 1,085 2,272 1,250 1,888 1,080 1,978 1,243 1,739 1,188 1,691
5 1,089 1,881 0,999 2,246 0,989 2,380 0,977 2,135 1,011 2,045 1,071 1,873 1,087 1,768
6 0,961 2,002 0,867 2,412 0,926 2,460 0,917 2,204 0,911 2,155 0,963 1,976 0,883 1,961
7 0,813 2,176 0,633 2,822 0,644 2,950 0,736 2,461 0,838 2,246 0,795 2,174 0,674 2,246
8 0,659 2,418 0,526 3,096 0,472 3,446 0,700 2,523 0,756 2,365 0,749 2,239 0,604 2,371
9 0,556 2,631 0,432 3,416 0,378 3,849 0,563 2,814 0,651 2,548 0,655 2,395 0,510 2,582
10 0,469 2,867 0,336 3,871 0,249 4,745 0,521 2,923 0,521 2,848 0,540 2,639 0,407 2,889
11 0,377 3,197 0,315 4,001 0,225 4,996 0,402 3,330 0,431 3,130 0,492 2,763 0,322 3,250
12 0,325 3,444 0,216 4,832 0,139 6,353 0,289 3,925 0,347 3,489 0,405 3,047 0,310 3,310
13 0,281 3,703 0,143 5,947 0,106 7,273 0,213 4,578 0,147 5,362 0,196 4,374 n.a. n.a.
14 0,136 5,315 0,015 18,148 0,017 17,938 0,016 16,949 0,041 10,110 0,117 5,664 0,140 4,929
1-year-sample
Dimension Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index
1 4,863 1,000 4,910 1,000 5,456 1,000 5,067 1,000 4,058 1,000 4,027 1,000 3,175 1,000
2 1,401 1,863 2,153 1,510 1,689 1,798 1,877 1,643 1,862 1,476 1,756 1,514 1,747 1,348
3 1,254 1,970 1,364 1,897 1,386 1,984 1,313 1,964 1,719 1,536 1,369 1,715 1,474 1,468
4 1,029 2,174 1,127 2,087 1,114 2,214 1,204 2,051 1,092 1,928 1,170 1,855 1,250 1,594
5 0,968 2,241 0,942 2,283 1,016 2,318 0,983 2,270 0,991 2,024 1,094 1,919 1,083 1,712
6 0,913 2,308 0,739 2,577 0,850 2,533 0,848 2,445 0,885 2,141 0,950 2,059 0,954 1,824
7 0,777 2,502 0,673 2,701 0,664 2,867 0,720 2,653 0,833 2,207 0,785 2,265 0,768 2,033
8 0,675 2,683 0,568 2,941 0,618 2,971 0,616 2,867 0,623 2,551 0,729 2,350 0,650 2,210
9 0,612 2,819 0,445 3,322 0,418 3,615 0,508 3,158 0,568 2,673 0,542 2,727 0,586 2,328
10 0,541 2,998 0,373 3,626 0,339 4,012 0,336 3,884 0,458 2,975 0,519 2,784 0,504 2,509
11 0,407 3,458 0,300 4,047 0,215 5,040 0,316 4,005 0,359 3,362 0,467 2,935 0,366 2,946
12 0,325 3,866 0,249 4,444 0,129 6,501 0,114 6,675 0,316 3,585 0,323 3,529 0,294 3,288
13 0,170 5,352 0,143 5,867 0,089 7,836 0,085 7,707 0,199 4,516 0,148 5,215 0,150 4,605
14 0,065 8,645 0,014 18,668 0,018 17,237 0,013 19,538 0,036 10,552 0,120 5,800 n.a. n.a.
2001 2000 19992005 2004 2003 2002
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2001 2000 19992005 2004 2003 2002
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Table 5.7: "How much" question revisited: Multicollinearity table for regression variables
5-year-sample
Dimension Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index
1 5.537 1.000 5.588 1.000 4.584 1.000 5.937 1.000 4.184 1.000 5.029 1.000 5.706 1.000
2 2.179 1.594 1.946 1.695 1.796 1.598 1.450 2.023 1.796 1.526 2.418 1.442 2.274 1.584
3 1.944 1.688 1.347 2.037 1.459 1.773 1.269 2.163 1.689 1.574 1.390 1.902 1.829 1.766
4 1.183 2.163 1.088 2.266 1.367 1.831 1.248 2.181 1.277 1.810 1.155 2.086 1.284 2.108
5 0.803 2.627 0.945 2.432 1.014 2.126 0.871 2.611 1.119 1.934 0.864 2.412 1.123 2.255
6 0.669 2.876 0.663 2.903 0.901 2.256 0.754 2.806 0.755 2.354 0.647 2.788 0.587 3.118
7 0.493 3.350 0.632 2.973 0.657 2.641 0.638 3.050 0.609 2.620 0.499 3.174 0.555 3.207
8 0.435 3.567 0.535 3.233 0.510 2.999 0.488 3.487 0.486 2.935 0.389 3.598 0.272 4.580
9 0.309 4.233 0.417 3.661 0.265 4.156 0.326 4.270 0.298 3.746 0.250 4.482 0.141 6.353
10 0.191 5.383 0.371 3.881 0.210 4.677 0.321 4.302 0.292 3.788 0.205 4.957 0.115 7.029
11 0.160 5.890 0.236 4.864 0.105 6.597 0.291 4.518 0.225 4.310 0.104 6.947 0.068 9.169
12 0.056 9.988 0.172 5.692 0.087 7.273 0.229 5.096 0.173 4.924 0.038 11.552 0.025 15.034
13 0.025 14.922 0.059 9.695 0.045 10.058 0.164 6.019 0.097 6.566 0.013 20.018 0.015 19.228
14 0.017 18.013 0.001 84.596 n.a. n.a. 0.015 20.062 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.005 33.420
3-year-sample
Dimension Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index
1 4.954 1.000 5.231 1.000 5.041 1.000 5.316 1.000 4.412 1.000 4.674 1.000 5.253 1.000
2 2.273 1.476 1.971 1.629 1.791 1.677 1.471 1.901 1.757 1.585 2.172 1.467 2.557 1.433
3 1.702 1.706 1.424 1.917 1.399 1.899 1.358 1.979 1.588 1.667 1.864 1.583 1.979 1.629
4 1.226 2.010 1.277 2.024 1.163 2.082 1.101 2.198 1.390 1.782 1.109 2.053 1.343 1.977
5 0.885 2.367 1.136 2.146 1.028 2.214 1.020 2.283 1.055 2.045 0.826 2.379 0.961 2.337
6 0.790 2.505 0.676 2.781 0.892 2.377 0.838 2.518 0.796 2.354 0.722 2.544 0.724 2.693
7 0.648 2.765 0.627 2.887 0.564 2.989 0.685 2.787 0.532 2.879 0.532 2.965 0.408 3.586
8 0.477 3.222 0.525 3.156 0.384 3.625 0.600 2.977 0.431 3.198 0.368 3.566 0.296 4.212
9 0.343 3.799 0.378 3.721 0.297 4.117 0.548 3.115 0.322 3.699 0.244 4.373 0.197 5.158
10 0.337 3.836 0.305 4.140 0.159 5.624 0.465 3.380 0.289 3.910 0.232 4.488 0.154 5.837
11 0.171 5.377 0.249 4.580 0.142 5.964 0.238 4.727 0.241 4.276 0.142 5.745 0.074 8.415
12 0.125 6.289 0.134 6.247 0.081 7.910 0.188 5.321 0.109 6.357 0.073 8.029 0.030 13.296
13 0.048 10.148 0.064 9.037 0.059 9.220 0.156 5.828 0.077 7.557 0.042 10.534 0.018 17.102
14 0.020 15.637 0.002 56.745 n.a. n.a. 0.016 18.109 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.004 34.325
1-year-sample
Dimension Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index Eigenvalue Condition index
1 6.434 1.000 4.578 1.000 4.824 1.000 6.471 1.000 3.634 1.000 4.518 1.000 5.297 1.000
2 2.121 1.742 2.085 1.482 1.732 1.669 1.599 2.012 2.149 1.300 1.701 1.630 2.799 1.376
3 1.190 2.325 1.270 1.898 1.452 1.822 1.275 2.253 1.520 1.546 1.584 1.689 1.765 1.732
4 1.025 2.505 1.153 1.992 1.052 2.142 1.118 2.406 1.369 1.629 1.440 1.771 1.452 1.910
5 0.918 2.648 1.017 2.122 0.988 2.210 0.927 2.642 1.181 1.754 1.073 2.052 0.747 2.664
6 0.695 3.042 0.778 2.426 0.859 2.369 0.735 2.967 0.981 1.924 0.882 2.264 0.600 2.971
7 0.538 3.457 0.566 2.843 0.711 2.604 0.540 3.463 0.593 2.475 0.602 2.740 0.417 3.566
8 0.392 4.051 0.432 3.256 0.449 3.277 0.497 3.610 0.470 2.780 0.402 3.353 0.334 3.982
9 0.287 4.732 0.355 3.592 0.362 3.649 0.312 4.555 0.353 3.208 0.304 3.858 0.239 4.705
10 0.193 5.768 0.291 3.963 0.270 4.225 0.259 4.999 0.313 3.407 0.248 4.266 0.152 5.895
11 0.105 7.824 0.202 4.760 0.153 5.620 0.171 6.149 0.200 4.265 0.136 5.761 0.132 6.344
12 0.052 11.114 0.171 5.169 0.107 6.718 0.056 10.795 0.129 5.300 0.078 7.595 0.047 10.672
13 0.037 13.270 0.102 6.694 0.041 10.856 0.026 15.749 0.107 5.821 0.033 11.720 0.014 19.547
14 0.011 24.120 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.015 20.789 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.006 28.822
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2001 2000 19992005 2004 2003 2002
 153 
6 SOURCES OF GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Goodwill impairment offers many challenges to academics and practitioners. Besides 
providing numerous opportunities for theoretical discussion and new issues for 
empirical research it also raises questions about implementation in practice. Papers on 
goodwill topics can be traced back to the 19th century and the number of studies as 
well as the variety of investigated aspects discussed has steadily increased over the 
years. 
Previous research on goodwill impairment shows that the concern (of investors, 
regulatory bodies or other parties) that write-downs might be conducted based on 
managers’ reporting incentives rather than the economic impairment of the asset could 
be well justified. Results of this research (including the previous studies in this thesis) 
are arrived at by concentrating mostly on the purely quantitative aspects of goodwill 
impairment. This study adds to academic research by asking additional questions 
(‘why’ and ‘how’) about goodwill impairment and using different (qualitative, partly 
combined with quantitative) methodology to find answers. Ultimately, the objective of 
this study is to enhance the understanding of goodwill impairment and to provide 
impulses for future research. 
More specifically, two issues are explored in the following sections. The first 
concentrates on the relationship between (challenging) economic environment and 
goodwill impairment. Prior research uses primarily capital market data and accounting 
ratios to describe and investigate the link between impairment and economic 
performance. However, the variables used in quantitative models measure the 
outcomes of economic performance (MTB, share price, etc; for details see chapter 2). 
This study explores the drivers behind the measures of economic performance. In 
doing so, it aims to improve the transparency of the impairment process and to obtain a 
deeper and more timely understanding of its underlying causes. Such understanding is 
not only vital to management but even more so for external users of the company 
financial statements, for example investors, auditors or regulators who are relying on 
such information to make an independent evaluation of the quality of management 
reporting (Hayn & Hughes, 2006, p. 225).  
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The investigation is conducted in the form of an exploratory study and relies on 
qualitative methodology (case study approach). Despite the numerous advantages of 
quantitative studies they sometimes fail to provide a complete insight into the depths 
of a particular research question. This problem could be caused by proxy inadequacy 
and/or variables completely omitted from the quantitative analysis, or statistical 
complications. Thus, quantitative studies often standardise complex economic 
phenomena by fitting them into orderly structures and constructing a model based on 
simplifying assumptions. While this procedure enjoys the (very significant) advantage 
of allowing the researcher to test numerous hypotheses, make conclusions and issue 
statements on various aspects of financial and economic reality, it also has several 
drawbacks. The main disadvantage as seen from the perspective of this study is that by 
reducing the complexity of real life phenomena, quantitative studies might ignore 
factors or influences which are of material importance for the investigated topics. This 
disadvantage could be minimised, if not removed, by applying qualitative methods of 
research which offer a more individual approach to explore specific research settings. 
Therefore, the analysis of the drivers of economic performance and their relation to 
goodwill impairment differs from previous research in approach and methodology. 
While previous studies on goodwill impairment rely mostly on quantitative methods 
(for further details see chapter 2), this investigation reviews internal and external 
information by means of a case study approach. It uses qualitative methods in an 
attempt to uncover further aspects of the goodwill impairment decision.133 In this 
context the first research question in this study is as follows: 
Why do companies impair goodwill (the ‘Why’ question): do drivers of the 
measures for economic performance provide better understanding of the 
managerial decision to impair goodwill? Does a change of methodology (case 
study approach) help to raise issues for future research? 
The second objective of this study is based on evidence gathered in previous research 
suggesting that managerial opportunistic behaviour is related to goodwill impairment. 
                                                 
133
 Despite the disadvantages of quantitative methods mentioned above, they sometimes do have an 
advantage where the objectivity of results is concerned as they provide answers which are 
independent from the individuals involved in the impairment process (management). Thus, while 
exploring the (qualitative) methodology opportunities for this research question the researcher also 
considered interviews of and / or questionnaires to management and external users of financial 
statements. However, the sensitivity of the research question (in particular where related to 
managerial opportunism) could have potentially lead to biased answers or to lack of access. 
Therefore, document analysis of the two companies was considered more appropriate for the 
investigation at hand as it combined the advantages of more flexibility and an independent 
investigation. 
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Several empirical studies have documented traces of managerial manipulation of the 
amount or timing of goodwill write-down (for an overview see chapters 2 and 5). This 
study adds to prior research by illustrating some of the opportunities managers have at 
their disposal to adjust goodwill write-downs according to their specifications and 
needs. It explores the impairment disclosures of companies and compares them to an 
independently conducted calculation of the discount rates used in the impairment 
process. Additionally, it discusses the quality of the impairment disclosures and the 
information provided to an external user of the financial statements. The investigation 
is conducted (continuing the first objective of the study) in the form of case studies and 
combines quantitative methods (the independent calculation of the discount rates) with 
qualitative techniques (comparison to disclosed discount rates and document analysis 
of impairment disclosures). In doing so, this study aims to pinpoint challenges of the 
impairment calculation and open new areas for future research. The research question 
relating to the second objective of the study is as follows: 
How do companies go about making the goodwill impairment calculation (the 
‘How’ question): are company impairment disclosures sufficiently transparent to 
allow a financial statement user to understand goodwill impairment? Do 
managers behave opportunistically when impairing goodwill by using the 
discretionary room available in the derivation of discount rates? 
This study contributes to previous research on goodwill impairment in four ways: first, 
the research questions are explored using a methodology which is new to this area of 
research. The overall exploratory study approach aims to look behind the numbers and 
individualise the analysis by investigating information which is usually overlooked 
when collecting data samples for purely quantitative studies (databases, etc.). The 
combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques in the form of case studies 
reinforces this effect. Second, this study aims to search for influences on the goodwill 
impairment decisions and calculations which have not yet been explored in previous 
research by looking at the drivers of economic performance rather than at the 
outcomes. Third, this study aims to illustrate the room for discretionary behaviour 
made available to managers by the lack of regulatory detail on impairment disclosures. 
Finally, by exploring various aspects of the goodwill impairment decision this study 
aims to provide new impulses and suggestions for future academic research in the field 
of goodwill impairment. 
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6.2 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Overall, considering the current goodwill accounting regulations and the design of the 
impairment calculation, the process of goodwill impairment can be split into four 
phases. First, the existence (or lack thereof) of triggering events (FRS 11, paras. 8, 10 
and 13); second, the choice of IGUs; third, the forecasting of cash flows of the IGU 
and, fourth, the derivation of the discount rate. This chapter concentrates on the last 
two of these impairment drivers: more specifically on factors influencing the 
forecasted cash flows and on the application of the appropriate discount rate. 
The factors influencing the forecasted cash flows for the impairment calculation can be 
economic events influencing the financial performance of the IGU, or, the company-
specific risks, or, (reporting) incentives providing motivation for management to incur 
or avoid a goodwill write-down. These causalities are presented in illustration 6.1 
below: 
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Illustration 6.1: Factors influencing the impairment calculation 
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While illustration 6.1 shows clearly that there are many possible economic drivers and 
many possible ways of influencing impairment numbers, the scope of this thesis limits 
significantly the factors that can be investigated. Therefore, in order to keep the extent 
of this chapter manageable, this section concentrates on industry regulation and 
competition. These two phenomena were chosen as they are regularly present 
(independently or jointly) in the economic environment of a company. Additionally, 
their impact is regularly sufficiently material to have an effect on many companies, 
rather than just on individual ones. Moreover, they are considered significant enough 
to be mentioned as key events for credit rating analyses (S&P, 2005) or, as to be 
included by standard setters in the triggering event examples for goodwill impairment 
(FRS, para. 10, see also chapter 2). Finally, a preliminary overview of the available 
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documents revealed that there was sufficient information to allow analysis and 
discussion of competition and industry regulation. 
6.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Essential financial information about the two companies for the investigation period is 
provided in table 6.22, followed by a summary of the development of their goodwill 
during the relevant period in tables 6.23 and 6.24 (all in the supplement to this 
chapter). The financial information was collected from the relevant annual reports as 
reported in the respective year (sometimes when reported as comparables for the 
previous financial year the financial information might be slightly different than in the 
report for the original year due to various adjustments to comparables). 
Vodafone Plc specialises in mobile telecommunications and operates worldwide 
through a number of subsidiaries, investments (altogether 26 countries in 2005) and 
network partners (in further 14 countries). Although the Group concentrates on mobile 
telecommunication services including voice and data communications, it also had a 
controlling interest in companies operating in non-mobile telecommunications 
(Germany) during the investigation period (see for example Vodafone Annual Report 
2005, p. 10). Group turnover increased significantly during the investigation period 
with the most significant effect provided by the AirTouch Merger in 2000 (turnover 
increased from £ 7,873 mln in 2000 to £ 15,004 mln in 2001). The acquisition of 
Mannesmann in 2001 resulted in material goodwill amortisation charges in the 
following years which led to negative results from 2001 onwards despite positive cash 
flows from operating activities. Cash outflows from investing activities were also 
material during the investigation period (peaking in 2001 at £ -18,988 mln) reflecting 
the significant M&A activity of the Group as well as substantial investments in the 
new 3G technology. The share price of the Group fell sharply from 1,151p in 1999 to 
193p in 2001, probably echoing the turbulent economic environment for 
telecommunications companies during and after the internet bubble burst at the start of 
the 21st century as well as financial pressures of the Group itself. Finally, goodwill 
constituted a large portion of total assets, amounting to well over 50.0% following the 
Mannesmann acquisition (from 2001 onwards). The Group recorded goodwill 
impairment additionally to goodwill amortisation in 2002 and 2005. In 2002 and 2003 
the Group also reported an impairment loss relating to one of its associated companies, 
Grupo Iusacell. 
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Cable & Wireless Plc (hereafter referred to as ‘C&W’) operates nationally and 
internationally covering a wide range of telecommunication services including, fixed 
network, voice, data, broadband, internet protocol (‘IP’) and mobile services. The 
Group provided services in 34 countries in 2005 (see C&W Annual Report 2005, 
p. 11). After a rise of Group turnover in 2000 to £ 9,201 mill, revenue fell continuously 
until the end of the investigation period reflecting the financial difficulties facing the 
Group and leading to negative results in years 2002 through 2004. The share price of 
the company shows a similar pattern during 1999-2003 but it rises slightly towards the 
end of the investigation period, probably reacting to the Group’s restructuring efforts 
during this time. Goodwill reached 20.6% of total assets in 2001 before being subject 
to impairment and complete elimination from the balance sheet until 2004. The Group 
recorded impairment losses additional to goodwill amortisation in years 2002 through 
2004.  
6.4 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE FRAMEWORK: ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The following sections present the analysis of the two investigated companies in 
respect of two economic factors and their potential influence on goodwill impairment: 
industry regulation and competition.134 
6.4.1 Vodafone Plc 
6.4.1.1 Analysis based on information disclosed by the Company 
Vodafone prepared its consolidated financial statements under UK GAAP throughout 
the investigation period (1999 – 2005). During this time the Group has recorded 
impairment charges on goodwill of its fully controlled and non-controlled subsidiaries 
in three reporting years: 2002, 2003 and 2005. The following subsidiaries were 
disclosed as having been subject to impairment: 
                                                 
134
 For an overview of further factors seen as influential for goodwill impairment see chapter 2. 
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Table 6.1: Vodafone Plc: overview of goodwill impairment charges (1999-2005) 
according to subsidiary 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Arcor --- --- --- 4,000 --- --- ---
Japan Telecom --- --- --- 400 --- --- ---
Cegetel --- --- --- 250 --- --- ---
Grupo Iusacell --- --- --- 450 80 --- ---
Vodafone Sweden --- --- --- --- --- --- 315
Total charge --- --- --- 5,100 80 --- 315
Vodafone subsidiary
£ mln
 
Source: Vodafone Annual Reports 1999-2005 
All impairment charges were reported under exceptional items and disclosed 
respectively in notes 4 ‘Exceptional operating items’ and 11 ‘Intangible fixed assets’ 
of the notes to the consolidated financial statements. 
The first impairment charge was conducted during the financial year 2002. It amounted 
to £ 5,100 mln. The disclosed amount was further split into an impairment charge of 
£ 4,353 mln reported in the note 11 ‘Intangible fixed assets’ and a further impairment 
charge of £ 706 mln provided in note 13 ‘Fixed asset investments’ on associated 
undertakings. A more detailed explanation of the impairment charge is offered in note 
14 ‘Impairment’ which includes information on the assumptions of the impairment 
charge calculation and allocates an impairment charge of altogether £ 6,000 mln to the 
subsidiaries.135 It can be deduced that the impairment charges referring to Arcor and 
Japan Telecom, both being wholly-owned subsidiaries, were reported in note 11 while 
the impairment charges in note 13 were related to Cegetel and Grupo Iusacell. 
In 2003 a further impairment charge of £ 80 mln was reported relating only to 
Vodafone’s Mexican subsidiary, Grupo Iusacell. This impairment charge was not 
shown in note 11 ‘Intangible fixed assets’ due to the fact that the investment in Grupo 
Iusacell was accounted for under associated undertakings. 
Finally, in 2005 Vodafone reported an impairment charge amounting to £ 315 mln 
related to the carrying value of goodwill of Vodafone Sweden. 
                                                 
135
 A shortcoming in the quality of Vodafone disclosures emerges when impairment amounts in 
different parts of the annual report are compared. The disclosed amounts in notes 4, 11 and 14 can 
only be approximately reconciliated due to lack of precise information on amounts and 
categorisation of the impairment charges. The impairment charge stated in note 14 includes an 
impairment charge of £ 900 mln relating to the Group’s interest in China Mobile (Hong Kong) 
Limited which was accounted under  exceptional non-operating items and is not discussed here as it 
does not represent an impairment charge on goodwill. This leaves an impairment charge of £ 5,100 
mln under operating items which can be roughly split into the amounts stated in the text above. 
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The main assumptions for the impairment charge calculation disclosed by Vodafone 
refer to the significant drivers of future revenue growth. Vodafone bases its cash flow 
projections on the expansion and development of GPRS and 3G technology to enhance 
voice average revenue per user (ARPU) and provide solid basis for new data products 
and services. Therefore, main cogs of the cash flow projections relate to capital 
expenditure, voice ARPU and data revenue. According to the disclosed information 
voice ARPU is projected to include the effect of price declines which indicates an 
increased awareness of management in this respect whether the price declines were 
based, for example, on technological progress, on industry regulation effects or an 
increasing number of competitors in the regions where Vodafone had businesses. The 
impairment test assumptions have the same structure every year and are very 
similar.136 
Table 6.2: Summary of assumptions for the impairment calculation Vodafone Plc 
 
 
 
 
 
The information provided in the annual report on the development of subsidiaries 
leading to an impairment of goodwill in 2002 is not extensive. While Arcor’s market 
position of leading competitor to Deutsche Telekom is emphasised and an increase of 
both its customer base and traffic volumes is reported, it is also noted that these were 
offset by tariff reductions reflecting the competitive environment: 
‘During the 2002 financial year, Arcor saw its contract voice customer base increase by 7% to 
2.4 million customers and traffic volumes increase by 30% to over 21 billion minutes. 
However, the effect of these increases was almost entirely offset by tariff reductions, reflecting 
the competitive environment.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 21). 
                                                 
136
 Differences in the discount rates used during the impairment testing in the different financial years 
are discussed in the section 6.5.2.  
Assumptions for impairment calculation 2002 2003
Length of detailed forecasts 10 yrs 10 yrs
Forecasted growth sustainable phase
=nominal GDP for mobile 
businesses;< nominal GDP 
for non-mobile 
=nominal GDP for mobile 
businesses;< nominal GDP 
for non-mobile 
Discount rate 8.80-11.50% 7.50-10.00%
Assumptions for impairment calculation 2004 2005
Length of detailed forecasts 10 yrs 10 yrs
Forecasted growth sustainable phase
=nominal GDP for mobile 
businesses;< nominal GDP 
for non-mobile 
≤nominal GDP for mobile 
businesses;< nominal GDP 
for non-mobile 
Discount rate 8.10-10.30% 8.30-11.60%
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Altogether a brief statement in the annual report suggests that despite revenue of 
€ 1.6 bln in the previous year, Arcor has reported increased losses for the financial year 
ended 31 March 2002: 
‘Arcor...has retained its position as the leading private operator and the strongest competitor to 
Deutsche Telekom with a total market share of more than 6%, which equates to 40% share of 
the total alternative German fixed-line operator market. ... The results for the 2002 financial 
year include increased losses within Arcor... The revenue of Arcor in the year ended 31 March 
2001 reached approximately 1.6 billion’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, pp. 21, 36 & 39). 
The reasons for the impairment of Grupo Iusacell and Japan Telecom were not 
commented on, although the acquisition summary on Grupo Iusacell reports that 
Vodafone paid £ 692 mln for a fair value of assets amounting to £ 19 mln (in 
accordance with UK GAAP), leaving a goodwill value of £ 673 mill (97% of the 
purchase price) for this acquisition (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 114). 
Nevertheless, the acquisition of Grupo Iusacell is presented in a positive light as 
follows:  
‘On 4 April 2001, the Group acquired a 34.5% interest in Grupo Iusacell. Grupo Iusacell 
currently provides wireless services in seven of Mexico’s nine regions, covering a population 
of 90 million people and representing approximately 90% of the country’s total population. 
Roaming is provided in the two remaining regions. At 31 March 2002, market penetration in 
Mexico was 22%. Mexico’s cellular market has continued to expand, with customer growth 
largely driven by prepaid products. At 31 March 2002, Grupo Iusacell had 1,995,000 registered 
customers, an increase of almost 13% since the date of acquisition. Of the total registered 
customer base, 81% were prepaid customers.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 17) 
This information suggests, at first, more of a promising investment in a market with a 
rather impressive potential for expansion. It does not suggest anything explaining the 
impairment charge on Grupo Iusacell in the same reporting period.  
More detailed information was provided on the 2003 impairment charge related to 
Grupo Iusacell. According to Vodafone the reasons for writing goodwill off were 
based on Grupo Iusacell’s financial and restructuring problems: 
‘Iusacell’s financial performance continued to decline in the year despite a modest increase in 
its customer base and management’s efforts to restructure the business through substantial 
headcount reductions and tight cost and cash management. 
In order to alleviate certain of the resulting financial pressures, Iusacell began a debt 
restructuring effort in December 2002 and, in May 2003, secured a temporary waiver related to 
its $266 million secured bank credit facility. Iusacell will continue to work with its financial 
advisor to restructure the terms and payment schedules of its various debt agreements and 
instruments. It is likely that Iusacell will require additional funding in order to grow its 
operations. However, there is no assurance that such funding could be obtained at all or, if 
obtainable, on terms which would be acceptable to Iusacell. As a result of Iusacell’s 
deteriorating financial performance, the Group has written off its investment and is currently 
considering its options with respect to its investment, including disposal.’ (Vodafone Annual 
Report 2003, p. 13) 
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This information paints a very inconsistent picture with the positive announcement 
about Grupo Iusacell in the previous financial year (2002). It clearly states that the 
subsidiary is in severe financial distress. The use of the term ‘temporary waiver’ in the 
quote above even suggests breach of loan covenants. This information, however, is 
more in line with the goodwill write-down conducted on Grupo Iusacell already in 
2002 and implies that the note on Grupo Iusacell in 2002 was uninformative and 
misleading and that reasons for impairment were not disclosed in a timely manner.  
In 2005 impairment testing led to a write-down relating to the carrying value of 
goodwill of Vodafone Sweden. The primary reason for the impairment was stated as 
follows: 
‘The impairment results from recent fierce price competition in the Swedish market combined 
with onerous 3G license obligations.’ (Vodafone Group annual report 2005, p. 34). 
Ideally, a researcher would be able to use the information provided by internal and 
external sources in order to simulate the impairment process and then look into the 
reasons which led to an impairment charge in one particular year and not during others. 
In practice, however, there is not enough information provided or the information 
supplied is not transparent enough to enable a simulation of the impairment testing 
process.137 Thus, in the case of Vodafone, although the main assumptions were 
provided in the relevant note, it is still not clear exactly what growth assumptions have 
been used138, deductions from cash flows other than the capital expenditure deductions 
are not explained, and only the range of the used discount rates is provided rather than 
the discount rate used for each IGU139. Furthermore, no information on the formation 
of IGUs is provided so that any IGU constellation in an impairment testing simulation 
would be conjecture. Nevertheless, based on the on the information available to the 
public about growth drivers and risks, several observations can be made about the 
likely impact (or lack of it) of different factors on the impairment drivers.  
                                                 
137
 The poor quality of impairment disclosures continued to represent a problem also under IFRS as 
recently as in 2008 and the Financial Reporting Review Panel instituted a special review of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of IAS 36, the results of which were issued in 2009, see 
http://www.frc.org.uk/frrp/press/pub2019.html. The results of an initial review showed that 22 of 30 
investigated companies provided better disclosures on impairment compared to the previous 
reporting period, however, qualifying almost 25% of the sample as unsatisfactory and subject to 
further review. 
138
 According to the notes to the consolidated financial statements, the growth assumed for the cash 
flow forecasts is, depending on the type of business, either at, or below nominal GDP of the relevant 
country (see table 6.2). However, the exact growth rates are not specified, leaving almost endless 
room for speculation. 
139
 This appears to be a common problem for companies, for example under IFRS, see Carlin et al 
(2007a), Carlin & Finch (2010). More details on discount rates are provided in sections 2.2.3.3.2 and 
6.5.2. 
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Since the first logical step in the impairment testing process would be to set the IGUs 
for the calculation of the value in use,140 the first step of this case study will be to 
investigate the assumptions made by Vodafone about their IGUs. According to FRS 11 
Group revenue should be split into ‘as many largely independent income streams as is 
reasonably practicable’ (FRS 11, para. 27), aiming to achieve the highest possible 
number of IGUs within reason and practicability. This requirement would lead, at first, 
to the assumption that every subsidiary of Vodafone could represent a separate IGU for 
impairment testing purposes, or, at least, every country (where there is more than one 
subsidiary in the same country, for example France or Japan). However, this would 
lead to numerous IGUs and such problems as for example having to make exceptions 
to the rule for subsidiaries that are too small, or for countries where the Group has only 
non-controlled interests (for example Mexico). In practice, it is not unusual for a 
company to mould its IGUs for impairment testing according to an already set internal 
structure (product, division, geographical) and pull income streams into larger portions 
of Group revenue thus reducing the complication level of the determination of IGUs. 
Therefore, another possibility is that the IGUs follow Vodafone’s internally set broad 
geographical structure. As of the financial year 2002 (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, 
p. 11) Vodafone announced that the Group structure will be split for reporting 
purposes into the following geographical divisions: Northern Europe, Central Europe, 
Southern Europe, Americas, Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa.141Additionally, 
Vodafone categorised its businesses according to their nature: mobile or non-mobile 
businesses.142 Since no further or more exact information is available all of these 
possibilities have been considered in the data collection in order to trace the effect of 
competition and industry regulation on the revenue growth drivers. Table 6.3 below 
presents a summary of this information: 
                                                 
140
 For an overview of the different phases of the impairment testing process see p. 27. 
141
 The Group structure prior to 2001 is not of immediate concern for this study (there were no 
impairments between 1999 and 2002) and is, therefore, not discussed here. Furthermore, in 2004 the 
geographical divisions of Vodafone were reorganised again (mainly the countries included in the 
Northern, Central and Southern Europe segments). In order to ensure consistency of the analysis the 
data included in this section has been adjusted to reflect the original geographical structure of 2002. 
142
 Further possibilities arise from categorisation according to product types, etc. However, since the 
investigation of IGUs is not the (primary) subject of this exploratory study and the pulling together 
of possible IGUs serves simply the presentation of industry regulation and competition data, it is not 
further discussed. It should also be noted that only IGUs relating to the disclosed impairment charges 
are presented above. 
 165 
Table 6.3: Possible IGUs including the impaired Vodafone subsidiaries in years 
2002-2004 
Possible IGU Country/-ies
Based on subsidiaries:
Arcor Germany
Cegetel France
Japan Telecom Japan
Grupo Iusacell Mexico
Vodafone Sweden Sweden
Based on type of business (mobile / non-mobile):
non-mobile businesses: Europe
Germany, France, Vizzavi 
Europe
non-mobile businesses: Asia Pacific Japan
mobile businesses: Americas USA, Mexico
Based on geographical area:
Central Europe (mobile / non-mobile)
Germany, Poland, 
Switzerland, Hungary, etc.
Northern Europe (mobile / non-mobile)
Sweden, Belgium, France, 
etc.
Asia Pacific (mobile / non-mobile)
Japan, Australia, China, 
Hong Kong, etc.
 
Considering the possible combinations, the following suggested IGUs are defined for 
purposes of this analysis: Northern Europe (mobile and non-mobile), Central Europe 
(mobile and non-mobile), Asia-Pacific (mobile and non-mobile) and Americas143. 
Information quality rises steeply in financial year 2002 when apparently also a number 
of organisational changes were conducted within the Group (such as the new 
geographical division structure, see above). This is also the year of the introduction of 
the new EU regulatory framework for the communications industry and the first year 
of FRS 11 goodwill impairment for Vodafone. 
In February 2002, the European Union introduced a new regulatory framework for the 
communications sector aiming to replace old regulations which were in force since the 
early 1990s. The purpose of the new regulatory framework was to increase consistency 
between the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and to set the basic parameters of 
regulatory intervention. For example, it raised the threshold for Significant Market 
                                                 
143
  The Americas IGU based on type of business is the same as when based on geographical area since 
Vodafone only had mobile businesses in this area during the investigation period. 
 166 
Power (SMP) from 25% to 40% (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 23).144 The NRAs 
were under the obligation to implement the new regulatory framework by 24 July 
2003. 
Although only first introduced in 2002 the regulatory framework must have had an 
effect on the cash flow prognoses for impairment testing of Vodafone for two reasons: 
first, Vodafone was among the biggest two or three market competitors in almost all 
countries where the Group had subsidiaries. Therefore, any price regulation due to 
SMP – even only anticipated ones – would have direct impact on revenues for 
Vodafone and would have to be considered especially since the detailed cash flows 
were forecasted over a prolonged period of 10 years, rather than the 5 years defined by 
the standard (FRS 11, para. 37). Second, substantial complications if not price 
reductions and fees could be foreseen already in 2001/2002, since some of the 
investigations of the European Commission had started at that point. Vodafone reports: 
‘As part of its sectoral enquiry into roaming charges, in July 2001, officials of the European 
Commission visited the offices of operators in the United Kingdom and Germany, including 
Group subsidiaries. The investigation is seeking evidence of collusion and / or excessive prices, 
in relation to both retail and wholesale roaming charges. The European Commission has yet to 
indicate how or if it may proceed in these matters.’(Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 23) 
The collected information  further suggests that particularly in France, but also in other 
countries belonging to the Northern Europe division such as UK and Ireland price 
reductions were introduced starting in the financial year 2002 and continuing each year 
of the investigation period and beyond: 
‘NRAs in Belgium and France have reached decisions during 2001/02 which both resulted in 
reductions of approximately 15% in call termination charges in 2002 and further proposed 
reductions in 2003.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2003, p. 19) 
The German NRA had not implemented the regulatory framework by the required 
date.  
Additionally, some Vodafone subsidiaries in other countries were also imposed on to 
comply with price reductions or price caps as summarised in table 6.4:  
                                                 
144
  While at a first glance this increase of the SMP threshold would seem to allow price increases for 
some companies (which under the ‘old’ regulation were subject to SMP restrictions and under the 
new ruling were not), for companies retaining their SMP status (such as Vodafone in many EU 
markets) the new regulations were bound to complicate the market situation as such companies 
would still be subject to regulatory price caps while facing an increased competition at the same 
time. An example of just this effect was provided by events in Sweden in 2005 leading to an 
impairment charge, see p. 168. 
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Table 6.4: Price reductions in relevant Vodafone (suggested) IGUs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vodafone Annual Reports 2002-2005 
Furthermore, Vodafone was declared to have SMP in many countries in Southern 
Europe (Italy, Greece, etc.) where no impairment was necessary.145This fact would 
suggest that the effects of regulatory actions in the countries of this IGU were not 
strong enough to provoke an impairment charge by themselves. 
Table 6.5: Overview of SMP limitations for Vodafone according to geographical 
divisions 
2003 2004 2005
Northern Europe --- yes yes
Central Europe --- --- ---
Southern Europe yes yes yes
Americas --- --- ---
Asia Pacific --- --- yes
Middle East and Africa --- --- ---
SMP in relevant country (ies)
 
Source: Vodafone Annual Reports 2003-2005 
                                                 
145
 A possible explanation of this phenomenon was that UK subsidiary is so much bigger than the other 
ones that price reductions in the UK had a bigger effect on the IGU. 
Possible IGU Countries
2002 2003 2004 2005
Based on subsidiaries:
Arcor Germany yes
Cegetel France yes yes yes
Japan Telecom Japan
Grupo Iusacell Mexico
Vodafone Sweden Sweden
Based on type of business (mobile / non-mobile):
non-mobile businesses: Europe
Germany, France, Vizzavi 
Europe yes yes yes
non-mobile businesses: Asia Pacific Japan
mobile businesses: Americas USA, Mexico
Based on geographical area:
Central Europe (mobile / non-mobile)
Germany, Poland, 
Switzerland, Hungary, etc. yes
Northern Europe (mobile / non-mobile)
UK, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Belgium, France, etc. yes yes yes yes
Asia Pacific (mobile / non-mobile)
Japan, Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, etc. yes yes
Price reductions due to 
industry regulation in 
relevant country/-ies
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In Sweden the new EU regulatory framework had succeeded to show its effect on 
Vodafone by 2005. The Group reports in its annual report: 
‘Sweden implemented the new EU Framework in July 2003. In its review of the Call 
Termination Market, the NRA concluded that all mobile network operators have SMP and 
imposed obligations of cost-orientation, non-discrimination, accounting separation and 
transparency. The NRA developed a LRIC Model to determine cost oriented mobile call 
termination rates and proposed from July 2004, a reduction from the current rate of SEK 1.35 
to SEK 0.8 and reducing to SEK 0.54 by July 2007.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2005, p. 19) 
While Vodafone Sweden had to struggle with price reductions imposed due to its SMP 
position, the competition apparently had also an impact on the Swedish 
telecommunications market: 
‘Intense competition (...) contributed to a 4% decline in Sweden.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 
2005, p. 38) 
Finally, another problem was rising for the Swedish subsidiary which would more than 
likely increase its difficulties. A part of the NRA-regulated conditions for obtaining a 
3G licence in Sweden required that the operators achieve certain coverage at specified 
points in time in the future. As Vodafone disclosed in its annual report, these 
conditions were not fulfilled by Vodafone Sweden by the financial year 2005 meaning 
that the company feared governmental fees for not complying with 3G licence terms: 
‘Sweden: … The NRA is also reviewing the 3G coverage required to be achieved by the four 
3G licensees by 31 December 2003 (such obligations were subsequently extended to 31 
December 2004). Discussions between the Government, the NRA and the licensees are being 
held on these matters. The NRA has powers to fine operators for non-compliance.’ (Vodafone 
Annual Report 2005, p. 19) 
Altogether, it seems more than likely that in some countries industrial regulation might 
have at least aggravated pricing conditions in a way causing Vodafone to rethink its 
cash flow forecasts which might have led to an impairment charge. 
The EU regulatory framework had, however, no effect on the impairment testing in 
Mexico or Japan. However, Japan was subjected to a turbulent series of reforms in the 
telecommunications sector starting in 2001: 
‘The Japanese market has been liberalised in stages over the last 15 years. ... In 2001, the 
Japanese government embarked on a two-year programme of economic reform, underpinned by 
review obligations contained in the Telecommunications Business Law. There are a variety of 
regulatory and policy issues under consideration, including fixed-line interconnection charges 
on NTT’s networks, regulation of the mobile sector, competition guidelines, administrative 
arrangements and universal service.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 24) 
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Additionally, pressure on the whole IGU of Asia Pacific was coming through the price 
reductions in Australia during the financial years 2004 and 2005 (Vodafone Annual 
Report 2004, p. 16 and Vodafone Annual Report 2005, p. 20).  
For Mexico no information about regulatory pressures is provided at all. The Americas 
division is mentioned in the annual reports of Vodafone; however, only a general 
statement about the FCC regulation in the US is provided. When looking at Grupo 
Iusacell another fact is very obvious. Table 6.6 below provides information about 
Vodafone’s main competitors as seen by the company in the main countries where it 
has subsidiaries: 
Table 6.6: Overview of Vodafone’s main competitors 
Possible IGU Country/-ies
2002 2003 2004 2005
Based on subsidiaries:
Arcor Germany 3 3 3 3
Cegetel France 2 2 2 2
Japan Telecom Japan 3 3 3 3
Grupo Iusacell Mexico 8 8 n.i. n.i.
Vodafone Sweden Sweden 2 2 4 3
Based on type of business (mobile / non-mobile):
non-mobile businesses: Europe
Germany, France, Vizzavi 
Europe 5 5 5 n.i.
non-mobile businesses: Asia Pacific Japan 3 3 3 n.i.
mobile businesses: Americas USA, Mexico 13 13 5
1
4
1
Based on geographical area:
Central Europe (mobile / non-mobile)
Germany, Poland, 
Switzerland, Hungary, etc. 5 9 10
2
10
2
Northern Europe (mobile / non-mobile)
UK, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Belgium, France, etc. 15 16 19
2
17
2
Asia Pacific (mobile / non-mobile)
Japan, Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, etc. 7 10 12 n.i.
Nr of competitors in relevant country/-ies
 
Notes:
1
Numbers adjusted to reflect former (prior to FY 2004) geografic regions
2
Information provided by Vodafone includes only national US carriers, Mexican Competitors and regional carriers were not included
Source: Vodafone Annual Reports 2002-2005 
While for most of the subsidiaries between two and four competitors have been 
deemed relevant, in the case of Mexico eight companies are among the main 
competition for Vodafone in financial years 2002 and 2003. Grupo Iusacell might have 
had serious financial problems, but its financial situation seems to have been further 
exacerbated by the large number of companies in the market. 
6.4.1.2 Analysis based on information provided by external sources 
A look at some of the analyst reports written on Vodafone during the investigation 
period provides useful information about the industry and other pressures which had 
n.i.: not included in annual report
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their effect on the Group. Already in the financial year 1999 S&P and Fitch Ratings 
placed Vodafone on CreditWatch and Rating Alert Negative respectively due to 
anticipated rise in debt levels and reduction of debt coverage ratios following the 
proposed merger with AirTouch Plc (S&P, 7 Jan 1999; Fitch Ratings, 19 Jan 1999) 
and again following the hostile takeover of Mannesmann a year later (Fitch Ratings, 
19 Nov 1999). Meanwhile, S&P reported signs of consolidation for the US market 
while also favourably commenting on Vodafone’s creation of Verizon Wireless in FY 
2000 in the US together with Bell Atlantic Corp. and GTE Corp. The competition on 
the wireless market seemed to produce first results and Vodafone appeared firmly set 
on one of the top positions (S&P, 10 Jan 1999). The report stated four acquisition 
characteristics pointing to the consolidation of at least the US telecommunications 
market:1) national US footprint (according to Vodafone’s annual report, Verizon 
Wireless had achieved this milestone and was taking further steps to reinforce its 
position, Vodafone Annual Report 2000, p. 26); 2) national brand (at that time 
Vodafone was already renaming all acquired businesses, Vodafone Annual Reports 
2000-2003); 3) strong international ties (since Vodafone had subsidiaries at that time 
in over 20 countries, it is safe to assume that this prerequisite was provided); 4) unified 
technical standards. This last trait would have represented a problem for Vodafone due 
to reported difficulties in matching phones and handsets at that time. However, the 
Group had already allocated resources to find solutions to this challenge (Fitch 
Ratings, 10 Dec 2001; DBRS Benchmark Report, 28 Sep 2001). In fact the main 
challenges for the company during the 2001 financial year were reported to be:  
‘(1) ... average revenue per user (‘ARPU’) is falling as increasing competition has led to rate 
discounting. (2) [The Company] is faced with rising handset subsidies as analog subscribers are 
migrated to digital service, which has a higher subsidy. (3) Its free cash flow is under pressure 
from high capital spending, which includes supporting network upgrades and expansions as 
well as strategic investments.’ (DBRS, 5 Jun 2000) 
During the financial year 2002, analyst research commented again on value drivers for 
Vodafone and future growth potential. The Group was noted to have grown 
inorganically, i.e. based on acquisitions more than continuous operations while 
essential value drivers such as ARPU had been falling in key markets and potential for 
new customer acquisition had been limited either through increasing competition and 
very high market penetration (for example in continental Europe, Japan) or, through 
high customer acquisition costs for data services (for example in Germany): 
‘The number of customers has increased by 55.64% to 83 mn. This comes mainly from 
acquisitions and increases in stakes undertaken by the company rather than from continuing 
operations. The turnover increased to 21 bn pounds which again is inorganic growth rather than 
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growth from continuing operations. Hence the growth till now has been mainly inorganic rather 
than incremental. 
… 
The ARPU has fallen substantially in one year. This is reflective of the worldwide trend of 
increasing competition in the wireless sector, resulting in falling tariffs. The rates have been 
decreased also in order to increase the subscriber base. This is especially true of the European 
market where the penetration rates have reached the highest levels in the world. Now with 
these increased penetration rates, the focus will turn to customer retention. Herein, the ARPUs 
will again come under pressure due to high churn rates and falling tariffs. 
… 
Germany…The data revenues as a percentage of total revenues are the highest in whole of 
Europe. But the high customer acquisition costs incurred by the company make this business 
model unsustainable. Hence the focus needs to shift to cost controls and increasing returns per 
customer rather than increasing the customer base. Substantial costs (5.55 bn pounds) were 
incurred for acquisition of the 3G license for this region. 
… 
Asia Pacific… The increase in EBIDTA is primarily inorganic in nature. Increase in the 
connection costs and increased competitiveness resulted in margins falling from 27% to 19%. 
The toughest part of this market is the competition in form of NTT DoCoMo.’ (First Global 
Research report, 8 Jun 2001). 
Furthermore, regulatory investigations in the UK were noted to potentially reduce 
ARPU even more: 
‘United Kingdom… Also, a recent investigation by Oftel to impose price caps may hurt the 
ARPU. Thus the ARPUs will come under pressure in the future.’ (First Global Research report, 
8 Jun 2001).  
The conclusion of the analysts was that apart from maintaining its conservative debt 
profile (Vodafone had financed a large part of its acquisitions through issue of equity 
rather than increasing its debt) Vodafone would have to shift focus from acquisition of 
new customers and markets to customer retention and cost control in order to survive 
the increasing pressure of the markets:  
‘The company has identified data services as the future growth driver. Herein the role of 
Vizzavi portal becomes extremely important. It aims to use it as a tool for increasing airtime 
usage, reduce churn and create additional value. At present this venture is running into huge 
losses. The company expects this venture to turn profitable in next 2 years. This forms a key 
component of the group’s strategy. 
It has also invested a lot on the GPRS technology and 3G licenses. Their commercial launches 
have just taken place in some countries and will happen in other countries in the near future. 
One would have to wait and watch as to how well they perform.’ (First Global Research report, 
8 Jun 2001) 
While noting the advantages of Vodafone’s acquisitions and investments in the newest 
technology analysts remained watchful of the accelerating competition and increasing 
saturation of the telecommunications markets. 
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However, following results for the first half of the financial year 2002 analysts were 
becoming more optimistic due to considerable EBITDA improvement despite bottom-
line loss. Items such as goodwill amortisation and goodwill impairment during the year 
were discarded since they do not affect cash flows:146 
‘The company reported a huge loss of 9.8 bn pounds for the April-September period of 2001 
but without considering the exceptional items and amortisation charges (both of which are 
non-cash) the operating income increased by 40% to 3.4 bn pounds. This is reflective of its 
strong continuing operations. The exceptional items amounted to a huge 4.7 bn pounds due to 
write-down of its investments in Arcor (a fixed line business in Germany), Iusacell and China 
Mobile. A charge of 6.7 bn pounds was made for goodwill amortisation. But these do not 
affect the cash flows of the company as the interest coverage ratio improved to 8.9 times 
compared to 4.8 times for the previous 6-months and 4.1 for the April-Sep. period of 2000. 
The adjusted earnings per share improved to 2.5 pence, a 63% rise year-on-year and 22% on 
a sequential basis.’ (First Global Research report, 19 Nov 2001) 
Nevertheless, when commenting on the major risk sources for Vodafone for the 
financial year 2002 and the years following S&P noted:  
‘Key risk factors:  1) increasing voice competition, 2) uncertainty about future mobile data 
revenues, 3) regulatory and event risk. Competitive pressures are expected to intensify in 
Vodafone’s key markets as new 3G entrants activate networks and voice markets reach 
saturation, which could result in ongoing reductions in voice average revenue per user (APRU). 
There is also substantial uncertainty about the future cash-generating ability of enhanced data 
services on 3G networks. Vodafone has, however, funded its 3G-license investment 
conservatively and is not dependent on future 3G cash flow to protect its credit quality and 
ratings. Furthermore, Vodafone is exposed to regulatory risk, which could compress 
international roaming and wholesale termination margins and ARPU. Vodafone's event risk is 
relatively high, as the group considers transactions that would allow it to broaden its global 
wireless footprint, particularly in countries where it already has a presence.’ (S&P, 
12 Jun 2002) 
As opposed to previous years competition and regulatory risk had already made their 
way to being among the essential risks the company was facing when predicting future 
cash flows. 
Despite positive reports of strong organic growth in the financial year 2003, analysts 
remained further cautious and slightly sceptical regarding Vodafone’s future prospects. 
The main reasons for this prudence were - again - the high penetration rates in 
continental Europe which left little room for further expansion (CreditSights, 
30 Jan 2003; CreditSights, 3 Feb 2003). Furthermore, a short announcement directly 
referring to Gruppo Iusacell was published to report the financial difficulties of the 
subsidiary: 
‘Mexican wireless phone operator Grupo Iusacell SA, controlled by Verizon Communications 
(VZ) and Vodafone Group PLC (VOD), may need a cash injection from shareholders to stay 
afloat’. (Income Securities Advisors, 13 Sep 2002) 
                                                 
146
 For a detailed discussion of analysts’ and raters’ views on goodwill impairment and goodwill 
amortisation see chapter 4. 
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The analysis of the IT sector provided by Fitch ratings reported serious problems for 
the whole telecommunications industry including weak world economy, regulatory 
pressures, increasing competition, high capital expenditures and additional goodwill 
charges. According to the rating company these difficulties – while less pressing than 
in 2001 and 2002 – continued to plague many companies in the sector. However, the 
outlook was more positive than during the years before (Fitch Ratings, 18 Dec 2002).  
Even more significant were analyst comments on the decision of the Competition 
Commission to regulate call termination charges147 in the UK. Fitch ratings predicted 
declining revenues following the verdict (Fitch Ratings, 30 Jan 2003) which were 
bound to have an impact on goodwill impairment calculations. 
The financial year 2004 brought more positive reports by analysts indicating that 
Vodafone had stabilised its ARPU, improved cost control, continued growing and 
improved its debt profile.148 Although growth in 2003 was mainly due to the 
consolidation of the Japanese subsidiaries for the first full year, in the first quarter of 
2004, analysts report that 80% of the growth was organic (CreditSights, 29 Jul 2003). 
The positive trend continued through the entire financial year.149 By the end of the 
financial year 2004, however, a further announcement of reduced tariffs (GPRS and 
3G) by 50% was issued by the Portuguese subsidiary of Vodafone (Income Advisors, 
7 Jan 2004). Judging from the timing of the announcement, such reduction would have 
had no effect on the numbers for 2004, but rather on future periods (i.e. its effects 
cannot be fully traced in the investigation period relevant here). 
The analyst outlook on the telecommunications sector remained negative. Analysts 
highlighted severe competition and regulatory pressures (CreditSights, 15 Jan 2003; 
Fitch Ratings, 11 Dec 2003). 
Financial year 2005 showed that problems from previous years were still not solved. 
Again analysts note: 
‘…business risk for the Company has not eased during the past year, attributable to heightened 
competition, regulatory changes, and the implementation of 3G. Additionally, a clear 
dichotomy in operating results has become evident, with Germany and Italy continuing to 
                                                 
147
 ‘Call termination charges are the charges made by mobile phone companies to complete phone calls 
on their networks that were originated on the networks of fixed line operators or other mobile 
operators. The regulatory view is that each operator has a monopoly over the termination of calls on 
its own network.” (Fitch Ratings, 30 Jan 2003)  
148
 Cazenove 27 May 2003; Deutsche Bank, 27 May 2003; CreditSights, 29 May 2003; Cazenove, 8 Jul 
2003. 
149
 Cazenove, 19 Aug 2003 and 18 Nov 2003; CreditSights, 20 Nov 2003. 
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improve, while the U.K. and Japan have deteriorated. Pressure in the U.K. market is 
attributable to: (1) heightened competition in the contract customer market, resulting in higher 
customer acquisition and retention costs; and (2) regulatory decisions that have lowered 
termination rates, with further rate cuts to be implemented in September 2004.’ (DBRS, 8 
September 2004) 
Thus, regulatory and competitive problems in the UK more than likely exercised 
considerable pressure on the North and Central European IGUs. Overall, analysts 
predicted declining free cash flows for 2005 (DBRS, 8 Sep 2004). 
Based on the information collected and presented above, the analysis shows that 
Vodafone was under considerable regulatory and competitive pressure in the countries 
where impairment charges were conducted. Furthermore, it is also evident that these 
pressures were forming a trend as confirmed by the company in its annual reports and 
by analysts in theirs. Such trends would inevitably have been included in at least the 
detailed cash flow forecasts for the impairment calculation, especially considering that 
Vodafone relied on a detailed forecast phase which was twice as long as the time 
required by FRS 11. Therefore, it seems more likely than not that industry regulations 
and competitive environment had an impact on goodwill impairment.150 
6.4.2 Cable & Wireless Plc 
6.4.2.1 Analysis based on information disclosed by the Company 
Similarly to Vodafone, C&W had prepared its consolidated financial statements 
according to UK GAAP through the whole investigation period. Impairment charges 
on goodwill were reported in financial years 2002, 2003 and 2004. The company 
disclosed impairment charges referring to the following subsidiaries: 
                                                 
150
 Suggestions on future research based on this conclusion are provided in section 6.6. 
 175 
Table 6.7: An overview of C&W impairment charges (1999-2005) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
C&W Global --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
UK --- --- --- 985 2,725 --- ---
US --- --- --- 697 --- --- ---
Europe --- --- --- 190 --- --- ---
Japan --- --- --- 124 --- --- ---
Rest --- --- --- 11 --- --- ---
C&W Regional --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Jamaica --- --- --- --- --- 10 ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Total charge --- --- --- 2,007 2,725 10 ---
C&W subsidiary
£ mln
 
Source: C&W Annual Reports 1999-2005 
The impairment information provided in financial year 2002 allocates the goodwill 
impairment charge mainly to the UK and US businesses (and small amounts to the rest 
of the European subsidiaries and Japan). 
In 2003 an impairment charge of altogether £ 2,725 mln was allocated to C&W Global 
and, more specifically, to the UK business.  
Finally, in 2004, goodwill was written off by further £ 10 mln relating to the subsidiary 
in Jamaica (i.e. C&W Regional). Thus, by the end of 2004 C&W had written off all of 
its goodwill (see table 6.24 in the supplement to this chapter). 
Information on the assumptions of the impairment calculation was even less detailed 
than the information provided by Vodafone. C&W disclosed key assumptions such as 
the length of the period including detailed forecasts, growth of revenue forecasts for 
the period after the detailed period and discount rates. This information is summarised 
in table 6.8 below:  
Table 6.8: Assumptions of goodwill impairment C&W 
Assumptions for  impairment calculation 2002 2003 2004 2005
Length of detailed forecasts 5 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs ---
Forecasted growth sustainable phase 2.50% 2.50% --- ---
Discount rates 11.00% 14.00% 10.50-20.00% 8.00-40.00%
 
Source: C&W Annual Reports 1999-2005 
The information disclosed covers only some of the key issues of the impairment 
calculation. Details such as revenue growth during the first five years or capital 
expenditure forecasts were not reported. Furthermore, the major value drivers of the 
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business development and future expectations relating to them were not analysed in the 
annual reports. Additionally, no comments were provided explaining why the growth 
rate for the sustainable phase was set at 2.5%. Considering that FRS 11 recommends 
application of growth rates for this phase which are not higher than the long-term 
average for the country / -ies where the business is operating (FRS 11, para. 37) this 
assumption at least needs some explanatory details (the UK average post-war GDP 
growth was 2.25% p.a., see Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 1039). 
C&W had divided its operations into two major units: C&W Regional providing 
telecommunications services in 33 countries, and C&W Global concentrating on IP 
(internet protocol) and data services for business customers (mostly Europe, US and 
Asia Pacific). Similarly to Vodafone no specific information as to the definition of 
IGUs is provided by the Group. However, as C&W was smaller than Vodafone (for 
example C&W turnover in 2005 was approximately 10% of Vodafone’s turnover in 
that year) it seems likely for C&W to have used the two major units, or, some 
combination of subsidiaries for the definition of their IGUs.151 
The C&W annual report 2002 does not provide much information on the goodwill 
impairment charge that year. The performance of the UK and the US subsidiaries is not 
discussed in detail, although it is noted that significant problems in capacity sales and 
voice solutions in the UK and the US have led to a 14% decline of revenues from 
Service Providers and 18% decline in revenues from Business Markets.152The decrease 
in revenues in Business Markets, in particular, was attributed to weak world economy 
and product shift to higher margins. C&W further states: 
‘Declining prices, rising customer bankruptcies and a deliberate move away from low margin 
business, led to lower voice revenue.’ (C&W Annual Report 2002, p. 10) 
It is not clear, however, whether these declining prices were due to the weak markets, 
intensifying competition or industrial regulation. Altogether, during the financial year 
2002 no information whatsoever is provided on industry regulation in the countries 
where the C&W Global businesses were active. 
                                                 
151
 Further analysis on potential IGU structure could not be performed due to lack of supporting 
information. 
152
 Service Providers were defined as ‘businesses that provide communication services direct to 
customers” (C&W Annual Report 2002, p. 79). 
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Another indication of the problems C&W Global was experiencing is displayed by the 
extensive headcount reduction programme (from 18,600 in December 2000 to 10,201 
in March 2002, see C&W Annual Report 2002, p. 12).  
In 2003 the information provided is more extensive. The Group indicated as follows: 
‘Cable & Wireless recorded a total operating loss of £6,000 million in 2003, compared with 
£4,910 million in 2002. Exceptional costs of £5,548 million were charged in 2003 reflecting the 
difficult trading conditions in the telecommunications sector, particularly the markets in which 
Cable & Wireless Global operates. Goodwill of £2,713 million was written off at 30 September 
2002 and fixed assets were impaired by a further £787 million. Additional impairment charges 
of £1,491 million were recognised at 31 March 2003 as the Group’s assessment of future 
performance was again revised downwards, together with a £115 million write down of 
redundant fixed assets.’ (C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 27) 
Furthermore, C&W reported that despite lower losses before exceptional items 
compared to 2002 (mainly due to the lower amortisation charge following impairment 
in 2002), the operating profit before depreciation, amortisation and exceptional items 
had deteriorated, in the UK by as much as 23% (C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 27). 
But even at turnover level, it is obvious that C&W had been having problems during 
the last years, especially in C&W Global: 
Table 6.9: C&W turnover overview (1999-2005) 
1999* 2000* 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005*
C&W Global 8,252 3,448 3,362 3,271 2,867 --- ---
C&W Regional --- --- 1,433 1,466 1,411 --- ---
Intra-Group Turnover -308 -443 -107 -34 -31 -23 -22
Continuing operations --- --- 4,688 4,703 4,247 3,384 3,023
Discontinued operations --- --- 3,163 1,045 144 287 199
Group turnover 7,944 9,201 7,851 5,748 4,391 3,671 3,222
* in financial years 1999 and 2000 C&W Regional did not exist yet; in financial years 2004 and 2005 
information is reported according to geographical segments, rather than for C&W Global and C&W Regional
£ mln
 
Source: C&W Annual Reports 1999-2005 
At a first glance it seems that the impairment charges in C&W were caused by the 
economic / performance problems the company was facing at the time. It remains to be 
determined what the role of industrial regulation and / or competition in this process 
was. Since the largest single amounts of the goodwill impairment charge were 
allocated to the UK, US, Continental Europe and Japan businesses, the industry 
regulations and the competition situation in these geographic regions as well as in 
Jamaica will be discussed in the following section. 
 178 
The risk factor review in 2003 includes large portions dedicated to regulatory 
environment and competitive difficulties (C&W Annual Report 2003, p.46f.). Thus, it 
is noted that many of the countries in which C&W has active subsidiaries are heavily 
regulated and companies declared to have SMP, in particular, are likely to experience 
some kind of negative impact on their performance due to industry regulation. Among 
the possible effects of industry regulation on the Group’s performance and financial 
situation the following are specifically noted:  
‘In some jurisdictions, the Group is currently required to offer competitors access to its 
networks, supply subscribers with various telecommunications services at regulated rates or on 
regulated terms and/or contribute to universal services funds.’ (C&W Annual Report 2003, 
p. 46) 
More specifically, in the UK, C&W had been alleged to have SMP on wholesale 
International Direct Dial (IDD) on routes to four different locations (C&W Annual 
Report 2003, p. 16). Therefore, with the new EU regulatory framework being 
implemented153 C&W could reasonably expect some effect on future revenues and 
cash flows even at a time when the decisions of the regulator were not final yet.154The 
(more ample) information disclosed by Vodafone in their annual report reveals that, by 
2003, the UK regulator of the telecommunications sector was already conducting 
investigations of the UK market and planning price reductions for SMP operators (see 
table 6.4, p. 166, and Vodafone Annual Report 2003, p. 18). Since both Vodafone and 
C&W were operating in a similar line of business (and in the same industry sector) it 
seems more than likely that C&W was informed about forthcoming regulations and 
would / should have included their impact into future forecasts.  
A similar situation was emerging in continental Europe where it was reported as highly 
likely that ‘Cable & Wireless would be designated as having ‘Significant Market 
Power’ for calls terminating on each of Cable & Wireless’ national voice networks’ 
(C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 16). Although this information was provided in the 
annual report for 2003 rather than in 2002 (when a goodwill impairment for 
continental Europe was effected), it was probably already known to the Group in 2002, 
especially considering that the intentions of the regulator were made public long before 
their official entry into force (Vodafone Annual Report 2002, p. 23f.). Due to the 
prudent view that FRS 11 requires for impairment testing (for example FRS 11, 
                                                 
153
 For a more detailed discussion of the EU regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector 
see also the section referring to Vodafone plc (p. 165). 
154
 According to the information provided the new regulator of the telecommunications sector in the 
UK, the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), was due to start acting officially in the end of 2003 
or 2004 (C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 16). 
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para. 38), such information would have been inevitably bound to make an impact on 
forecasted cash flows and, possibly, on impairment losses. 
Even in Japan (where goodwill was also written-off in financial year 2002), industry 
regulation was reported to influence materially the Group’s results: 
‘Interconnection charges for origination and termination traffic on the networks of NTT East 
and NRR West impact the profitability of Cable & Wireless IDC’s voice business. The 
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (MPHPT) 
regulates these interconnection charges. ... Legislation to establish a Universal Service Fund 
was passed in 2001, but the Japanese government has not yet announced an intention to impose 
levies on carriers. There remains, however, a possibility that Cable & Wireless IDC will be 
liable to make payments in future years.’ (C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 17) 
In the United States C&W was declared a dominant market participant for some 
specific routes. The regulatory burden was further acerbated by the competition 
situation in the US. Due to the recent difficulties the telecommunications sector was 
experiencing as a whole, some of C&W’s competitors in the US market were forced to 
file for bankruptcy under local bankruptcy law (Chapter 11 protection). One of the 
major competition risks for C&W was stated to stem from exactly such firms, which 
might have been able to rebuild their businesses at a lower restructuring cost or 
financial burden than C&W itself was bearing at the time (C&W Annual Report 2003, 
pp. 47 and 49). 
Furthermore, competition fears in other C&W subsidiaries (especially Europe, 
including UK and Japan) were also quite strong based on sector-specific problems and 
regulatory issues: 
‘The Group faces competition and downward pressure on prices in many areas and markets of 
its business. ... The Group also believes the sector may experience consolidation in the near 
future, which could result, amongst other things, in further competition that would make it 
more difficult for Cable & Wireless to compete effectively. ...The transatlantic, pan-European 
and US markets are all currently experiencing considerable levels of overcapacity. ... If the 
current overcapacity situation is not resolved or worsens, prices may continue to decline in the 
affected regions and such price decline could have a material adverse effect on the Group’s 
operations.’ (C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 49-50). 
Having stated these difficulties so clearly as major risks for the Group, C&W would 
have had to include such issues in the goodwill impairment calculation, or, more 
likely, (if these effects were not quantifiable yet) at least in the economic decision 
whether to impair goodwill for the respective IGU or not. 
In 2004 there was hardly goodwill left on the balance sheet (at the end of 2003 the 
remaining goodwill was amounting to £ 10 mln, see table 6.24 in the supplement to 
this chapter). Nevertheless, a further impairment charge was conducted relating to the 
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C&W subsidiary in Jamaica. The Group reported a significant finding for the 
Caribbean region in its report: deregulation in the region which had started several 
years ago (C&W Annual Reports 1999-2003 for disclosures on the liberalisation of the 
Caribbean markets) was progressing at an immense pace resulting in mostly 
completely liberalised markets, eliminating exclusive licensing and introducing 
competition in most of the 16 countries in the Caribbean where C&W had subsidiaries. 
Most notably, countries such as Jamaica, Barbados and the Cayman Islands had fully 
liberalised their telecommunications markets by 2004. While prior to liberalisation, 
C&W had exclusive licences in these countries, the Group reported in 2004 that ‘over 
70 per cent of the Group’s revenues in this region [are] now exposed to competition’ 
due to market liberalisation (C&W Annual Report 2004, p. 22). 
6.4.2.2 Analysis based on information provided by external sources 
External sources on the financial performance of C&W and the environment of the 
Group show a similar picture to the information already disclosed by the company. 
Although there were less analyst reports covering C&W than Vodafone155 the findings 
indicate that C&W was not only struggling with problems due to deteriorating 
financial performance but also that these problems were at least partially caused by 
increasing regulatory and competitive pressures. Thus, S&P notes in its full report on 
C&W in 2003 that competitive pressures are among the main challenges C&W was 
facing. Furthermore, when analysing the performance of the C&W Global unit and, in 
particular, the UK business, the analysts state as follows: 
‘The company has cash on hand to fund the identified restructuring costs of £1 billion and is in 
part reverting to the better-established operations in the U.K. Given the adverse industry 
conditions, however, especially in the wholesale carrier business where there is overcapacity 
and pricing pressure, there are major uncertainties regarding the execution of this restructure 
and whether it will deliver a sustainable enterprise with a supportable cost base.’ (S&P, 
8 May 2003). 
While analysts recognised that C&W can rely on its core operations in the UK where 
the Group was considered to be the second largest operator after British 
Telecommunications in terms of market share, they were unsure of C&W’s ability to 
deal with competitive challenges and price pressures: 
‘The U.K. market ... Competition is active and C&W needs to meet the threats posed by both 
BT, which has refocused on its fixed-line business, and the surviving alternative carriers such 
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 Many analyst reports on C&W could not be downloaded due to limitation of access. Therefore, the 
author has reviewed mainly S&P reports on C&W over the investigation period. 
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as COLT Telecom Group PLC (B-/Stable/--) and WorldCom Inc., which, while itself 
restructuring, continues to operate under Chapter 11 in the U.S.’ (S&P, 8 May 2003) 
In the 2004 report of S&P on C&W analysts note already that the regulatory 
environment in the UK has changed and has become a factor to be considered due to 
the market investigations initiated by Oftel (S&P, 27 Aug 2004). Referring to 
competition in the UK market, S&P further states: 
‘The significant transmission capacity in the [UK] market, available from a large number of 
providers, results in continued pressure on prices for carrier services, which contribute about 
one-half of C&W's U.K. revenue base. 
The remainder of the U.K. revenue base is derived from the provision of telecoms services to 
enterprise and business customers. Although this business typically has a value-added 
component and higher margins, the competition here is also intense as C&W seeks to retain 
customers where it is the main provider and increase business as a secondary or occasional 
provider.’ (S&P, 27 Aug 2004). 
Considering the performance problems the Group was facing combined with this level 
of competition and rapidly increasing regulatory interference it is not surprising that 
C&W had written down almost its entire goodwill by the beginning of 2004. 
In Japan industrial regulation also represented a significant problem for C&W: 
‘The business in Japan is to be retained primarily, as low access charges make it possible for 
small players such as C&W to compete. Nevertheless, access charges have recently been 
increased for the first time in 10 years by 5%, and this is likely to weaken C&W's cost base and 
competitive position.’(S&P, 8 May 2003)  
In the Caribbean region the gradual increase of industry regulation effects (in the form 
of liberalisation of the telecommunications market) and of intense competition as a 
direct consequence thereof can be followed from year to year.156 While in 2001 and in 
2002, C&W was reported to have a dominant position, even, monopoly in most of the 
Caribbean countries where it had subsidiaries (S&P, 21 Dec 2001 and 14 Nov 2002), 
by 2003 this favourable situation had begun to change, albeit very slightly. 
The Caribbean operations were still reported to have developed favourably in 2003 
despite the ongoing liberalisation of the local telecommunication markets. 
Nevertheless, industrial regulation was quickly becoming the main topic when 
discussing the C&W Regional business. The positive analyst outlook for the Caribbean 
was based on the importance of C&W for local states: 
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 This is a particularly interesting environment since throughout the investigation period C&W 
Regional had been the successful unit of the C&W Group as opposed to the loss-generating C&W 
Global (C&W annual reports 1999-2005). Nevertheless, even this successful division saw fit to 
impair goodwill in 2004. 
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‘As the C&W business is often an important corporate locally and local governments are 
significant stakeholders, deriving both taxes and dividends from C&W Regional's operations, 
there is a rational basis for constructive engagement on liberalization and regulatory issues.’ 
(S&P, 8 May 2003) 
However, a year later, in 2004, the competitive situation had further changed to the 
worse from C&W perspective. As liberalisation of markets continued analysts became 
more concerned about its effect on C&W’s performance in the Caribbean: 
‘The Caribbean and Panama are the division's most significant operations contributing about 
25% of group revenues and over one-half of the group's EBITDA. Performance in these 
regions was severely affected by strong competition, some one time charges and adverse U.S. 
dollar and local currency movements, especially in the second half of financial 2004. …The 
markets in which the National Telco's division operates have been or are being opened to 
competition. ...  Although additional demand has been stimulated given the relatively low 
penetration rates, aggressive new entrants have taken significant market share with attractive 
propositions. C&W has worked with governments to achieve rebalancing and headcount 
reductions as liberalization occurs, but this has been insufficient to compensate for the pressure 
on revenue streams with good margins. C&W has faced strong competition and pricing 
pressure in both international calls and mobile services, especially in Jamaica.’ (S&P, 
27 Aug 2004). 
It is during this financial year that the impairment calculations conducted by C&W led 
to a goodwill write-down of the goodwill in Jamaica. At this point, there was no 
further goodwill left to impair. 
6.4.3 Summary and conclusion: Economic factors 
The analysis in the preceding sections concentrates on the possible effects of industry 
regulation and competitive environment on goodwill impairment. Two companies 
from the telecommunication sector were chosen for this analysis which was conducted 
using a case study research methodology. Both companies were among the leading 
operators in their lines of business during the investigation period: Vodafone Plc in 
mobile telecommunications and C&W in fixed-line telecommunications and internet 
protocol. Both companies impaired goodwill in roughly the same years and both had 
subsidiaries around the world. The main difference between these companies for 
purposes of this study relates to the operating and financial difficulties which they (or 
some of their subsidiaries) were facing during the investigation period. Thus, while 
Vodafone continued expanding throughout the investigation period (see also tables 
6.22 and 6.23 in the supplement to this chapter), C&W was facing major performance 
difficulties and was forced to retire from the US and most of the Continental European 
markets (see also Tables 6.22 and 6.24 in the supplement to this chapter). In this sense 
the analysis of both companies aims to uncover new aspects of the influence economic 
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factors have on the goodwill impairment for companies at different levels of the 
performance scale. 
Despite the differences in the financial situation of both companies there are numerous 
indications that industry regulation and/or increasingly competitive environment might 
have at least added to the pressures leading to an impairment charge. In the case of 
Vodafone goodwill impairment was caused in countries such as Germany and Japan, 
both subject to industry regulation aiming to restrict dominant positions on the market 
either through price pressures or through market access barriers. Alternatively, in 
countries such as Mexico and Sweden, Vodafone’s subsidiaries suffered as a result of 
the immense competition, leading to deteriorating performance, and, in the case of 
Grupo Iusacell, to a divesture of Vodafone’s investment. 
For C&W the effects of industry regulation and competition were even more intense. 
On the one hand, a seriously shattered UK business was being restructured just at the 
time when the UK started discussing the implementation of the EU regulatory 
framework for the telecommunications sector and initiated first market investigations. 
Moreover, in Japan, where the Group tried to enter the market it was facing access 
charge rises for the first time in 10 years. Finally, the traditionally strong Caribbean 
part of the business where C&W had been enjoying monopoly positions was being 
rapidly liberalised leading to an immense competition and further challenges for the 
Group. Considering this environment the complete write-down of goodwill in the 
financial years 2002-2004 is easily explained. 
Overall, the findings suggest that industry regulation – either by means of pricing or 
increased competitive pressures – might lead to goodwill impairment or, at least, have 
a material impact both on the decision to impair goodwill and on the amount of 
goodwill impairment to the extent that these effects can be quantified.157 Moreover, 
this evidence suggests that outsiders to the firm such as investors, auditors and 
accounting regulators should be aware that policies of industry regulators can provide 
an early indicator of pressure on company’s financial performance and so lead to 
possible goodwill impairment losses. 
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 For suggestions for future research see chapter 7. 
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6.5 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE FRAMEWORK: MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
The evidence in the previous section looks at the economic environment of a company. 
As prior research suggests, however, economic factors are not always the only force 
behind goodwill impairment. According to research findings managers are likely to 
use, at least partially, the discretionary room available to steer the goodwill impairment 
calculation according to their needs (for details on research on goodwill impairment 
causes, see chapter 2, and, additionally, chapter 5 for results of own research). 
Considering the calculation of the value in use (see p. 27) managers have several ways 
of using potential discretionary room available: on the one hand, by manipulating the 
numerator of the value-in-use calculation which consists of the sum of the projected 
free cash flows of the IGU (and is based on the assumptions for this projection). On 
the other hand, room for managerial discretion might be potentially available in the 
denominator which consists of the discount rate specific for the IGU. The following 
sections discuss and illustrate the room for managerial discretion in the cases of 
Vodafone Plc and C&W Plc. While the case studies in section 6.5.1 rely on 
information provided in the impairment notes of the annual reports of the companies, 
the evidence related to discount rates in section 6.5.2 is provided by comparing the 
discount rates disclosed by the companies with an independent calculation of discount 
rates for the relevant period based on publicly available information. 
6.5.1 Managerial discretion in the numerator 
6.5.1.1 Vodafone Plc 
Two things are noticeable when the assumptions of impairment testing in Vodafone’s 
annual report 2002 are scrutinised. Although FRS 11 strongly recommends that the 
time frame of detailed cash flow projections is 5 years at the most, it allows longer 
periods to be used under unusual circumstances which are to be explained in the 
relevant note (FRS 11, para. 37). Vodafone has made use of this exception and has 
defined a period of 10 years for its detailed cash flow prognoses: 
‘...Revenue growth is forecast from a combination of new data products and services and strong 
underlying voice ARPU. Data revenue is expected to increase significantly to 2006 but grow at 
more modest rates to 2011. Voice ARPU is forecast to benefit from new services and traffic 
moving from fixed networks to mobile networks and reflects the impact of price declines. 
Accordingly, the directors believe that it is appropriate to use projections in excess of five years 
as growth in cash flows for the period to 31 March 2011 is expected to exceed relevant country 
growth in nominal GDP.’ (Vodafone Annual Report 2005, p. 97) 
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It can be deduced from the information provided in this passage that the directors’ 
team has made special efforts to project cash flows as accurately as possible by taking 
into account such effects as price declines and specific new products and services. On 
the other hand, the prolonged period (almost double the standard period recommended 
in FRS 11) of detailed cash flow forecasts assuming a higher rate of growth than the 
sustainable post-2011-growth leaves room for managerial discretion. The length of the 
period could be possibly used to adjust the value in use so that impairment charges 
might be avoided, or at least, the amounts of the impairment charge can be minimised. 
In the annual report 2005 Vodafone elaborates further on this subject as follows: 
‘The Group prepares and internally approves formal ten year plans for its businesses and uses 
these as the basis for its impairment reviews’ (Vodafone annual report 2005, p. 95) 
This information implies that ten year plans are regularly prepared and approved for all 
businesses for all other purposes and are additionally used for the impairment 
calculation. Since, however, FRS 11 requires that the cash flow projections used for 
the impairment testing differ on the prudent side from cash flow forecasts used for 
other purposes it is not clear to what extent the ten year plans for Vodafone’s 
businesses are altered or adjusted for impairment testing.158 (FRS 11, paras. 37f., Ernst 
& Young, 2003, p. 1040). 
The second observation refers to the assumption relating to the forecast of capital 
expenditures (capex). According to FRS 11 the cash flow projections for the 
impairment calculation should be made on the basis of the status quo situation of the 
company (FRS 11, para. 38). This means that capex can be included in the cash flow 
projections but only to the extent that current products or services need to maintained. 
However, capital expenditure relating to new investments as well as future income 
resulting from them should not be included in the cash flow projections. Such a 
requirement might seem antiquated and unrealistic (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 1040) as 
it excludes future development potential of the subject of the impairment test which is 
an intrinsic part of the fair value of the business. However, the standard setter seems to 
be more interested in a ‘prudential’ approach in order to avoid unexpected future 
impairment losses. 
The 2002 annual report of Vodafone provides some information on the capex 
assumptions used in the impairment calculation: 
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 For an example of these differences see below the second observation referring to capex 
assumptions. 
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‘...For mobile businesses, projections reflect investment in network structure to provide 
enhanced voice services and a platform for new data products and services, enabled by GPRS 
and 3G technologies, which are forecast to be significant drivers of future revenue growth. 
Capital expenditure is heaviest in the early years of the projections, but in most countries is 
expected to fall to below 10% of revenues by the year ended 31 March 2008.’(Vodafone 
Annual Report 2002, p. 97) 
It is unclear from the information provided in this passage whether capex refers only to 
the already initiated investments (maintenance capex), or whether it includes 
expansion capex as well. This shortcoming must have been noted by Vodafone or their 
auditors because by 2005 the capex assumption was altered very slightly – albeit 
crucially – stating that capex included in cash flow projections results from continuous 
investment in network infrastructure: 
‘...The plans include cash flow projections for the mobile businesses which reflect continuing 
investment in network infrastructure to provide enhanced voice and data services, which are 
forecast to be significant drivers of future revenues growth. Capital expenditure is heaviest in 
the early years of the projections but is forecast to fall to 10% of revenue at Group level by the 
year ending 31 March 2008.’(Vodafone annual report 2005, p. 95) 
While this new wording more closely fits the requirements of FRS 11 it is still 
noticeable that capex is projected to be largest in the early projection years – the 
schedule for the projections has not changed since 2002 – and is then expected to fall. 
This assumption does not fit the idea of maintenance capex and is more in line with the 
heavy investments in the early 2000s in the then new GPRS and 3G technology. It can 
be argued that as these investments were already starting in the early 2000s, the capital 
expenditures in the following years were included in the impairment calculations as 
continuing investments in an already existing network. Nevertheless, the capex 
assumption provides a good example of the room for managerial discretion when 
projecting cash flows for impairment testing. 
6.5.1.2 Cable & Wireless Plc 
Unlike Vodafone C&W has provided very little information on the details concerning 
the impairment process. Specific information about the parameters of the goodwill 
impairment calculation appears first in year 2002 and it is most detailed in years 2002 
and 2003. Even then the only information available related to the projection of cash 
flows refers to the duration of the detailed forecasts and the growth rates after this 
period159: 
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 Additionally, information is provided on possible impairment triggering events and on the discount 
rate(s) used in the impairment calculation (see also section 6.5.2). Growth rates for the sustainable 
phase are adjusted in the cost of capital (denominator) and are, therefore, not discussed here. 
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‘Future cash flows were determined with reference to Cable & Wireless’ five year plan using a 
growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the period beyond Cable & Wireless’ five year plan (based on a 
nominal increase in GDP for the countries in which Cable & Wireless operates)…. Changes to 
the assumptions used by management to determine the level of impairment required, such as 
the discount rate or growth rate used, could significantly affect Cable & Wireless’ results.’ 
(C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 42) 
The use of five-year detailed forecasts which are based on the business plans approved 
by the board of directors (see C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 106) suggests at first a 
more conservative approach than Vodafone’s 10-year-forecasts. However, there is no 
way to assess the effects of this forecast period due to the complete lack of information 
regarding the basic assumptions of these forecasts. Unlike Vodafone, where the growth 
rates for the detailed forecasts were at least verbally described (if not quantified), 
C&W refrains from mentioning anything about the detailed forecast which could help 
users of financial statements to understand why management has conducted an 
impairment write-down of virtually its complete goodwill in years 2002 and 2003. 
In 2004 and 2005, although hardly possible, the information disclosed on goodwill 
impairment is even less. The disclosures were limited to only repeating important 
events which could trigger impairment and reporting the discount rates used. No 
information referring to the cash flow projections is provided. This could be due to the 
small amount of goodwill on the balance sheet (£ 10 mln which were impaired in 2004 
and £ 88 mln resulting from acquisitions in 2005). 
The lack of disclosures about the impairment assumptions can also be interpreted as an 
opportunity for managerial discretion. If no information is provided about the 
impairment calculation, the reported impairment losses are – at best – unexplainable 
and non-transparent. Additionally, considering the disclosure requirements of FRS 11 
(FRS 11, paras. 69f.) the issue of UK GAAP compliance could also be further 
researched.160  
6.5.2 Managerial discretion in the denominator 
According to FRS 11 the forecasted cash flows of the IGU are discounted by using the 
appropriate pre-tax discount rate (FRS 11, para. 41). The appropriate discount rate is 
defined as the discount rate investors would require for the next best (equally risky) 
alternative on the capital market (Ernst & Young, 2003, p.1041). The discount rate 
may be determined by researching the market for transactions of similar assets. In the 
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 However, due to limitations of scope this issue is not part of the research questions in this chapter. 
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case that an active market for the IGU does not exist, the discount rate may be deduced 
from the discount rate of a comparable listed company, the cash flows of which are 
similarly risky to the cash flow profile of the IGU. Alternatively, it may be derived 
from the WACC for the whole company and adjusted for IGU-specific risks. In this 
last case, the discount rate should be adjusted if the growth rate of the cash flows is 
projected to be higher than the five-year average. Additionally, the weighted average 
of the specific discount rates of all IGUs should equal the company’s individual 
WACC (FRS 11, para. 42f). For IGUs it is unlikely that an active market exists (unless 
the IGU structure is subsidiary based), therefore, the alternative ways to determine the 
discount rates will have to be used (Ernst & Young, 2003, p. 1042). It is clear that, 
ceteris paribus, the choice of the discount rate can influence the goodwill impairment 
decision as well as the write-down amount. FRS 11 requires disclosure of the discount 
rates for the impairment calculation, although it does not specify whether the rates are 
to be disclosed when there has been an impairment charge only, or, whether they are to 
be reported irrelevant of the outcome of the calculation (FRS 11, para. 69). 
Furthermore, although the discount rates must be disclosed, the assumptions of their 
derivation are not required. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent companies have 
used discretionary room when determining the discount rate. The following sections 
simulate the derivation of the discount rates for Vodafone and C&W based on publicly 
available data. Thus, the investigation attempts to provide a better understanding of the 
discount rates used in the impairment calculation and their calculation. The aim of the 
simulation is to see whether an independent calculation will yield discount rates which 
are materially different than the ones disclosed by the companies. 
Additionally, this discount rate simulation illustrates some of the opportunities for 
managerial discretion related to the derivation of discount rates in the impairment 
process. As discussed in sections 2.2.3.3.2 and 3.1.3 there are several (technical) 
choices managers need to make when calculating the discount rates. Since no details 
referring to the discount rate calculation are provided by the companies, it is not clear, 
for example, what the exact specifics of the determination of the beta factor in the cost 
of equity are. In the following sections the beta factors are derived based on varying 
lengths of the total period (1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 5 years), based on different 
intervals (daily, weekly and monthly) as well as compared to different indices (national 
indices, FTSE 100 and Mexbold, and a world index, MSCI). 
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One issue which needs to be addressed is that discount rates need to be determined for 
every IGU. However, since neither Vodafone, nor C&W have disclosed any 
information regarding their IGUs for impairment calculation purposes, such a 
calculation cannot be performed (such data are not publicly available). Therefore, the 
discount rates for the whole entities of Vodafone and of C&W are determined, as 
according to FRS 11, they would have to equal the weighted average result of their 
IGU rates (see above). 
6.5.2.1 Vodafone Plc 
Since there was no information provided by Vodafone on the derivation of the beta 
factor for the discount rate calculation, beta factors were deduced based on varying 
intervals, on different time periods and compared to different indices. All of these 
constellations are commonly used in practice and discussed in the literature (see 
chapter 2). The findings are provided in table 6.10 below. The table shows beta 
calculations for each year based on daily, weekly and monthly intervals as well as on 
data collected over 1-year, 2-year, 3-year and 5-year periods.  Panel A uses the 
FTSE100 as the reference index while Panel B refers to the worldwide MSCI as a 
benchmark for the deduction of the beta factors: 
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Table 6.10: Derivation of beta factors for Vodafone Plc (Panel A: FTSE 100)161 
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,15 35,24% 251 11,64 yes 1,01 24,62% 51 4,00 yes 1,46 24,34% 12 1,79 no
2 years 1,13 36,98% 505 17,18 yes 0,77 16,47% 103 4,46 yes 1,12 28,83% 24 2,99 yes
3 years 1,38 53,48% 757 29,46 yes 0,95 25,44% 155 7,23 yes 1,26 44,00% 35 5,09 yes
5 years 1,58 50,50% 1261 35,84 yes 1,23 29,70% 260 10,44 yes 1,35 33,63% 60 5,42 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,13 37,88% 254 12,40 yes 0,59 10,41% 51 2,39 yes 1,06 32,31% 12 2,18 no
2 years 1,40 55,11% 506 24,87 yes 0,94 25,33% 103 5,85 yes 1,29 47,38% 23 4,35 yes
3 years 1,45 52,67% 757 28,98 yes 0,93 22,78% 155 6,72 yes 1,23 31,85% 35 3,93 yes
5 years 1,55 45,50% 1263 32,45 yes 1,23 27,59% 260 9,91 yes 0,98 20,13% 60 3,82 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,46 59,08% 252 19,00 yes 1,04 29,14% 51 4,49 yes 1,72 64,59% 11 4,05 yes
2 years 1,50 54,80% 503 24,65 yes 0,97 23,85% 103 5,62 yes 1,33 30,65% 23 3,05 yes
3 years 1,66 52,69% 756 28,98 yes 1,30 31,15% 156 8,35 yes 1,42 31,97% 36 4,00 yes
5 years 1,54 45,19% 1261 32,22 yes 1,40 33,67% 260 11,44 yes 1,05 20,10% 60 3,82 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,60 48,77% 250 15,37 yes 0,92 20,14% 51 3,51 yes 0,61 4,43% 11 0,65 no
2 years 1,91 50,43% 503 22,58 yes 1,51 34,23% 104 7,29 yes 1,38 22,64% 24 2,54 yes
3 years 1,70 41,17% 756 22,97 yes 1,41 29,66% 156 8,06 yes 0,59 6,03% 36 1,48 no
5 years 1,51 37,73% 1262 27,63 yes 1,43 34,50% 260 11,66 yes 0,79 11,63% 60 2,76 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 2,28 54,24% 252 17,22 yes 2,33 54,83% 52 7,79 yes 1,85 34,82% 12 2,31 yes
2 years 1,77 38,39% 505 17,70 yes 1,75 36,78% 104 7,70 yes 0,43 3,70% 24 0,92 no
3 years 1,58 38,33% 757 21,66 yes 1,80 42,87% 156 10,75 yes 0,71 8,96% 36 1,83 no
5 years 1,48 33,59% 1262 25,24 yes 1,55 37,28% 260 12,38 yes 0,73 10,11% 59 2,53 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,25 23,57% 253 8,80 yes 1,14 19,78% 52 3,51 yes -0,65 36,12% 12 2,38 yes
2 years 1,30 31,89% 505 15,35 yes 1,53 37,16% 104 7,77 yes 0,15 0,70% 24 0,39 no
3 years 1,23 29,07% 759 17,61 yes 1,33 33,91% 156 8,89 yes 0,25 2,09% 36 0,85 no
5 years 1,24 24,38% 1263 20,17 yes 1,31 28,16% 261 10,08 yes 0,29 1,93% 60 1,07 no
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,32 40,71% 252 13,10 yes 1,80 55,92% 51 7,88 yes 1,02 18,59% 12 1,51 no
2 years 1,21 32,75% 506 15,67 yes 1,37 42,14% 103 8,58 yes 0,65 10,64% 24 1,62 no
3 years 1,24 29,74% 757 17,88 yes 1,36 37,47% 155 9,57 yes 0,77 11,04% 35 2,02 no
5 years 1,18 21,89% 1262 18,79 yes 1,31 30,58% 260 10,66 yes 0,95 16,67% 60 3,41 yes
2000
1999
2001
2003
2002
Reference Index: FTSE 100 Total Return
2005
VODAFONE GROUP PLC
2004
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 The beta factor is determined in a regression of the company stock returns against the returns of a 
representative index returns (reflecting the market portfolio). For further details see section 3.1.3. 
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Table 6.10 (cont’d): Derivation of beta factors for Vodafone Plc                     
(Panel B: MSCI) 
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,59 12,33% 251 5,92 yes 0,65 18,22% 51 3,30 yes 0,64 8,38% 12 0,96 no
2 years 0,66 14,17% 505 9,11 yes 0,41 6,98% 103 2,75 yes 0,48 6,51% 24 1,24 no
3 years 1,16 28,13% 757 17,19 yes 0,76 19,61% 155 6,11 yes 1,10 36,79% 35 4,38 yes
5 years 1,26 24,89% 1261 20,42 yes 0,90 17,90% 260 7,50 yes 1,00 24,31% 60 4,32 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,71 15,28% 254 6,74 yes 0,17 1,25% 51 0,79 no 0,43 5,67% 12 0,77 no
2 years 1,24 30,49% 506 14,87 yes 0,78 19,59% 103 4,96 yes 1,14 40,36% 23 3,77 yes
3 years 1,23 26,88% 757 16,66 yes 0,81 19,16% 155 6,02 yes 1,03 28,31% 35 3,61 yes
5 years 1,26 22,32% 1263 19,03 yes 0,89 15,63% 260 6,91 yes 0,81 17,80% 60 3,54 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,42 35,75% 252 11,79 yes 0,96 26,84% 51 4,24 yes 1,57 61,99% 11 3,83 yes
2 years 1,34 29,35% 503 14,43 yes 0,90 22,29% 103 5,38 yes 1,14 30,66% 23 3,05 yes
3 years 1,41 27,58% 756 16,95 yes 1,00 19,63% 156 6,13 yes 1,06 24,81% 36 3,35 yes
5 years 1,32 23,18% 1079 18,03 yes 0,99 18,63% 230 7,23 yes 0,85 19,65% 60 3,77 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,19 20,31% 250 7,95 yes 0,87 19,67% 51 3,46 yes 0,47 5,48% 11 0,72 no
2 years 1,41 22,70% 503 12,13 yes 1,05 17,68% 104 4,68 yes 0,71 10,51% 24 1,61 no
3 years 1,28 18,11% 756 12,91 yes 0,96 14,74% 156 5,16 yes 0,49 6,03% 36 1,48 no
5 years 1,26 18,30% 837 13,68 yes 1,02 17,09% 190 6,22 yes 0,64 10,90% 60 2,66 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,63 25,31% 252 9,21 yes 1,37 19,32% 52 3,46 yes 0,71 8,49% 12 0,96 no
2 years 1,33 17,38% 505 10,29 yes 1,05 13,89% 104 4,06 yes 0,35 3,27% 24 0,86 no
3 years 1,30 17,64% 575 11,08 yes 1,12 16,99% 126 5,04 yes 0,56 8,87% 36 1,82 no
5 years 1,29 17,57% 597 11,26 yes 1,09 16,92% 149 5,47 yes 0,61 10,55% 59 2,59 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,92 8,54% 253 4,84 yes 0,68 7,22% 52 1,97 no -0,57 26,31% 12 1,89 no
2 years 0,98 10,74% 323 6,21 yes 0,90 13,57% 74 3,36 yes 0,26 3,00% 24 0,83 no
3 years 0,97 10,87% 334 6,36 yes 0,88 13,48% 86 3,62 yes 0,32 4,15% 36 1,21 no
5 years 0,95 10,57% 358 6,49 yes 0,82 11,88% 110 3,82 yes 0,37 4,63% 60 1,68 no
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,14 20,02% 70 4,13 yes 1,18 30,81% 21 2,91 yes 0,70 17,96% 12 1,48 no
2 years 1,10 19,51% 81 4,38 yes 1,03 24,47% 33 3,17 yes 0,61 13,75% 24 1,87 no
3 years 1,07 18,93% 92 4,58 yes 1,00 24,31% 44 3,67 yes 0,70 16,08% 35 2,51 yes
5 years 1,05 18,37% 117 5,09 yes 0,91 18,69% 69 3,92 yes 0,74 14,75% 60 3,17 yes
2000
1999
2004
2005
2001
2002
2003
VODAFONE GROUP PLC
Reference Index: MSCI
 
All beta factors based on daily and weekly intervals are significant at the 95% 
confidence level (with the exception of financial year 2000, weekly intervals). The R2-
results of the regressions are not very high, which, however, is not unusual for the beta 
derivation: for the FTSE 100 reference index between 10.11% (2001, 5 years, monthly 
intervals) and 59.08% (2003, 1 year, daily intervals) for the significant findings; for 
MSCI between 6.98% (2005, 2 years, weekly intervals) and 40.36% (2004, 2 years, 
monthly intervals). This suggests that other factors must be involved in the explanation 
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of the dependent variable (rate of return of Vodafone) beside the rate of return of the 
index (the only independent variable in the model). However, complete explanation of 
the dependent variable or the determination of all predictors is not the purpose of this 
investigation. The t-values, on the other hand, which indicate strength of the 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, are significant as 
described above. 
The beta factors derived on the basis of monthly intervals for one year were not 
considered for the following calculations, even if they were significant, since the 
regression included a maximum of 12 data points in these cases which could point to 
misleading results due to the small sample. 
The findings suggest that depending on the method of calculation, the variation in the 
beta factor can be very high. A summary of the above beta factor derivation is 
provided in table 6.11 as follows:  
Table 6.11: Summary beta factors Vodafone Plc 
Max Min Range Max Min Range
2005 1,58 0,77 0,81 1,26 0,41 0,85
2004 1,55 0,59 0,96 1,26 0,71 0,55
2003 1,66 0,97 0,69 1,42 0,85 0,57
2002 1,91 0,79 1,12 1,41 0,64 0,77
2001 2,33 0,73 1,60 1,63 0,61 1,02
2000 1,53 1,14 0,39 0,98 0,82 0,16
1999 1,80 0,95 0,85 1,18 0,7 0,48
FTSE 100 MSCI
Beta Factors Vodafone
 
The differences in beta factors between the data collection periods are material for both 
reference indices. Thus, when measured against the FTSE 100 beta factors can differ 
up to 1.60 (2001) and in the case of MSCI up to 1.02 (2001). Additionally, although a 
general conclusion about the direction of the intervalling effect cannot be made based 
on the evidence, it is clear that the beta factors differ significantly depending on the 
interval chosen for their calculation. A trend related to the intervalling effect is 
noticeable: before 2002 the betas based on monthly intervals tend to be lower than the 
daily and the weekly deduced betas, post 2002 this trend reverses and the monthly 
betas – while still lower than the ones determined on a daily basis – are higher than the 
weekly betas. 
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Furthermore, while differences related to the length of period or the data collection 
intervals remain between the calculated betas when the MSCI is taken as a benchmark, 
the differences are smaller than when using the FTSE 100 index. Thus, with the 
exception of 2005 when the span between the maximum and the minimum beta is 
roughly the same for both indices, the range of calculated betas under the MSCI index 
is a narrower than under FTSE 100.  
The findings also indicate that the values of the beta factors are overall lower when the 
MSCI is used as a reference index. 
Altogether, this evidence shows that, all other things equal, the choice of input 
parameters for the derivation of the beta factor will lead to substantial differences 
which will be then reflected in the discount rate and in the impairment charge 
respectively. Thus, it is well possible that the choice of the beta factor is used to 
manipulate the impairment decision or amount in one direction or the other, especially, 
since specifics concerning this particular calculation need not be disclosed. 
The choice of calculation for the beta factor can be traced to the calculation of the 
discount rate chosen for the impairment calculation. For Vodafone, these discount rates 
were calculated and compared to the ones reported in the annual reports. The findings 
are presented in table 6.12. The table shows the calculation of the cost of equity which 
is based on the beta factors as determined in table 6.10 and uses the effective cost of 
debt to calculate the WACC (weighted average cost of capital) as defined in the 
CAPM.162 
                                                 
162
  The WACC is defined as the sum of the cost of equity and the cost of debt weighted by the 
percentage of their corresponding capital (equity or debt) from total capital. For further details see 
section 3.1.3. 
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Table 6.12: Discount Rates Vodafone Plc
RFR ERP Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax
(daily) WACC (weekly) WACC (monthly) WACC
1 year 1,15 11,34% 10,56% 14,66% 1,01 10,53% 9,83% 13,66% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,13 11,25% 10,48% 14,55% 0,77 9,10% 8,56% 11,90% 1,12 11,14% 10,38% 14,42% 8.3-11.6%
3 years 1,38 12,72% 11,78% 16,37% 0,95 10,14% 9,49% 13,19% 1,26 11,99% 11,13% 15,46%
5 years 1,58 13,90% 12,83% 17,82% 1,23 11,83% 10,99% 15,26% 1,35 12,55% 11,63% 16,16%
1 year 1,13 11,28% 10,86% 15,25% 0,59 8,11% 7,97% 11,19% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,40 12,90% 12,34% 17,32% 0,94 10,19% 9,86% 13,84% 1,29 12,23% 11,73% 16,47% 8.1-10.3%
3 years 1,45 13,21% 12,63% 17,72% 0,93 10,12% 9,80% 13,76% 1,23 11,88% 11,41% 16,01%
5 years 1,55 13,78% 13,14% 18,45% 1,23 11,89% 11,42% 16,03% 0,98 10,41% 10,07% 14,13%
1 year 1,46 13,24% 12,04% 17,09% 1,04 10,75% 9,94% 14,10% 1,72 14,74% 13,32% 18,89%
2 years 1,50 13,47% 12,23% 17,36% 0,97 10,31% 9,57% 13,58% 1,33 12,45% 11,38% 16,15% 7,5-10%
3 years 1,66 14,39% 13,01% 18,47% 1,30 12,27% 11,23% 15,93% 1,42 12,97% 11,81% 16,76%
5 years 1,54 13,68% 12,42% 17,62% 1,40 12,84% 11,71% 16,61% 1,05 10,80% 9,98% 14,17%
1 year 1,60 14,51% 13,34% 19,25% 0,92 10,51% 9,82% 14,17% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,91 16,32% 14,93% 21,55% 1,51 13,97% 12,86% 18,57% 1,38 13,19% 12,18% 17,58% 8.8-11.5%
3 years 1,70 15,13% 13,88% 20,04% 1,41 13,41% 12,37% 17,85% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 1,51 13,97% 12,86% 18,57% 1,43 13,50% 12,45% 17,97% 0,79 9,77% 9,16% 13,23%
1 year 2,28 18,07% 17,53% 25,59% 2,33 18,36% 17,80% 25,98% 1,85 15,52% 15,11% 22,05%
2 years 1,77 15,04% 14,65% 21,39% 1,75 14,95% 14,57% 21,27% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 1,58 13,94% 13,61% 19,86% 1,80 15,21% 14,82% 21,63% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 1,48 13,32% 13,02% 19,01% 1,55 13,78% 13,45% 19,64% 0,73 8,93% 8,85% 12,92%
1 year 1,25 11,75% 11,59% 17,14% 1,14 11,10% 10,97% 16,22% -0,65 0,51% 0,69% 1,02%
2 years 1,30 12,00% 11,83% 17,49% 1,53 13,38% 13,17% 19,47% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 1,23 11,59% 11,44% 16,91% 1,33 12,19% 12,02% 17,78% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 1,24 11,64% 11,49% 16,98% 1,31 12,06% 11,89% 17,58% N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 year 1,32 12,32% 7,31% 10,87% 1,80 15,12% 8,29% 12,32% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,21 11,67% 7,09% 10,53% 1,37 12,62% 7,42% 11,02% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 1,24 11,82% 7,14% 10,60% 1,36 12,55% 7,39% 10,99% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 1,18 11,47% 7,02% 10,42% 1,31 12,23% 7,28% 10,82% 0,95 10,12% 6,54% 9,72%
VODAFONE GROUP PLC
Length of 
period for 
beta 
6,85% 32,69% 35,07% 64,93%
2005
2004
4,56%
Reference Index: FTSE 100 Total Return
Cost of equity
5,90% 88,82%28,01%6,00%
Pre-tax disount 
rate (pre-tax 
WACC) published 
in annual report
2005
8,73%
11,18%
4,63% 5,90% 9,13% 28,75% 91,27%
5,90% 9,71% 32,36% 96,99% 3,01%
2003 4,60% 5,90% 84,45% 15,55%
5,90%
5,90%
87,98% 12,02%
5,12%94,88%10,90% 31,49%
5,90%
2002 5,08%
2001 4,61%
2000
1999
4,35%
4,51%
7,88% 29,53%
6,87% 30,72%
Cost of 
debt
Tax rate Equity 
ratio
Debt Ratio Cost of equity Cost of equity
Panel A
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Table 6.12 (cont'd): Discount Rates Vodafone Plc
RFR ERP Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax
(daily) WACC (weekly) WACC (monthly) WACC
1 year 0,59 8,02% 7,61% 10,57% 0,65 8,39% 7,94% 11,02% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,66 8,46% 8,00% 11,11% 0,41 6,95% 6,66% 9,25% N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.3-11.6%
3 years 1,16 11,38% 10,59% 14,71% 0,76 9,06% 8,53% 11,85% 1,10 11,02% 10,27% 14,27%
5 years 1,26 11,98% 11,12% 15,45% 0,90 9,87% 9,25% 12,85% 1,00 10,47% 9,79% 13,59%
1 year 0,71 8,80% 8,60% 12,07% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,24 11,94% 11,47% 16,09% 0,78 9,23% 8,99% 12,62% 1,14 11,33% 10,91% 15,31% 8.1-10.3%
3 years 1,23 11,86% 11,39% 15,99% 0,81 9,40% 9,15% 12,84% 1,03 10,68% 10,31% 14,47%
5 years 1,26 12,05% 11,57% 16,24% 0,89 9,85% 9,56% 13,42% 0,81 9,40% 9,15% 12,84%
1 year 1,42 12,99% 11,83% 16,79% 0,96 10,27% 9,53% 13,53% 1,57 13,84% 12,55% 17,81%
2 years 1,34 12,50% 11,42% 16,20% 0,90 9,89% 9,22% 13,08% 1,14 11,30% 10,41% 14,77% 7,5-10%
3 years 1,41 12,92% 11,78% 16,71% 1,00 10,47% 9,71% 13,78% 1,06 10,83% 10,01% 14,20%
5 years 1,32 12,40% 11,34% 16,09% 0,99 10,45% 9,69% 13,75% 0,85 9,64% 9,00% 12,78%
1 year 1,19 12,12% 11,23% 16,21% 0,87 10,23% 9,57% 13,82% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,41 13,38% 12,34% 17,82% 1,05 11,26% 10,48% 15,13% N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.8-11.5%
3 years 1,28 12,62% 11,67% 16,85% 0,96 10,75% 10,03% 14,48% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 1,26 12,53% 11,60% 16,74% 1,02 11,10% 10,34% 14,92% 0,64 8,87% 8,38% 12,09%
1 year 1,63 14,22% 13,87% 20,25% 1,37 12,68% 12,41% 18,11% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,33 12,45% 12,20% 17,80% 1,05 10,81% 10,64% 15,53% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 1,30 12,31% 12,06% 17,60% 1,12 11,22% 11,03% 16,10% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 1,29 12,23% 11,98% 17,49% 1,09 11,02% 10,84% 15,83% 0,61 8,24% 8,20% 11,96%
1 year 0,92 9,75% 9,66% 14,27% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,98 10,12% 10,01% 14,80% 0,90 9,66% 9,56% 14,14% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 0,97 10,09% 9,99% 14,76% 0,88 9,54% 9,45% 13,97% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 0,95 9,97% 9,86% 14,58% 0,82 9,16% 9,08% 13,43% N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 year 1,14 11,22% 6,93% 10,29% 1,18 11,45% 7,01% 10,41% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,10 10,97% 6,84% 10,16% 1,03 10,58% 6,70% 9,96% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 1,07 10,81% 6,78% 10,08% 1,00 10,43% 6,65% 9,88% 0,70 8,67% 6,03% 8,96%
5 years 1,05 10,73% 6,76% 10,04% 0,91 9,90% 6,46% 9,60% 0,74 8,90% 6,11% 9,08%
VODAFONE GROUP PLC
Reference Index: MSCI
Pre-tax disount rate 
(pre-tax WACC) 
published in annual 
report
4,63%
4,60%
1999
2003
2002
2001
2000
2005
2004
2005
4,56% 5,90% 6,00% 28,01% 88,82% 11,18%
5,90% 9,13% 28,75% 91,27% 8,73%
7,88% 29,53% 84,45%
10,90% 31,49%
15,55%
5,08% 5,90% 6,87% 30,72% 87,98% 12,02%
5,90%
94,88% 5,12%
4,35% 5,90% 9,71% 32,36% 96,99% 3,01%
4,61% 5,90%
4,51% 5,90% 6,85% 32,69% 35,07% 64,93%
Panel B
Cost of equity Cost of 
debt
Tax rate Equity ratio Debt Ratio Cost of 
equity
Cost of equityLength of 
period for beta 
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The key points of this information are summarised in table 6.13 below to illustrate the 
variation opportunities in the discount rate stemming from the application of different 
beta factors: 
Table 6.13: Summary discount rates Vodafone Plc 
Max Min Range Max Min Range
2005 17,82% 11,90% 5,92% 15,45% 9,25% 6,20% 8,30%-11,60%
2004 18,45% 11,19% 7,26% 16,24% 12,07% 4,17% 8,10%-10,30%
2003 18,47% 13,58% 4,89% 16,79% 12,78% 4,01% 7,50%-10,00%
2002 21,55% 13,23% 8,32% 17,82% 8,38% 9,44% 8,80%-11,50%
2001 25,98% 12,92% 13,06% 20,25% 11,96% 8,29% N/A
2000 19,47% 16,22% 3,25% 14,80% 13,43% 1,37% N/A
1999 12,32% 9,72% 2,60% 10,41% 8,96% 1,45% N/A
Discount rate 
published in 
annual report
Discount Rates Vodafone
FTSE 100 MSCI
 
Three main conclusions can be made based on the calculated discount rates: 
1. All independently calculated pre-tax rates using the FTSE 100 as a reference 
index are higher and most are significantly higher than the discount rates 
disclosed by Vodafone. As there is no information available as to what are the 
IGUs of Vodafone, the independently analysed discount rates are calculated for 
the whole company. These discount rates should represent the weighted 
average of the rates for Vodafone’s IGUs. Vodafone has disclosed a range of 
values for the discount rates in several years meaning that the rate for the whole 
company should be somewhere within these disclosed ranges. However, the 
calculated discount rates (based on the FTSE 100) are well above the reported 
ranges. The reason as to why Vodafone has used lower discount rates is not 
discussed or disclosed anywhere in the information analysed here. It is, 
however, entirely possible that Vodafone management might have used lower 
discount rates (based on other parameter constellations than the ones used in 
this study) in order to calculate higher value in use for (at least some of) the 
IGUs, therefore, reducing the amount of goodwill impairment or, avoiding it 
altogether. These findings are reinforced by the information reported by 
Vodafone referring to the use of longer detailed forecast periods for the 
impairment calculation (see p. 184) which could also lead to a higher value in 
use (due to the use of higher growth rates for the detailed forecasts). 
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The discount rates based on the MSCI are better comparable to the rates 
disclosed by Vodafone. 163  However, the independently calculated discount 
rates are still higher than the reported ones. Also interesting is the discrepancy 
in the trend in discount rate development over time: while the rates disclosed 
by Vodafone tend to get higher between 2003 and 2005 (after falling from 
2002 to 2003), the trend in the independently calculated discount rates is 
reversed. 
2. The intervalling effect present in the derived beta factors has an impact on the 
calculation of the discount rates. The impact is most noticeable in weekly 
discount rates which are lower due to the lower beta factors. Therefore, if 
management were to aim for lower discount rates, intervalling effect would 
allow additional room for discretion. Intervalling effect is present in both FTSE 
100 and MSCI calculations. However, discount rates calculated based on the 
MSCI are more robust to the effects of this phenomenon. 
3. The length of period for calculating beta has a significant effect on the 
FTSE 100 calculation but has almost no effect (with the exception of 2005) on 
rates calculated using the MSCI. For example, daily rates in 2001 range 
between 19.01% and 25.59% based on FTSE 100 but between 17.49% and 
20.25% with the MSCI as a reference index. In 2003 weekly rates range 
between 13.58% and 16.61% (FTSE 100) and between 13.08% and 13.78% 
respectively. Altogether, it can be concluded that MSCI provides more robust 
beta factors, at least referring to the length of period and the intervals. 
Nevertheless, since arguments in favour of use of both national and 
international indices can be applied (see section 2.2.3.3.2), management might 
have used either FTSE 100 or MSCI (or a completely different reference index) 
irrelevant of the robustness issue. 
One of the limitations of this investigation refers to the fact that information on the 
IGU classification of Vodafone is not available and, therefore, discount rates can only 
be independently calculated on Group basis. However, one of the Vodafone 
subsidiaries which was almost completely impaired before being disposed of (in 2002 
and 2003) – Grupo Iusacell – was listed separately on the Mexican Stock Exchange 
since August 4, 1999. Therefore, beta factors and discount rates could be determined 
                                                 
163
  In 2002 and 2005 the range of the independently calculated rates even partly overlaps with the rates 
disclosed by Vodafone, also suggesting that the Group might have used the MSCI for the calculation 
of the discount rates. 
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for Grupo Iusacell164 and compared with the rates disclosed by Vodafone. Considering 
that Grupo Iusacell was impaired, it can be assumed that either the cash flows of the 
IGU were low, or the discount rate was high, or both. Since the information provided 
on Grupo Iusacell by Vodafone in 2002 stated that the subsidiary had financing 
problems, it is more than likely that these risks should have been reflected (at least 
partially) in the discount rates for the IGU. Therefore, for Grupo Iusacell, the discount 
rates would be expected to be in the higher range of the rates disclosed by Vodafone. 
The findings – including a summary of key data - are presented as follows: 
                                                 
164
  The debt ratios in the independent discount rate calculation for Grupo Iusacell are based on 
Bloomberg data since balance sheets for the subsidiary were not provided in the Vodafone annual 
reports. It should be noted, however, that a subsidiary’s debt ratio is often difficult to accurately 
ascertain as the amount of debt and equity it has will often be subject to overall group financing 
issues. 
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Table 6.14: Derivation of beta factors for Grupo Iusacell (Panel A: Mexbold)165  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165
 The beta factor is determined in a regression of the company stock returns against the returns of a 
representative index returns (reflecting the market portfolio). For further details see section 3.1.3. 
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0.75 8.80% 240 4.79 yes 0.85 8.33% 51 2.11 yes 0.58 7.41% 12 0.89 no
2 years 0.89 3.46% 493 4.20 yes 0.69 2.00% 103 1.44 no 0.21 0.20% 24 0.21 no
3 years 1.10 6.85% 745 7.39 yes 1.48 10.29% 155 4.19 yes 1.94 16.28% 35 2.53 yes
5 years 1.14 12.21% 1179 12.80 yes 1.43 21.96% 260 8.52 yes 1.79 30.73% 60 5.07 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1.03 2.58% 253 2.58 yes 0.39 0.35% 51 0.41 no -3.16 7.79% 12 0.92 no
2 years 1.22 6.91% 505 6.11 yes 1.72 11.34% 103 3.59 yes 2.55 20.87% 23 2.35 yes
3 years 1.30 10.44% 751 9.34 yes 1.73 17.47% 155 5.69 yes 2.52 32.60% 35 4.00 yes
5 years 1.08 11.39% 1056 11.64 yes 1.30 20.42% 241 7.83 yes 1.80 34.09% 55 5.24 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1.24 12.18% 252 5.89 yes 2.22 25.28% 51 4.07 yes 3.38 32.04% 11 2.06 no
2 years 1.33 17.18% 498 10.15 yes 1.93 30.57% 103 6.67 yes 2.67 49.27% 23 4.52 yes
3 years 1.19 18.78% 686 12.58 yes 1.53 34.68% 156 9.04 yes 1.92 45.95% 36 5.38 yes
5 years 1.08 15.79% 803 12.26 yes 1.34 28.41% 189 8.62 yes 1.83 46.74% 43 6.00 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1.41 24.61% 245 8.91 yes 1.74 37.25% 51 5.39 yes 2.53 76.04% 11 5.34 yes
2 years 1.16 23.71% 433 11.57 yes 1.40 43.11% 104 8.79 yes 1.70 65.83% 24 6.51 yes
3 years 1.03 17.62% 550 10.82 yes 1.21 31.52% 137 7.88 yes 1.63 60.58% 31 6.68 yes
5 years 1.03 17.62% 550 10.82 yes 1.21 31.52% 137 7.88 yes 1.63 60.58% 31 6.68 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1.03 24.24% 187 7.69 yes 1.28 52.41% 52 7.42 yes 1.41 78.02% 12 5.96 yes
2 years 0.89 15.30% 304 7.39 yes 1.08 31.36% 85 6.16 yes 1.37 63.77% 19 5.47 yes
3 years 0.89 15.30% 304 7.39 yes 1.08 31.36% 85 6.16 yes 1.37 63.77% 19 5.47 yes
5 years 0.89 15.30% 304 7.39 yes 1.08 31.36% 85 6.16 yes 1.37 63.77% 19 5.47 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0.61 5.53% 117 2.60 yes 0.65 8.88% 33 1.74 no 1.04 29.05% 7 1.43 no
2 years 0.61 5.53% 117 2.60 yes 0.65 8.88% 33 1.74 no 1.04 29.05% 7 1.43 no
3 years 0.61 5.53% 117 2.60 yes 0.65 8.88% 33 1.74 no 1.04 29.05% 7 1.43 no
5 years 0.61 5.53% 117 2.60 yes 0.65 8.88% 33 1.74 no 1.04 29.05% 7 1.43 no
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year N/A 0 no 0 no 0 no
2 years N/A 0 no 0 no 0 no
3 years N/A 0 no 0 no 0 no
5 years N/A 0 no 0 no 0 no
2000
1999
2001
2003
2002
2004
Reference Index: Mexbold
2005
Grupo Iusacell
Panel A
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Table 6.14 (cont’d): Derivation of beta factors for Grupo Iusacell            
(Panel B: MSCI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.15: Summary beta factors Grupo Iusacell 
Max Min Range Max Min Range
2005 1,94 0,75 1,19 2,31 0,52 1,79
2004 2,55 1,03 1,52 2,72 0,50 2,22
2003 2,67 1,08 1,59 2,48 0,65 1,83
2002 1,74 1,03 0,71 2,50 1,31 1,19
2001 1,37 0,89 0,48 1,89 1,19 0,70
2000 0,61 0,61 0,00 N/A N/A N/A
1999 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mexbold MSCI
Beta Factors Grupo Iusacell
 
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0.72 2.87% 240 2.65 yes 2.13 17.12% 51 3.18 yes 0.82 3.91% 12 0.64 no
2 years 0.27 0.21% 493 1.02 no 0.63 1.20% 103 1.11 no 1.41 4.17% 24 0.98 no
3 years 0.52 1.22% 745 3.03 yes 0.49 0.89% 155 1.17 no 2.27 14.35% 35 2.35 yes
5 years 0.88 3.90% 1179 6.92 yes 1.09 6.05% 260 4.08 yes 2.31 21.71% 60 4.01 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0.08 0.02% 253 0.21 no 0.05 0.01% 51 0.06 no 1.62 2.49% 12 0.51 no
2 years 0.50 1.09% 505 2.35 yes 0.28 0.29% 103 0.54 no 2.55 16.85% 23 2.06 no
3 years 0.75 2.77% 751 4.62 yes 0.77 2.82% 155 2.11 yes 2.72 20.50% 35 2.92 yes
5 years 0.87 3.59% 1056 6.26 yes 0.95 4.40% 241 3.32 yes 2.20 21.47% 55 3.81 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0.65 3.10% 252 2.83 yes 0.10 0.05% 51 0.16 no 1.85 12.09% 11 1.11 no
2 years 0.94 6.20% 498 5.72 yes 0.83 4.36% 103 2.15 yes 2.48 18.57% 23 2.19 yes
3 years 1.05 7.45% 686 7.42 yes 1.12 7.90% 156 3.63 yes 2.18 22.16% 36 3.11 yes
5 years 1.03 6.22% 803 7.29 yes 1.05 6.20% 189 3.52 yes 2.09 22.78% 43 3.48 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1.41 13.38% 245 6.13 yes 1.43 17.08% 51 3.18 yes 4.15 41.19% 11 2.51 yes
2 years 1.41 12.59% 433 7.88 yes 1.62 19.46% 104 4.96 yes 2.50 37.89% 24 3.66 yes
3 years 1.31 8.86% 550 7.30 yes 1.41 12.34% 137 4.36 yes 2.17 32.90% 31 3.77 yes
5 years 1.31 8.86% 550 7.30 yes 1.41 12.34% 137 4.36 yes 2.17 32.90% 31 3.77 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1.38 11.28% 187 4.85 yes 1.89 22.70% 52 3.83 yes 2.25 58.17% 12 3.73 yes
2 years 1.19 6.25% 304 4.49 yes 1.38 9.60% 85 2.97 yes 1.89 39.70% 19 3.35 yes
3 years 1.19 6.25% 304 4.49 yes 1.38 9.60% 85 2.97 yes 1.89 39.70% 19 3.35 yes
5 years 1.19 6.25% 304 4.49 yes 1.38 9.60% 85 2.97 yes 1.89 39.70% 19 3.35 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0.55 0.77% 117 0.95 no -0.18 0.10% 33 0.18 no 0.72 5.72% 7 0.55 no
2 years 0.55 0.77% 117 0.95 no -0.18 0.10% 33 0.18 no 0.72 5.72% 7 0.55 no
3 years 0.55 0.77% 117 0.95 no -0.18 0.10% 33 0.18 no 0.72 5.72% 7 0.55 no
5 years 0.55 0.77% 117 0.95 no -0.18 0.10% 33 0.18 no 0.72 5.72% 7 0.55 no
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year N/A 0 no N/A 0 no N/A 0 no
2 years N/A 0 no N/A 0 no N/A 0 no
3 years N/A 0 no N/A 0 no N/A 0 no
5 years N/A 0 no N/A 0 no N/A 0 no
2000
1999
2004
2005
2001
2002
2003
Grupo Iusacell
Reference Index: MSCI
Panel B
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Results based on less than 20 data points were not considered in the investigation due 
to the small sample even if they were statistically significant. Furthermore, results 
which were based on the same amount of data points despite different length of the 
investigation period were also not included in the analysis (for 2002 all results based 
on a 3- and a 5-year period, for 2001 – 2-, 3- and 5-year periods and for 2000 – 1-, 2-, 
3,- and 5-year periods). This is due to the fact that Grupo Iusacell was first listed in 
1999 and there were no capital market data available for prior periods. Despite these 
limitations of the results, the remaining beta factors show a much higher volatility than 
the beta factors of the Vodafone Group. Thus, for example for the Mexbold, the beta 
factor range reached 1.59 in 2003 with a similar value in 2004.The beta factors using 
the MSCI as a reference index were even more volatile: in 2002 and 2003 when 
Vodafone’s interest in Grupo Iusacell was written off, the beta factor range for Grupo 
Iusacell amounted to 1.19 and 1.83 respectively, moving to peak at 2.22 in 2004 
(although this fluctuation might well have been the result of Vodafone’s divesture of 
Grupo Iusacell). The intervalling effect is also very pronounced in the beta factors 
based on the MSCI index: betas based on monthly intervals seem to be a lot higher 
than weekly and daily betas. Interestingly, the results for Grupo Iusacell have a 
different trend relating to the reference index than the results for Vodafone. While the 
Vodafone beta factors based on the MSCI seem to be more robust to variations of the 
parameters, the MSCI betas for Grupo Iusacell are more sensitive to parameter 
changes. 
The discount rates calculated using the above specifications are presented below166: 
                                                 
166
 The WACC is defined as the sum of the cost of equity and the cost of debt weighted by the 
percentage of their corresponding capital (equity or debt) from total capital. For further details see 
section 3.1.3. 
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Table 6.16: Discount rates Grupo Iusacell
RFR ERP Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax
(daily) WACC (weekly) WACC (monthly) WACC
1 year 0,75 9,00% 8,94% 12,77% 0,85 9,59% 9,47% 13,53% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,89 9,82% 9,68% 13,83% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.3-11.6%
3 years 1,10 11,06% 10,80% 15,43% 1,48 13,31% 12,84% 18,34% 1,94 15,98% 15,25% 21,79%
5 years 1,14 11,28% 11,00% 15,72% 1,43 12,98% 12,54% 17,92% 1,79 15,13% 14,49% 20,70%
1 year 1,03 10,72% 10,38% 15,49% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,22 11,82% 11,37% 16,96% 1,72 14,80% 14,04% 20,95% 2,55 19,65% 18,39% 27,44% 8.1-10.3%
3 years 1,30 12,27% 11,77% 17,56% 1,73 14,83% 14,06% 20,98% 2,52 19,51% 18,26% 27,26%
5 years 1,08 11,00% 10,63% 15,87% 1,30 12,29% 11,78% 17,59% 1,80 15,28% 14,47% 21,59%
1 year 1,24 11,91% 11,48% 17,39% 2,22 17,71% 16,63% 25,20% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,33 12,45% 11,96% 18,12% 1,93 15,96% 15,08% 22,85% 2,67 20,35% 18,97% 28,75% 7,5-10%
3 years 1,19 11,61% 11,21% 16,99% 1,53 13,61% 12,99% 19,68% 1,92 15,92% 15,04% 22,79%
5 years 1,08 10,96% 10,64% 16,11% 1,34 12,48% 11,99% 18,17% 1,83 15,38% 14,56% 22,07%
1 year 1,41 13,40% 12,91% 19,87% 1,74 15,35% 14,70% 22,62% 2,53 19,99% 18,94% 29,14%
2 years 1,16 11,95% 11,59% 17,83% 1,40 13,34% 12,86% 19,79% 1,70 15,11% 14,48% 22,28% 8.8-11.5%
3 years 1,03 11,14% 10,85% 16,69% 1,21 12,23% 11,85% 18,23% 1,63 14,68% 14,09% 21,67%
5 years 1,03 11,14% 10,85% 16,69% 1,21 12,23% 11,85% 18,23% 1,63 14,68% 14,09% 21,67%
1 year 1,03 10,72% 10,56% 16,24% 1,28 12,19% 11,94% 18,36% 1,41 12,91% 12,61% 19,40%
2 years 0,89 9,89% 9,78% 15,05% 1,08 11,01% 10,83% 16,66% 1,37 12,71% 12,42% 19,11% N/A
3 years 0,89 9,89% 9,78% 15,05% 1,08 11,01% 10,83% 16,66% 1,37 12,71% 12,42% 19,11%
5 years 0,89 9,89% 9,78% 15,05% 1,08 11,01% 10,83% 16,66% 1,37 12,71% 12,42% 19,11%
1 year 0,61 7,93% 7,81% 12,01% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,61 7,93% 7,81% 12,01% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 0,61 7,93% 7,81% 12,01% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 0,61 7,93% 7,81% 12,01% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 year N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
88,78% 11,22%
11,87% 35,00%
1999
4,35%
4,51% 5,90%
5,90%
6,93% 35,00%
2002 5,08%
2001 4,61%
2000
5,90%
7,35% 35,00% 95,97% 4,03%
2003 4,60% 5,90%
5,90%
91,50% 8,50%
6,39%93,61%12,71% 35,00%
4,63% 5,90% 11,05% 33,00%
12,26% 34,00%
Reference Index: Mexbold
30,00%11,90%
2005
2005
2004
4,56%
Cost of 
debt
Tax rate
10,88% 89,12%
10,33%
9,48%
89,67%
Grupo Iusacell
Length of 
period for 
beta 
Pre-tax disount 
rate (pre-tax 
WACC) 
published in 
annual report 
VODAFONE
5,90% 90,52%
Panel A
Cost of 
equity
Equity 
ratio
Debt 
Ratio
Cost of 
equity
Cost of 
equity
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Table 6.16 (cont'd): Discount rates Grupo Iusacell
RFR ERP Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax
(daily) WACC (weekly) WACC (monthly) WACC
1 year 0,72 8,82% 8,78% 12,54% 2,13 17,14% 16,31% 23,30% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.3-11.6%
3 years 0,52 7,64% 7,70% 11,00% N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,27 17,95% 17,04% 24,34%
5 years 0,88 9,73% 9,59% 13,71% 1,09 10,98% 10,73% 15,33% 2,31 18,20% 17,27% 24,67%
1 year N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,50 7,57% 7,55% 11,27% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.1-10.3%
3 years 0,75 9,08% 8,91% 13,29% 0,77 9,16% 8,98% 13,41% 2,72 20,67% 19,30% 28,80%
5 years 0,87 9,76% 9,52% 14,21% 0,95 10,25% 9,95% 14,85% 2,20 17,63% 16,58% 24,74%
1 year 0,65 8,46% 8,42% 12,76% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,94 10,15% 9,92% 15,02% 0,83 9,51% 9,35% 14,17% 2,48 19,20% 17,96% 27,21% 7,5-10%
3 years 1,05 10,82% 10,51% 15,93% 1,12 11,18% 10,84% 16,42% 2,18 17,47% 16,42% 24,87%
5 years 1,03 10,67% 10,38% 15,73% 1,05 10,77% 10,47% 15,86% 2,09 16,93% 15,94% 24,15%
1 year 1,41 13,41% 12,92% 19,88% 1,43 13,51% 13,02% 20,03% 4,15 29,54% 27,69% 42,60%
2 years 1,41 13,40% 12,91% 19,87% 1,62 14,63% 14,04% 21,60% 2,50 19,86% 18,83% 28,96% 8.8-11.5%
3 years 1,31 12,79% 12,36% 19,01% 1,41 13,42% 12,94% 19,90% 2,17 17,88% 17,01% 26,18%
5 years 1,31 12,79% 12,36% 19,01% 1,41 13,42% 12,94% 19,90% 2,17 17,88% 17,01% 26,18%
1 year 1,38 12,76% 12,47% 19,19% 1,89 15,75% 15,27% 23,49% 2,25 17,90% 17,29% 26,60%
2 years 1,19 11,66% 11,44% 17,60% 1,38 12,77% 12,48% 19,20% 1,89 15,77% 15,29% 23,52% N/A
3 years 1,19 11,66% 11,44% 17,60% 1,38 12,77% 12,48% 19,20% 1,89 15,77% 15,29% 23,52%
5 years 1,19 11,66% 11,44% 17,60% 1,38 12,77% 12,48% 19,20% 1,89 15,77% 15,29% 23,52%
1 year N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 year N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
10,88% 89,12%
95,97% 4,03%
91,50%
93,61% 6,39%
4,35% 5,90% 7,35% 35,00%
35,00%
4,51% 5,90% 6,93% 35,00%
4,61% 5,90% 12,71% 35,00%
8,50%
4,60% 5,90% 12,26% 34,00% 88,78% 11,22%
5,08% 5,90% 11,87%
5,90% 11,05% 33,00% 89,67% 10,33%
90,52% 9,48%4,56% 5,90% 11,90% 30,00%
Length of 
period for 
beta 
2005
2000
1999
2003
2002
2001
Grupo Iusacell
Reference Index: MSCI
4,63%
Pre-tax disount 
rate (pre-tax 
WACC) 
published in 
annual report 
VODAFONE
2005
2004
Panel B
Cost of 
equity
Cost of 
debt
Tax rate Equity 
ratio
Debt Ratio Cost of equity Cost of 
equity
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Table 6.17: Summary discount rates Grupo Iusacell 
Max Min Range Max Min Range
2005 21,79% 12,77% 9,02% 24,67% 11,00% 13,67% 8,30%-11,60%
2004 27,44% 15,49% 11,95% 28,80% 11,27% 17,53% 8,10%-10,30%
2003 28,75% 16,11% 12,64% 27,21% 12,76% 14,45% 7,50%-10,00%
2002 22,62% 16,69% 5,93% 28,96% 19,01% 9,95% 8,80%-11,50%
2001 19,11% 15,05% 4,06% 23,52% 17,60% 5,92% N/A
2000 12,01% 12,01% 0,00% N/A N/A N/A N/A
1999 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Discount Rates Grupo Iusacell Discount rate 
published in 
annual report 
Vodafone
Mexbold MSCI
 
The main result shows a very significant discrepancy between the discount rates 
calculated independently and the discount rates disclosed by Vodafone. This result 
stands even assuming that the discount rates for the IGU including Grupo Iusacell 
must have ranged at the top of the Vodafone discount rates.167 If one concentrates on 
the years in which Grupo Iusacell was part of the Vodafone Group (2001-2003), it is 
clear that in these years the discrepancies are particularly distinctive. Since Vodafone 
conducted goodwill impairments of its entire interest in Grupo Iusacell in 2002 and 
2003, the findings suggest that discount rates might have provided some opportunity to 
time (delay) the impairments (by influencing their amounts and, therefore, their 
influence on the P&L) rather than impact the impairment decision itself. 
The evidence also suggests that for subsidiaries with financial problems (and, 
therefore, more turbulent share price reactions) the discretionary opportunities 
available to management in the discount rate calculation increase. 
6.5.2.2 Cable & Wireless Plc 
The same parameters which were used for Vodafone and Grupo Iusacell were applied 
in the calculation of the discount rates for C&W: 
                                                 
167
 Since the pre-tax cash flows of the IGUs were not known the pre-tax rates in the independent 
calculation were not calculated in an iterative process but were approximated by using the after-tax 
discount rates. This is also a methodology widely used in practice (see Ernst & Young, 2003, 
p. 1044). Iterative pre-tax rates would have been slightly lower, however, not low enough in order to 
close the gap (4% + for the years 2002-2004) calculated between the independent and the disclosed 
tax rates. 
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Table 6.18: Derivation of beta factors for C&W Plc (Panel A: FTSE 100)168 
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,18 13,39% 251 6,21 yes 1,41 18,31% 51 3,31 yes 1,61 10,16% 12 1,06 no
2 years 1,17 13,18% 505 8,74 yes 1,07 10,95% 103 3,53 yes 1,81 17,69% 24 2,17 yes
3 years 1,14 14,86% 757 11,48 yes 0,46 1,41% 155 1,48 no 1,27 11,41% 35 2,06 yes
5 years 1,39 22,25% 1261 18,98 yes 1,17 11,68% 260 5,84 yes 1,78 22,88% 60 4,15 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,17 13,01% 254 6,14 yes 0,84 6,82% 51 1,89 no 1,67 17,74% 12 1,47 no
2 years 1,14 15,00% 506 9,43 yes 0,35 0,81% 103 0,91 no 1,30 12,04% 23 1,70 no
3 years 1,24 19,42% 757 13,49 yes 0,78 5,39% 155 2,95 yes 1,49 15,83% 35 2,49 yes
5 years 1,39 22,17% 1263 18,95 yes 1,23 13,05% 260 6,22 yes 1,59 19,56% 60 3,76 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,13 15,26% 252 6,71 yes 0,11 0,07% 51 0,19 no 0,93 5,24% 11 0,71 no
2 years 1,25 20,49% 503 11,36 yes 0,71 4,37% 103 2,15 yes 1,11 8,57% 23 1,40 no
3 years 1,42 24,03% 756 15,44 yes 1,14 10,77% 156 4,31 yes 1,56 17,96% 36 2,73 yes
5 years 1,41 25,58% 1261 20,80 yes 1,30 15,92% 260 6,99 yes 1,57 20,52% 60 3,87 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,51 39,19% 250 12,64 yes 1,44 41,80% 51 5,93 yes 2,08 55,75% 11 3,37 yes
2 years 1,79 37,51% 503 17,34 yes 1,86 40,66% 104 8,36 yes 2,64 65,73% 24 6,50 yes
3 years 1,63 31,06% 756 18,43 yes 1,77 34,48% 156 9,00 yes 1,89 32,91% 36 4,08 yes
5 years 1,48 31,25% 1262 23,93 yes 1,53 31,77% 260 10,96 yes 1,68 33,54% 60 5,41 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 2,14 38,50% 252 12,51 yes 2,45 45,06% 52 6,40 yes 3,33 72,64% 12 5,15 yes
2 years 1,71 28,54% 505 14,17 yes 2,00 33,90% 104 7,23 yes 1,80 26,81% 24 2,84 yes
3 years 1,59 31,84% 757 18,78 yes 1,85 34,92% 156 9,09 yes 1,86 31,82% 36 3,98 yes
5 years 1,44 28,67% 1262 22,50 yes 1,51 28,84% 260 10,23 yes 1,55 28,11% 59 4,72 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,28 19,02% 253 7,68 yes 1,50 22,75% 52 3,84 yes 0,63 4,80% 12 0,71 no
2 years 1,37 29,40% 505 14,47 yes 1,55 29,91% 104 6,60 yes 1,25 18,05% 24 2,20 yes
3 years 1,26 26,80% 759 16,65 yes 1,27 24,72% 156 7,11 yes 1,07 17,01% 36 2,64 yes
5 years 1,23 24,95% 1263 20,48 yes 1,21 22,54% 261 8,68 yes 1,02 14,14% 60 3,09 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,43 42,23% 252 13,52 yes 1,67 41,93% 51 5,95 yes 1,95 43,15% 12 2,76 yes
2 years 1,25 33,37% 506 15,89 yes 1,21 28,61% 103 6,36 yes 1,36 30,48% 24 3,11 yes
3 years 1,23 30,94% 757 18,39 yes 1,19 26,71% 155 7,47 yes 1,38 29,18% 35 3,69 yes
5 years 1,25 30,94% 1262 23,76 yes 1,21 28,68% 260 10,19 yes 1,33 29,25% 60 4,90 yes
2003
2002
Reference Index: FTSE 100 Total Return
2005
CABLE & WIRELESS PLC
2004
2000
1999
2001
 
                                                 
168
 The beta factor is determined in a regression of the company stock returns against the returns of a 
representative index returns (reflecting the market portfolio). For further details see section 3.1.3. 
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Table 6.18 (cont’d): Derivation of beta factors for C&W Plc (Panel B: MSCI) 
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,86 9,52% 251 5,12 yes 1,10 20,07% 51 3,51 yes 2,10 31,05% 12 2,12 no
2 years 0,90 8,78% 505 6,96 yes 0,99 14,17% 103 4,08 yes 2,02 26,80% 24 2,84 yes
3 years 0,96 7,91% 757 8,05 yes 0,55 2,39% 155 1,94 no 1,40 15,23% 35 2,43 yes
5 years 1,15 11,90% 1261 13,04 yes 1,04 10,37% 260 5,46 yes 1,62 25,06% 60 4,40 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,92 8,36% 254 4,79 yes 0,86 9,69% 51 2,29 yes 1,78 21,02% 12 1,63 no
2 years 0,98 7,77% 506 6,52 yes 0,45 1,48% 103 1,23 no 1,38 14,72% 23 1,90 no
3 years 1,07 10,44% 757 9,38 yes 0,85 6,98% 155 3,39 yes 1,42 18,34% 35 2,72 yes
5 years 1,14 11,23% 1263 12,63 yes 1,02 9,82% 260 5,30 yes 1,57 24,75% 60 4,37 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,98 7,37% 252 4,46 yes 0,22 0,31% 51 0,39 no 1,05 7,82% 11 0,87 no
2 years 1,10 10,69% 503 7,75 yes 0,79 5,82% 103 2,50 yes 1,10 11,62% 23 1,66 no
3 years 1,21 12,53% 756 10,39 yes 1,00 9,01% 156 3,91 yes 1,39 19,85% 36 2,90 yes
5 years 1,18 12,01% 1079 12,13 yes 1,07 10,98% 230 5,30 yes 1,52 28,36% 60 4,79 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,33 22,48% 250 8,48 yes 1,47 47,29% 51 6,63 yes 1,22 39,69% 11 2,43 yes
2 years 1,43 19,75% 503 11,10 yes 1,56 30,49% 104 6,69 yes 1,73 49,27% 24 4,62 yes
3 years 1,30 15,29% 756 11,67 yes 1,39 22,75% 156 6,73 yes 1,71 39,72% 36 4,73 yes
5 years 1,31 16,07% 837 12,65 yes 1,43 25,60% 190 8,04 yes 1,63 45,23% 60 6,92 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,55 18,67% 252 7,58 yes 1,76 23,72% 52 3,94 yes 2,27 55,42% 12 3,53 yes
2 years 1,29 13,00% 505 8,67 yes 1,36 16,43% 104 4,48 yes 1,89 39,18% 24 3,76 yes
3 years 1,31 13,96% 575 9,64 yes 1,41 19,52% 126 5,48 yes 1,76 45,49% 36 5,33 yes
5 years 1,30 14,07% 597 9,87 yes 1,36 19,78% 149 6,02 yes 1,49 38,20% 59 5,94 yes
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant Raw R² Data t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 0,91 6,55% 253 4,20 yes 0,68 7,22% 52 1,97 no -0,57 26,31% 12 1,89 no
2 years 0,98 10,74% 323 6,21 yes 0,90 13,57% 74 3,36 yes 0,26 3,00% 24 0,83 no
3 years 0,97 10,87% 334 6,36 yes 0,88 13,48% 86 3,62 yes 0,32 4,15% 36 1,21 no
5 years 0,95 10,57% 358 6,49 yes 0,82 11,88% 110 3,82 yes 0,37 4,63% 60 1,68 no
daily weekly monthly
Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant Raw R² Data- t-value Significant
Beta points 95% Beta points 95% Beta points 95%
1 year 1,14 20,02% 70 4,13 yes 1,18 30,81% 21 2,91 yes 0,70 17,96% 12 1,48 no
2 years 1,10 19,51% 81 4,38 yes 1,03 24,47% 33 3,17 yes 0,61 13,75% 24 1,87 no
3 years 1,07 18,93% 92 4,58 yes 1,00 24,31% 44 3,67 yes 0,70 16,08% 35 2,51 yes
5 years 1,05 18,37% 117 5,09 yes 0,91 18,69% 69 3,92 yes 0,74 14,75% 60 3,17 yes
CABLE & WIRELESS PLC
Reference Index: MSCI
2000
1999
2004
2005
2001
2002
2003
 
The beta factors derived for C&W are differing widely depending on the parameter 
constellation chosen for the derivation. The following table provides the key summary: 
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Table 6.19: Summary beta factors C&W 
Max Min Range Max Min Range
2005 1,81 1,07 0,74 2,02 0,86 1,16
2004 1,59 0,78 0,81 1,57 0,85 0,73
2003 1,57 0,71 0,86 1,52 0,79 0,73
2002 2,64 1,44 1,20 1,73 1,30 0,43
2001 2,45 1,44 1,01 1,89 1,29 0,60
2000 1,55 1,02 0,53 0,98 0,82 0,16
1999 1,67 1,19 0,48 1,18 0,70 0,47
FTSE 100 MSCI
Beta Factors Cable & Wireless
 
Thus, based on length of period and intervals, beta factors can differ up to 1.20 in an 
individual year (2002) when using FTSE 100 as a reference index, or up to 1.16 (2005) 
referring to the MSCI. Some trends can be observed based on the findings: beta factors 
referring to the MSCI are generally lower than the ones referring to the FTSE 100 and 
the range of the values is narrower (with the exception of 2005). A trend of higher 
betas in 2002, 2003 and 2005 is observed for both reference indices and shows that the 
parameters of the beta derivation will probably not change the general direction of the 
results but could be used to fine-tune the betas. 
Furthermore, intervalling effect is observed in both MSCI and FTSE 100 betas with 
monthly betas higher than the daily or weekly betas for the period 2001-2005. The 
length of period had also significant impact: for example in 2003 the FTSE 100 weekly 
beta factor based on 2 years of return data was 0.71, while the one based on 5 years of 
data was 1.30. In 2002, the FTSE 100 monthly beta factor based on 2 years of data was 
2.68 and 1.68 based on 5 years. In 2001, for FTSE 100 daily betas 1 year of return data 
yielded 2.14 and 1.44 based on 5 years. Since the betas based on shorter lengths of 
period in 2001 are higher than the ones based on longer periods, it can be deduced that 
2001 was a turbulent year on capital markets. This effect can be traced to 2002 - 2004 
when the betas based on longer periods become higher while the betas based on shorter 
periods decrease gradually. 
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Table: 6.20: Discount Rates C&W Plc
RFR ERP Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax
(daily) WACC weekly WACC monthly WACC
1 year 1,18 11,51% 10,21% 14,18% 1,41 12,90% 11,29% 15,68% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,17 11,48% 10,19% 14,16% 1,07 10,87% 9,72% 13,50% 1,81 15,23% 13,09% 18,18% 8.00%-40.00%
3 years 1,14 11,31% 10,06% 13,97% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,27 12,06% 10,63% 14,77%
5 years 1,39 12,78% 11,20% 15,55% 1,17 11,47% 10,18% 14,14% 1,78 15,04% 12,94% 17,97%
1 year 1,17 11,51% 10,04% 14,09% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,14 11,37% 9,93% 13,93% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10.50 -20.00%
3 years 1,24 11,96% 10,37% 14,56% 0,78 9,26% 8,32% 11,68% 1,49 13,41% 11,47% 16,11%
5 years 1,39 12,80% 11,01% 15,46% 1,23 11,87% 10,31% 14,47% 1,59 14,02% 11,94% 16,76%
1 year 1,13 11,26% 8,78% 12,46% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,25 11,95% 9,25% 13,13% 0,71 8,79% 7,10% 10,08% N/A N/A N/A N/A 14.00%
3 years 1,42 13,00% 9,97% 14,14% 1,14 11,31% 8,81% 12,51% 1,56 13,83% 10,53% 14,94%
5 years 1,41 12,91% 9,90% 14,05% 1,30 12,28% 9,48% 13,45% 1,57 13,86% 10,55% 14,97%
1 year 1,51 14,01% 12,06% 17,41% 1,44 13,59% 11,73% 16,93% 2,08 17,38% 14,76% 21,30%
2 years 1,79 15,65% 13,38% 19,31% 1,86 16,05% 13,70% 19,78% 2,64 20,66% 17,38% 25,09% 11.00%
3 years 1,63 14,73% 12,64% 18,24% 1,77 15,52% 13,27% 19,15% 1,89 16,22% 13,83% 19,96%
5 years 1,48 13,81% 11,91% 17,18% 1,53 14,13% 12,16% 17,55% 1,68 14,99% 12,85% 18,55%
1 year 2,14 17,21% 15,11% 22,06% 2,45 19,07% 16,67% 24,33% 3,33 24,25% 21,02% 30,68%
2 years 1,71 14,70% 13,00% 18,98% 2,00 16,40% 14,43% 21,06% 1,80 15,25% 13,46% 19,65% N/A
3 years 1,59 14,00% 12,41% 18,12% 1,85 15,52% 13,69% 19,99% 1,86 15,57% 13,73% 20,04%
5 years 1,44 13,13% 11,68% 17,05% 1,51 13,55% 12,03% 17,56% 1,55 13,75% 12,21% 17,82%
1 year 1,28 11,90% 8,90% 13,15% 1,50 13,17% 9,62% 14,22% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,37 12,42% 9,19% 13,59% 1,55 13,51% 9,81% 14,50% 1,25 11,73% 8,80% 13,02% N/A
3 years 1,26 11,78% 8,83% 13,06% 1,27 11,83% 8,86% 13,10% 1,07 10,66% 8,20% 12,12%
5 years 1,23 11,61% 8,74% 12,91% 1,21 11,49% 8,67% 12,81% 1,02 10,38% 8,04% 11,89%
1 year 1,43 12,93% 8,98% 13,34% 1,67 14,37% 9,61% 14,27% 1,95 15,99% 10,31% 15,32%
2 years 1,25 11,89% 8,53% 12,67% 1,21 11,66% 8,43% 12,52% 1,36 12,52% 8,80% 13,08% N/A
3 years 1,23 11,76% 8,47% 12,58% 1,19 11,51% 8,36% 12,42% 1,38 12,66% 8,86% 13,17%
5 years 1,25 11,87% 8,52% 12,65% 1,21 11,67% 8,43% 12,52% 1,33 12,33% 8,72% 12,95%
43,64% 56,36%
8,03%
8,80% 32,69%
Reference Index: FTSE 100 Total Return
Disount rate 
published in 
annual report
2005
2004
4,56% 5,90% 77,35%28,01%
2005
CABLE & WIRELESS PLC
Length of 
period for 
beta
Debt 
Ratio
Cost of 
equity
Cost of 
equity
24,07%
22,65%
4,63% 5,90% 7,55% 28,75% 75,93%
5,97% 31,49%
5,90% 7,41% 32,36% 56,45% 43,55%
2003 4,60% 5,90% 67,99% 32,01%4,99% 29,53%
5,90%
5,90%
79,98% 20,02%
16,01%83,99%
6,20% 30,72%
5,90%
2002 5,08%
2001 4,61%
2000
1999
4,35%
4,51%
Panel A
Cost of 
equity
Cost of 
debt
Tax 
rate
Equity 
ratio
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Table: 6.20 (cont'd): Discount Rates C&W Plc
RFR ERP Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax Beta WACC Pre-tax
(daily) WACC weekly WACC monthly WACC
1 year 0,86 9,62% 8,75% 12,15% 1,10 11,07% 9,87% 13,72% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,90 9,89% 8,96% 12,44% 0,99 10,38% 9,34% 12,97% 2,02 16,46% 14,04% 19,50% 8.00%-40.00%
3 years 0,96 10,23% 9,22% 12,81% N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,40 12,80% 11,21% 15,57%
5 years 1,15 11,36% 10,10% 14,03% 1,04 10,69% 9,58% 13,30% 1,62 14,10% 12,22% 16,97%
1 year 0,92 10,08% 8,94% 12,55% 0,86 9,68% 8,64% 12,13% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,98 10,39% 9,19% 12,89% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10.50 -20.00%
3 years 1,07 10,96% 9,62% 13,50% 0,85 9,62% 8,60% 12,07% 1,42 12,99% 11,16% 15,66%
5 years 1,14 11,37% 9,93% 13,93% 1,02 10,64% 9,37% 13,15% 1,57 13,92% 11,86% 16,65%
1 year 0,98 10,38% 8,18% 11,61% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,10 11,06% 8,65% 12,27% 0,79 9,23% 7,40% 10,51% N/A N/A N/A N/A 14.00%
3 years 1,21 11,73% 9,10% 12,91% 1,00 10,51% 8,27% 11,74% 1,39 12,80% 9,83% 13,95%
5 years 1,18 11,58% 9,00% 12,77% 1,07 10,90% 8,53% 12,11% 1,52 13,55% 10,34% 14,67%
1 year 1,33 12,90% 11,18% 16,14% 1,47 13,77% 11,88% 17,14% 1,22 12,26% 10,67% 15,39%
2 years 1,43 13,52% 11,68% 16,85% 1,56 14,28% 12,28% 17,72% 1,73 15,28% 13,08% 18,88% 11.00%
3 years 1,30 12,73% 11,04% 15,94% 1,39 13,27% 11,48% 16,57% 1,71 15,15% 12,98% 18,73%
5 years 1,31 12,83% 11,12% 16,05% 1,43 13,52% 11,68% 16,85% 1,63 14,70% 12,62% 18,22%
1 year 1,55 13,78% 12,23% 17,85% 1,76 14,98% 13,23% 19,32% 2,27 18,01% 15,78% 23,03%
2 years 1,29 12,22% 10,92% 15,93% 1,36 12,61% 11,25% 16,42% 1,89 15,75% 13,89% 20,27% N/A
3 years 1,31 12,33% 11,02% 16,08% 1,41 12,94% 11,52% 16,82% 1,76 15,02% 13,27% 19,38%
5 years 1,30 12,28% 10,97% 16,01% 1,36 12,64% 11,27% 16,46% 1,49 13,38% 11,89% 17,36%
1 year 0,91 9,72% 7,67% 11,34% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 0,98 10,12% 7,89% 11,67% 0,90 9,66% 7,63% 11,29% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 0,97 10,09% 7,88% 11,65% 0,88 9,54% 7,57% 11,19% N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 years 0,95 9,97% 7,81% 11,54% 0,82 9,16% 7,35% 10,87% N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 year 1,14 11,22% 8,24% 12,23% 1,18 11,45% 8,33% 12,38% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 years 1,10 10,97% 8,12% 12,07% 1,03 10,58% 7,95% 11,81% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 years 1,07 10,81% 8,06% 11,97% 1,00 10,43% 7,89% 11,72% 0,70 8,67% 7,12% 10,58%
5 years 1,05 10,73% 8,02% 11,92% 0,91 9,90% 7,66% 11,38% 0,74 8,90% 7,22% 10,73%
1999
2003
2002
2001
2005
2004
Cost of 
equity
Cost of 
debt
Tax rateLength of 
period for 
beta
2005
CABLE & WIRELESS PLC
Reference Index: MSCI
2000
4,56% 5,90% 8,03% 28,01% 77,35% 22,65%
4,63% 5,90% 7,55% 28,75% 75,93% 24,07%
4,60% 5,90% 4,99% 29,53%
5,97% 31,49%
67,99% 32,01%
6,20% 30,72% 79,98% 20,02%
83,99% 16,01%
4,35% 5,90% 7,41% 32,36% 56,45% 43,55%
4,61% 5,90%
4,51% 5,90% 8,80% 32,69% 43,64% 56,36%
Disount rate 
published in 
annual report
5,08% 5,90%
Panel B
Equity 
ratio
Debt 
Ratio
Cost of 
equity
Cost of 
equity
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The range of the pre-tax discount rates depending on the reference index is 
summarised in the following table: 
Table 6.21: Summary discount rates C&W 
Max Min Range Max Min Range
2005 18,18% 13,50% 4,68% 19,50% 12,15% 7,35% 8.00%-40.00%
2004 16,76% 11,68% 5,08% 16,65% 12,07% 4,58% 10.50 -20.00%
2003 14,97% 10,08% 4,89% 14,67% 10,51% 4,17% 14.00%
2002 25,09% 16,93% 8,16% 18,88% 15,94% 2,94% 11.00%
2001 24,33% 17,05% 7,28% 20,27% 15,93% 4,34% N/A
2000 14,50% 11,89% 2,61% 11,67% 10,87% 0,80% N/A
1999 14,27% 12,42% 1,85% 12,38% 10,58% 1,80% N/A
Discount Rates Cable & Wireless
FTSE 100 MSCI
Disount rate 
published in 
annual report
 
In the case of C&W the independently calculated discount rates uncover different 
trends than for Vodafone. In years 2003 - 2005 the discount rates are similar for both 
reference indices. In 2001 and 2002, however, the FTSE 100 based discount rates are a 
lot higher than the MSCI ones (in this aspect the discount rates for C&W react 
similarly to the Vodafone ones). Moreover, while the range of the FTSE 100 discount 
rates in these years also increases compared to years 2003-2005, the range of the MSCI 
rates decreases. In fact, the range of the MSCI rates is highest in 2005 when it is 
almost twice as wide as for the FTSE 100 rates, thus providing more room for 
discretion (the opposite is true in 2001 and 2002).  
The findings can only be compared to rates disclosed by C&W in years 2002 to 2005, 
since no information on discount rates was provided by the Group in years when there 
was no goodwill impairment (with the exception of 2005). Opposite to the results for 
Vodafone and Grupo Iusacell, the evidence for C&W suggests that in 2005, 2004 and, 
to some extent 2003, the independently calculated discount rates have a similar value 
range as the rates reported by the Group. In 2004, C&W has reported discount rates for 
impairment purposes between 10.5 and 20%; the rates calculated on the basis of 
publicly available information are between 11.68% and 16.76% (FTSE 100) and 
between 12.07% and 16.65% (MSCI). The fact that the ranges for both indices are 
narrower than the range of the discount rates C&W used could be explained by looking 
at the definitions of the discount rates: while C&W disclosed rates which have been 
used in the calculations of values in use for the different IGUs, the independently 
calculated discount rates are calculated for the whole company and should per 
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definition represent the weighted average of the discount rates for the IGUs. Since no 
information is available either on the exact IGUs of the company or the specific 
discount rates used in the goodwill impairment calculation an exact comparison is not 
possible. Nevertheless, a rough match is feasible and the deduction can be made that 
the range of the independently calculated discount rates ‘fits’ into the range of the 
disclosed ones.  
For 2003 a more precise statement can be made. C&W has disclosed only one discount 
rate (14.0%) for this year which is stated to be ‘the estimated weighted average cost of 
capital for Cable & Wireless’ (C&W Annual Report 2003, p. 42) and which can be 
directly compared to the independently calculated discount rates. While the disclosed 
discount rate does match the upper end of the range calculated in the investigation 
(14.97% for FTSE 100 and 14.67% for MSCI) the findings illustrate how much room 
for discretion managers had in this year. The evidence for 2003 is, however, best 
interpreted in combination with the findings for 2002. In 2002, a very significant 
discrepancy is observed between the independently calculated and the disclosed 
discount rates. While the minimum rates calculated were 16.93% (FTSE 100) and 
15.94% (MSCI) C&W had disclosed a discount rate which is significantly lower 
(11.0%). Since 2002 and 2003 were the years during which the Group had large 
portions of goodwill written-off (in 2004 the impairment amount was negligible 
compared to 2002 and 2003 as substantially all goodwill had been written off by the 
end of 2003, see C&W Annual Report 2004, p. 28) the use of discount rates which 
were lower than the ones deduced based on capital market data in one year and the 
discount rates which were at the top end of the independently calculated ones in the 
following year suggests income smoothing by spreading the impairment write-off over 
two years.. 
6.5.2.3 Managerial discretion in the denominator: Conclusion 
The analysis in the previous sections illustrates the opportunities for managerial 
discretion in the impairment calculation by concentrating on discount rate effects in the 
denominator of the value in use formula. 
The findings provide insights into the discretionary potential of discount rates by 
altering specific parameters used in the derivation of the beta factors.  
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For Vodafone and Grupo Iusacell the calculated discount rates are significantly higher 
than the ones disclosed by the Group in almost all cases. The findings, therefore, 
suggest that managers might have used additional discretionary parameters to adjust 
the discount rates to their needs. The evidence on C&W shows that the disclosed and 
the calculated discount rates move in a similar range for 2005 and 2004. However, the 
findings for 2002 and 2003 suggest that managers might have used discount rates to 
avoid burdening earnings in years of financial and economic turbulence. 
Overall, the results lead to one material conclusion. The disclosures required on 
discount rates for goodwill impairment are not informative and do not support the 
understanding of financial statements regarding goodwill impairment. The above 
investigation has shown that despite the fact that discount rates were disclosed by both 
companies according to the requirements of FRS 11 the goodwill impairment decisions 
and amounts are still not transparent. In order to understand better the goodwill 
impairment process and to increase the transparency of financial statements, more 
precise information regarding the parameters of the discount rate calculation is needed, 
in particular the parameters of the derivation of the beta factor. 
Additionally, the findings show clearly that even by using parameters which are 
commonly applied in practice and argued for in the literature managers still have a 
myriad of opportunities to ‘customise’ discount rates and, through them, goodwill 
impairment. This is a very worrying result, considering the aim of regulators that 
impairment (under IFRS, US GAAP) should reduce the noise and the lack of accuracy 
created by amortisation. 
6.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study concentrates on several aspects of the goodwill impairment process and its 
underlying causes. It addresses gaps in existing literature by investigating two drivers 
of economic performance (competition and industry regulation) and discussing their 
effect on goodwill impairment. Additionally, it illustrates the extent of potential for 
managerial opportunism and the quality of impairment disclosures by analysing 
(disclosed) impairment assumptions and discount rates used for the impairment 
calculation. 
The study contributes to academic research on goodwill impairment in several ways. 
First, it is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and is 
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presented in the form of case studies. This technique allows an individualised analysis 
of the research questions and aims to provide ideas for future research in the area of 
goodwill impairment. Second, it addresses variables which have not been investigated 
in previous studies on goodwill impairment (such as the drivers of economic 
performance measures, or the beta factor derivation). Third, the investigation is 
conducted within the accounting framework of UK GAAP which allows both 
impairment and amortisation unlike other GAAP discussed in previous research. 
Finally, the companies investigated in the study are UK companies representing a 
different sample from the data used in prior research. 
The main results show a strong indication that industrial regulation – by means of 
market liberalisation and increased competition, or price reductions – is more than 
likely to have an effect on goodwill impairment. These results imply that the actions of 
regulators not only have a direct effect on company profits (due to smaller revenues as 
a result of regulation) but also an indirect effect (due to their impact on the impairment 
charge as well as on the value of goodwill on the balance sheet). Therefore, presence 
of strong regulation in a company’s sector may provide an early indicator of potential 
for goodwill impairment and could be a useful screening mechanism for users (for 
example investors) and others (for example auditors, accounting regulators) who want 
to focus on sectors likely to suffer impairments. 
As regards the investigation of managerial incentives as a cause for goodwill 
impairment, the main results illustrate that the discount rate alone provides numerous 
opportunities for manipulation of the impairment charge. While various parameters 
commonly used in practice were varied in the calculation of the discount rate, the 
independently determined discount rates were still mostly higher than the rates 
disclosed by the companies. Additionally, for subsidiaries experiencing financial 
troubles, the room for managerial discretion in the discount rates may increase even 
further. 
Finally, impairment disclosures were explored in order to further analyse the 
impairment assumptions. The main result shows very poor quality of impairment 
disclosures including mostly general statements about the impairment assumptions and 
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very few quantitative numbers. This might be due partly to non-compliance with FRS 
11, or, to inadequate disclosure requirements of the standard.170 
The evidence in this study points to several issues which might be interesting for future 
research. As regards the drivers of economic performance and their impact on goodwill 
impairment, this study represents a preliminary investigation. In this context future 
research could concentrate on the quantification of both variables investigated here and 
on quantitative research of their relationship to goodwill impairment. Additionally, 
further drivers of economic performance could be added to the investigation with the 
ultimate aim to increase understanding and the transparency of the goodwill 
impairment process. Furthermore, the results of the two case studies in this preliminary 
investigation cannot be generalised until tested using larger cross-sector samples. 
The topic of discount rate calculation and disclosures also remains open to discussion 
as IFRS regulations referring to the goodwill impairment calculation are similar to the 
ones required under FRS 11. Therefore, possible paths for future research in this area 
include a large frame investigation including more companies (in different countries) 
and testing whether the discretionary potential illustrated here is a common 
phenomenon. Additionally, studies could concentrate on the interface of valuation 
standards (specific to a country171) and accounting standards to deduce standardised 
methods for deriving beta factors for impairment purposes aiming to reduce 
discretionary behaviour of management. 
                                                 
170This compliance issue, however, is not included in the scope of this thesis and is, therefore, not 
pursued further. 
171
  For example, the IACVA valuation standards or the valuation standards of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer, IDW) in Germany. 
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Summary Key Financial Information Vodafone
£ 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Group turnover (mln) 33,133 33,559 30,375 22,845 15,004 7,873 3,360
Profit/loss for FY (mln) -7,54 -9,015 -9,819 -16,155 -9,885 542 637
Equity shareholders’ funds (mln) 99,317 111,924 128,630 130,540 144,979 140,589 815
Net assets (mln) 102,135 114,931 131,493 133,395 147,400 142,109 924
Total assets (mln) 133,906 147,129 163,239 162,867 172,362 153,541 3,644
Net cash inflow from operating activities (mln) 12,713 12,317 11,142 8,102 4,587 2,510 1,045
Net cash outflow for capex and fin. investment -4,768 -4,267 -5,359 -4,441 -18,988 -752 -688
Company share price at FYE 140.5p 128.75p 113p 129.75p 193p 348.5p 1,151p
Earnings/loss per share (diluted) -11.39p -13.24p -14.41p -23.77p -16.09p 1.98p 20.52p
Weighted average nr shares (diluted) (mln) 66,196 68,096 68,155 67,961 61,439 27,360 3,102
Cash dividends per share 4.07p 2.03p 1.69p 1.47p 1.40p 1.34p 6.36p
Net book value goodwill (mln) 68,673 78,780 92,833 91,695 94,797 21,511 173
% goodwill of total assets 51.3% 53.5% 56.9% 56.3% 55.0% 14.0% 4.7%
Summary Key Financial Information Cable & Wireless
£ 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Group turnover (mln) 3,222 3,671 4,391 5,911 8,099 9,201 7,944
Profit/loss for FY (mln) 302 -237 -6,533 -5,123 2,632 3,724 908
Equity shareholders’ funds (mln) 1,818 1,744 2,149 9,024 15,380 8,096 4,571
Net assets (mln) 2,137 1,993 2,520 9,423 16,511 11,125 7,997
Total assets (mln) 5,000 4,967 7,362 16,308 23,853 21,528 17,487
Net cash inflow from operating activities (mln) 346 73 95 119 1,348 2,236 2,602
Net cash outflow for capex and fin. investment -268 -41 -215 -1,699 -4,125 -1,702 -1,936
Company share price at FYE 129.25p 129.75p 69p 223.75p 475p 1,178p 774p
Earnings/loss per share (diluted) 12.3p -10.2p -280.4p -187.4p 95.4p 150.9p 37.5p
Weighted average nr shares (diluted) (mln) 2,528 2,328 2,336 2,735 2,761 2,470 2,434
Cash dividends per share 3.8p 3.15p 1.6p 16.5p 16.5p 15.0p 13.5p
Net book value goodwill (mln) 88 0 10 2,896 4,903 1,762 1,150
% goodwill of total assets 1.8% 0.0% 0.1% 17.8% 20.6% 8.2% 6.6%
Sources: Annual reports, Bloomberg, Group Websites
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Table 6.23: Development of goodwill during the investigation period (1999-2005) 
for Vodafone Plc 
Cost £ m Change in goodwill £ m Net book v £ m
01. Apr 98 --- 01. Apr 98 ---
Exchange movements 10 Exchange movements 0
Acquisitions 171 Amortisation charge 8
Additions -
31-Mar-99 181 31-Mar-99 8 31-Mar-99 173
31-Mar-98 ---
01. Apr 99 181 01. Apr 99 8
Exchange movements -431 Exchange movements 4
Acquisitions 22,447 Amortisation charge 674
Additions -
31-Mar-00 22,197 31-Mar-00 686 31-Mar-00 21,511
31-Mar-99 173
01. Apr 00 22,197 01. Apr 00 686
Exchange movements 2,561 Exchange movements 11
Acquisitions 87,185 Amortisation charge 9,585
Additions -
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings 11,49
Disposals -18,963 Disposals -609
31-Mar-01 104,470 31-Mar-01 9,673 31-Mar-01 94,797
31-Mar-00 21,511
01. Apr 01 104,482 01. Apr 01 9,671
Exchange movements -2,047 Exchange movements -54
Acquisitions 4,938 Amortisation charge 10,962
Additions - Impairment charge 4,353
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings 9,254
31-Mar-02 116,627 31-Mar-02 24,932 31-Mar-02 91,695
31-Mar-01 94,811
01. Apr 02 116,627 01. Apr 02 24,932
Exchange movements 13,534 Exchange movements 3,811
Acquisitions 3,290 Amortisation charge 11,875
Additions -
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings -
Reclassifications from 
associated 
undertakings -
31-Mar-03 133,451 31-Mar-03 40,618 31-Mar-03 92,833
31-Mar-02 91,695
01. Apr 03 133,451 01. Apr 03 40,618
Exchange movements -4,101 Exchange movements -1,709
Acquisitions 1,434 Amortisation charge 13,095
Additions -
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings -
Disposals -407 Disposals -407
31-Mar-04 130,377 31-Mar-04 51,597 31-Mar-04 78,780
31-Mar-03 92,833
01. Apr 04 130,377 01. Apr 04 51,597
Exchange movements 2,737 Exchange movements 1,323
Acquisitions 1,757 Amortisation charge 12,929
Additions - Impairment charge 315
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings -
Disposals -52 Disposals -18
31-Mar-05 134,819 31-Mar-05 66,146 31-Mar-05 68,673
31-Mar-04 78,780
VODAFONE GROUP PLC
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Table 6.24: Development of goodwill during the investigation period (1999-2005) 
for C&W Plc 
Cost £ m Change in goodwill £ m Net book v £ m
01. Apr 98 --- 01. Apr 98 ---
Exchange movements 25 Exchange movements 2
Acquisitions Amortisation charge 61
Additions 1,188
31-Mar-99 1,213 31-Mar-99 63 31-Mar-99 1,150
31-Mar-98 ---
01. Apr 99 1,213 01. Apr 99 63
Exchange movements 51 Exchange movements 5
Acquisitions Amortisation charge 180
Additions 746
31-Mar-00 2,010 31-Mar-00 248 31-Mar-00 1,762
31-Mar-99 1,150
01. Apr 00 2,010 01. Apr 00 248
Exchange movements 122 Exchange movements 26
Acquisitions Amortisation charge 469
Additions 3,626
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings
Disposals -125 Disposals -13
31-Mar-01 5,633 31-Mar-01 730 31-Mar-01 4,903
31-Mar-00 1,762
01. Apr 01 5,633 01. Apr 01 730
Exchange movements Exchange movements -3
Acquisitions Amortisation charge 562
Additions 631 Impairment charge 2,007
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings -12
Disposals -66 Disposals -6
31-Mar-02 6,186 31-Mar-02 3,290 31-Mar-02 2,896
31-Mar-01 4,903
01. Apr 02 6,186 01. Apr 02 3,290
Exchange movements -55 Exchange movements -8
Acquisitions Amortisation charge 128
Additions 10 Impairment charge 2,721
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings
Reclassifications from 
associated 
undertakings
31-Mar-03 6,141 31-Mar-03 6,131 31-Mar-03 10
31-Mar-02 2,896
01. Apr 03 6,141 01. Apr 03 6,131
Exchange movements Exchange movements
Acquisitions Amortisation charge
Additions Impairment charge 10
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings
Disposals -2,252 Disposals 2,252
31-Mar-04 3,889 31-Mar-04 3,889 31-Mar-04 0
31-Mar-03 10
01. Apr 04 3,889 01. Apr 04 3,889
Exchange movements 4 Exchange movements
Acquisitions Amortisation charge 7
Additions 91
Reclassifications from 
associated undertakings
Disposals -276 Disposals 276
31-Mar-05 3,708 31-Mar-05 3,620 31-Mar-05 88
31-Mar-04 0
CABLE & WIRELESS PLC
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Goodwill has figured prominently in accounting research and practitioners’ 
discussions for a very long period. Early publications on goodwill and its 
characteristics date as far back as the beginning of last century (for example Kemper, 
1921). This considerable interest on both the academic and the practitioner side has 
been essentially prompted by the flexible nature of goodwill. Its intangible 
characteristics combined with the loopholes available in goodwill accounting provide 
numerous opportunities for discretionary managerial activities which have a significant 
role in the politics of financial statements. Additionally, goodwill amounts on the 
balance sheet are regularly so large that any changes are bound to have a significant 
impact on net income and on the balance sheet, and, therefore, on essential information 
communicated to financial statements’ users. Finally, since goodwill represents a 
residual amount of the purchase price which cannot be allocated to specific assets, the 
lack of transparency stemming from its definition has represented a challenge to 
standard setters, academics and financial statements’ users for many years now. It is in 
particular this challenge that has driven academic research in this area in its attempt to 
understand better the causes and the mechanism of goodwill and its write-downs and it 
is this challenge that motivates this thesis as a whole. 
7.1 SUMMARY OF THESIS RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis focuses on selected aspects of the goodwill impairment process. While 
previous research172  has clarified many of the underlying characteristics of goodwill 
and goodwill impairment, there are still questions which have yet to be answered, in 
particular, when facing the rapidly changing regulatory environment where goodwill is 
concerned.173 
The overall purpose of this thesis is threefold. First, it aims to add new information to 
existing research in order to increase the understanding of the goodwill impairment 
process, its causes and impact. Second, it explores questions of goodwill impairment 
under the UK GAAP framework which allows both amortisation and impairment. This 
accounting regime provides a regulatory environment under which management’s 
impairment decisions may differ from those under more restrictive regulations where 
                                                 
172
  For details on previous academic research see chapter 2. 
173
  Goodwill accounting regulations as well as the accounting history of goodwill are discussed in 
section 2.1. 
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only the impairment approach is allowed. Finally, it provides impulses for future 
research based on the exploratory study on goodwill impairment (chapter 6). 
This thesis includes three empirical essays on the impact and causes of goodwill 
impairment which focus on the following topics: the importance of goodwill write-
downs in the credit rating decision making process, managerial choices in goodwill 
accounting in the UK, and the drivers of economic performance factors leading to 
goodwill impairment as well as the room for managerial discretion in goodwill 
impairment provided by discount rates in the impairment calculation. The main results 
of the studies are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
The research questions are organised to explore goodwill impairment starting at the 
‘visible’ side of the impairment process, i.e. its impact (chapter 4), and moving on to 
explore the underlying causes of goodwill impairment (chapter 5) as well as the drivers 
of these causes and the possible sources of impairment manipulation (chapter 6). 
The focus of the first empirical essay lies on the impact of goodwill write-downs in the 
rating decision making process. While there is little information on the way goodwill 
write-downs are considered by rating agencies, it is common knowledge that the 
quantitative part of the rating analysis relies heavily on accounting information from 
the company financial statements. Prior research shows that goodwill write-downs 
may provide signals about the financial welfare of the company or the quality of 
management. Therefore, they might be incorporated at least to some extent in the 
rating decision making process. UK GAAP allows the application of different 
accounting treatments for goodwill, each of which might lead to a differing perception 
by rating agencies. Therefore, the study investigates whether and how goodwill and 
goodwill write-downs are taken into consideration in the rating decision making 
process. The investigation uses an ex post accounting predictive model based on key 
financial ratios to simulate the rating calculation. Results suggest that rating agencies 
ignore both goodwill as an asset and goodwill write-downs (amortisation or 
impairment) for purposes of the rating calculation. These findings are consistent with 
the largely preferred treatment of goodwill prior to the introduction of FRS 10 and 11 
in the UK (immediate write-off against equity), and with the aim of rating agencies to 
achieve long-term stability in the rating assessment. 
The second study is motivated by the UK regulatory framework for goodwill 
accounting available until 2005 for listed companies and presently for not listed 
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companies in the UK. As current UK GAAP regulations allow the simultaneous (or 
alternating) application of both amortisation and impairment treatments the room for 
managerial discretion in this area is material. In this context uncovering the underlying 
causes of goodwill impairment charges becomes essential. Therefore, the study 
investigates the motivation behind goodwill impairment losses undertaken additionally 
to the regular amortisation charge. The main results show that while the decision 
whether to impair goodwill or not may depend on the financial performance of the 
company, the decision about the amount of the impairment write-down seems to be 
based on reporting incentives, most notably income smoothing. The findings lead to 
the conclusion that while impairment does reflect the company situation to a certain 
extent, managers use their discretion to bias decisions to their advantage. Additionally, 
the presence of goodwill impairments in previous years is also likely to influence the 
decision to impair goodwill, however, not the amount of the write-down. This result is 
consistent with the relation between economic factors and the decision to impair 
goodwill as phases of financial distress are often known to stretch over several 
reporting periods. For further interpretation the findings of chapter 5 are considered in 
combination with the findings of chapter 4. The results show that on the one hand 
managerial discretion is not entirely eliminated by the use of goodwill impairment and 
there are still regulatory gaps providing management with the opportunity to adjust 
financial statements to its taste. In this sense the findings suggest that while standard 
setters have improved the content and transparency of financial statements (as regards 
goodwill impairment) to some extent, the goal of limiting management discretion is 
still yet to be achieved. On the other hand, goodwill impairment does seem to provide 
genuine signals about the financial welfare of the company as managers are at least 
likely to base their decision to impair goodwill on economic factors. This, however, 
implies that raters are not correct to exclude goodwill and its write-downs entirely 
from the credit rating assessment, as results of chapter 4 indicate, and might be 
omitting material information from their calculations.174 
The third empirical study of this thesis, which adopts a case study methodology, 
extends research where the two previous essays, and indeed most other purely 
quantitative studies, leave off. While the investigation of the causes of goodwill 
impairment in chapter 5 is based on the use of certain measures of financial 
performance of the company and of managerial discretionary behaviour, chapter 6 
                                                 
174
  Of course, rating agencies might be incorporating goodwill impairments in a different way than 
modelled in chapter 4 (see section 7.2.2). 
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aims to investigate in greater depth what lies behind the numbers. It asks the ‘Why’ 
and the ‘How’ questions of goodwill impairment. In doing this, two of the drivers of 
the economic performance of the company, competition and industrial regulation, and 
their connection to goodwill impairment are investigated. In addition, the discount 
rates used in the impairment calculation are explored as a possible source of 
managerial discretion. Finally, the quality of impairment disclosures is evaluated by 
comparing independently calculated discount rates based on publicly available data 
with the discount rates disclosed by companies. This research is exploratory in nature 
and takes the form of case studies of two companies selected from the general data 
sample used for the other studies in this thesis. The results lead to the following 
conclusions. As regards the investigation of the relationship between competition and 
industrial regulation and goodwill impairment the findings suggest that the impairment 
charge is likely to be at least partially influenced by industrial regulation – whether by 
means of market liberalisation and, consequently, increased competition, or, by means 
of price caps. The findings imply that the actions of regulators not only have direct 
effect on company profits (due to smaller revenues as a result of regulation) but also an 
indirect effect on company profits (due to impact on the impairment charge) as well as 
on the value of goodwill on the balance sheet. As a result, the presence of regulation 
and/or strong competition are likely to provide financial statements users, auditors and 
accounting regulators useful early warning indicators of the likelihood of goodwill 
impairment. 
As regards the investigation of the discount rates used in the impairment calculation, 
the main results suggest that the discount rate calculations provide numerous 
opportunities for managerial discretion. By testing various parameter constellations 
commonly used in practice the investigation illustrates significant differences in the 
values of possible discount rates. Such differences could have an effect on the presence 
or absence of a goodwill impairment charge and on its amount. More specifically, the 
independently calculated discount rates were mostly higher than the rates disclosed by 
the companies. For subsidiaries experiencing significant financial difficulties these 
discrepancies were even more pronounced. The results show that the wide range of 
potential discount rate values can be used to justify virtually any impairment charge 
desired by management.  
The analysis of impairment disclosures shows the poor quality of the disclosures and 
lack of transparency. Thus, the disclosed information is often insufficient to enable 
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users to make an informed evaluation of the plausibility of the values used (for 
example in the case of discount rates, or growth rates for cash flow forecasts). 
7.2 CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING RESEARCH, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
7.2.1 Contributions to Existing Research 
The first essay in this thesis concentrates on the role of goodwill write-downs in the 
rating decision process (chapter 4) and extends previous research which has primarily 
concentrated on shareholder reactions to goodwill impairment. The study focuses on 
the debt market, thus aiming to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
goodwill perception by sources external to the company. Additionally, the 
investigation uses an accounting predictive model (on an ex post basis) which is also a 
new approach to goodwill accounting research.  
The second essay (chapter 5) contributes to existing literature by elaborating on several 
aspects which are new to goodwill accounting research. First, the investigation of the 
managerial motivation for goodwill impairment differentiates between the decision to 
impair goodwill (the ‘If’ question) and the decision about the goodwill impairment 
amount (the ‘How Much’ questions). Additionally, the UK GAAP framework allowing 
both impairment and amortisation provides an interesting regulatory environment for 
goodwill research. Prior studies had mainly concentrated on US GAAP which 
regulates goodwill write-downs in a more rigid manner. Thus, goodwill accounting 
under UK GAAP offers the possibility to increase understanding of goodwill and to 
uncover new aspects of its structure. Finally, the investigation is based on a UK sample 
and thus differs from previous research on impairment which has covered mostly US 
companies. Furthermore, while prior studies mainly explore asset write-downs or 
goodwill write-downs under the transitional requirements of a new standard, chapter 5 
focuses on goodwill impairment losses which are not motivated by the implementation 
of new accounting regulations. 
The third essay in chapter 6 contributes to existing literature on goodwill impairment 
in the following ways. First, the study is exploratory by nature and uses qualitative 
research methodology (case study approach) which is new to goodwill impairment 
research and allows a more in-depth investigation of the research questions than purely 
quantitative methods. Additionally, the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
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techniques in the discount rate investigation allows the illustration of opportunities for 
managerial manipulation of the discount rate and, through it, goodwill impairment. 
Second, chapter 6 extends prior research by concentrating on the drivers of economic 
performance rather than on the outcomes which are mostly in the focus of interest of 
other studies on goodwill impairment. In this context the study searches for new 
aspects of the goodwill impairment process and aims to raise new questions for future 
research. Finally, chapter 6 investigates the impairment calculation to search for 
sources of managerial discretion. By exploring discount rates the study aims to show 
the room for manipulation available to management due to the lack of definition and 
detail in relevant regulations.  
7.2.2 Limitations 
This thesis concentrates on selected aspects of goodwill impairment under UK GAAP. 
Considering the significant amount of research which has been done in this area as 
well as the numerous questions left to answer, it does not presume to explore all 
aspects relevant to or variables potentially influencing goodwill impairment. In 
particular, the exploratory study in chapter 6 is a preliminary study, concentrating on 
specific issues of the goodwill impairment process (industrial regulation, competition 
and discount rates) while excluding from its scope other variables which could be 
equally or even more relevant for the goodwill impairment process. Due to number of 
possible variables which can still be investigated in relation to goodwill impairment 
these are topics which would exceed the scope of this thesis and are left for future 
research. 
The main limitation of the thesis is that the investigated sample is relatively small. 
Thus, although the overall sample for all three studies includes 97 companies, in the 
credit rating study in chapter 4 the sample is based on 46 companies due to the small 
number of rated companies with goodwill impairment.175 Therefore, the model used in 
chapter 4 could be tested on a larger sample in order to generalise and confirm the 
findings of the study.  
The studies in this thesis use accounting information provided in audited financial 
statements. While these statements are of course only a representation of economic 
reality, it is often argued that they do faithfully reflect the firm’s economic activities 
                                                 
175
  The sample of 97 companies is, in fact, the full population of FTSE 350 companies with an 
impairment charge during the investigation period. 
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and environment of the respective companies in the sense of the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 2 (SFAC 2) of the FASB: 
‘An analogy with cartography has been used to convey some of the characteristics of financial 
reporting, and it may be useful here. A map represents the geographical features of the mapped 
area by using symbols bearing no resemblance to the actual countryside, yet they communicate 
a great deal of information about it. The captions and numbers in financial statements present a 
"picture" of a business enterprise and many of its external and internal relationships more 
rigorously—more informatively, in fact—than a simple description of it. There are, admittedly, 
important differences between geography and economic activity and, therefore, between maps 
and financial statements. But the similarities may, nevertheless, be illuminating.’ (SFAC 2, 
para. 24) 
Based on the results of all three studies, however, the usefulness of this map could be 
questioned and the quality of the cartographers explored in situations where this 
assumption is relaxed or waived entirely. 
Additionally, although several alternatives to the methodology used in the different 
chapters were considered before the researcher settled on the specific approach which 
was applied, it is possible that a change in methodology could have led to different 
results or insight into goodwill impairment. Thus, all research questions could benefit 
from an investigation based, for example, on interviewing techniques, or 
questionnaires. Such change of methodology would, however, require access to rating 
agencies which is currently restricted (see pp. 85 and 116). Additionally, the sensitivity 
of the topic of managerial opportunism, or indeed manipulation, would provide 
significant challenges to such a methodological approach. Finally, in particular where 
the first part of chapter 6 is concerned, the document analysis could be extended by 
adding further sources of information which are external to the firm such as for 
example media sources such as newspapers or other publications discussing goodwill 
impairment. 
The results of the credit rating study in chapter 4 are limited to annual rating 
assessments. It is possible that goodwill and goodwill impairment are taken into 
account by rating agencies separately from these annual analyses. For example, a 
goodwill impairment charge might lead to a placement on the credit watchlist or 
provoke an event-driven rating analysis possibly leading to a downgrade of the rating. 
Furthermore, the model used in chapter 4 may be different from the models used by 
rating agencies in their assessment process and may, therefore, not reflect accurately 
all factors taken into consideration in the rating evaluation of a company. 
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The sample used for the study in chapter 5 included the original sample of 97 
companies. These, however, did not all have a goodwill impairment charge in each 
year of the investigation period. Therefore, the ‘How Much’ revisited question in 
chapter 5 was tested for samples including between 16 and 56 companies (only the 
companies which had impairment charges in the relevant year).176 Additionally, the 
model used in the investigation may not include all variables impacting the goodwill 
impairment loss. This is a limitation which chapter 6 seeks to, at least partially, 
neutralize. Moreover, although tested in prior research, it is possible that the proxies 
used to reflect economic phenomena or managerial behaviour fail to capture the 
essence of these phenomena.  
Finally, the exploratory study in chapter 6 concentrates on two companies in order to 
provide the opportunity for extensive document research and the basis for the discount 
rate investigation. While the small number of companies investigated limits the 
generalisations that can be made, the aim of such case study research is to raise 
questions and suggest new directions for future research rather than provide conclusive 
statements valid for large data samples. 
7.2.3 Future Research 
The thesis provides several ideas for future research on goodwill impairment. In 
particular, chapter 6 – as is typical for exploratory studies – raises more questions than 
it answers.  
The results of all chapters were tested on UK companies using the UK GAAP 
framework. In order to update the findings and test the usefulness of the new IFRS 
regulations the research questions could also be tested on other (geographical) samples 
within the IFRS framework. 
The credit rating investigation could be extended by including not only annual credit 
ratings of the companies but also placements on the credit watchlist, event-driven 
ratings and also ratings by agencies other than S&P. 
Chapter 5 raises some questions concerning the so-called ‘border years’ of the 
investigation (1999 and 2005). None of the results valid for the core of the 
investigation period were relevant for these years, suggesting that there might be other 
                                                 
176
  The ‘If’ and the ‘How Much’ questions were tested
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factors influencing goodwill impairment when a regulatory change is imminent (1999 
was the first year after the introduction of FRS 11 and 2005 – the first year of the 
mandatory application of IAS 36 for listed EU-companies). Therefore, future research 
might look into differing models reflecting the reality of regulatory changes. 
Chapter 6 raises numerous questions for future investigations of goodwill impairment. 
These can be grouped into four categories. First, research on the drivers of economic 
performance can be extended to explore further variables which could be relevant for 
goodwill impairment as well as by testing the validity of the findings for larger 
samples in different accounting and geographical settings. Additionally, the 
methodology for such research can also be extended to include further document 
sources such as newspaper articles or other publications, or other research techniques 
such as interviews or questionnaires. Second, the investigation of the discount rates 
used in the goodwill impairment calculation provides various impulses for future 
research. Possible research paths in this area include a large frame investigation 
including more companies (in different countries) and testing whether the discretionary 
potential illustrated in chapter 6 is a common phenomenon. Third, studies could 
concentrate on valuation standards to evaluate whether the specification of 
standardised methods for deriving input variables in valuation calculations would 
improve reporting quality. Finally, the investigation of impairment disclosures in 
chapter 6 could be extended by examining the extent to which companies are or are not 
complying with existing standards, and whether impairment disclosure requirements 
suffice to provide adequate transparency to financial statement users. 
7.3 GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT – CAUSES AND IMPACT:                
‘RESEARCH LESSONS LEARNT’ 
This thesis started as a project with the ultimate aim to improve understanding of the 
nature and the process of goodwill impairment. In order to achieve this, the researcher 
first explored large areas of research on goodwill impairment and a summary of this 
exploration is captured in the literature review in chapter 2. Starting to look at goodwill 
impairment at its ’visible end’, i.e. the impact of goodwill write-downs, the researcher 
noted that most previous studies had concentrated on shareholders’ reactions while 
lenders (and, in this context, also rating agencies) had largely been ignored. A 
preliminary testing on a potential study on the links between the debt market and 
goodwill impairment revealed that such an investigation was not easily performed. 
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While investors’ reactions were often being proxied using share price movements or 
questionnaires, lenders’ reaction was not readily available as most of the relevant 
documentation is not provided to the public. More specifically, in the case of rating 
agencies, there was no exact information about the rating assessment information. An 
attempt to interview rating agencies was not successful for the study, as – although one 
S&P employee would discuss the rating calculation unofficially with the researcher – 
they would not officially commit to providing information revealing the specifics of 
their procedures. These technical difficulties shifted the focus of the study on credit 
ratings and goodwill impairments from attempting to acquire information directly from 
the rating agencies to performing an independent investigation. Additionally, the 
researcher realised that such an independent investigation enjoys the benefits of 
exploring the transparency of the rating process which is important to end users of the 
credit rating. 
As the results of the first empirical study showed that raters are most likely to ignore 
goodwill and its write-downs in their annual analyses, another question emerged: were 
they correct in doing what they were doing? This thought led to further exploration of 
the sample. However, in this second study the research questions were raised at the 
‘invisible end’ of the impairment process: what were the reasons for the impairment 
charge? What was management communicating by reporting or avoiding impairment? 
Did impairment reflect ‘black-and-white’ information or did it include different shades 
of grey sub-reasons (‘if’ and ‘how much’ questions). In this way the second empirical 
study was tied to the first and could develop it further. Similar to the credit rating 
study, a qualitative investigation was considered at first but – due to the sensitive 
subjects of earnings management and managerial opportunism which were explored 
here – such an investigation did not appear appropriate. Therefore, a quantitative 
approach was selected.  
Nevertheless, the researcher found that quite a few questions remained unanswered 
after the second empirical study. Most of all, despite the research done in and before 
this thesis it still seemed unclear why companies do what they do (in terms of goodwill 
impairment). This idea led to the third study contained in chapter 6. In fact, asking the 
question ‘why’ led to two new paths of research which split chapter 6 into two parts. 
First, after two relatively large sample statistical studies it was becoming clear that the 
thesis might, after all, benefit from a change in methodology. In particular, as chapter 6 
was used to explore new aspects of goodwill impairment, a more in-depth case study 
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approach was adopted, primarily based on document analysis. This approach seemed 
particularly suitable, especially as methods such as interviews and questionnaires had 
to be discarded due to the sensitivity of the subject. Additionally, it did not seem 
anymore sufficient to ask why managers impaired goodwill. If there was managerial 
manipulation of goodwill, the question was also how it was done. This consideration 
led finally to the second part of chapter 6 which concentrates on discount rates. This 
part, however, while still remaining in the case study frame imposed on the whole 
chapter required a more quantitative approach to illustrate managerial opportunism in 
the discount rate calculation. 
In conclusion, it is noted that while this project started as an attempt to learn more 
about the effects and causes of goodwill impairment, in the course of time it has 
changed its direction several times in order to also question the methodology and 
variables used in previous impairment research. The motivation for each study (except 
for the first one which resulted from the literature review) was born in the conclusion 
phase of the previous one as each investigation led to a set of questions some of which 
were raised in the following ones while the rest was left to future research.  
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